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This thesis examines the identity construction of Kird/Zaza in Çewlig/Bingöl. It will 
track how the Kird/Zaza identity is being constructed, and who the main actors of this 
identity formation are. This research will also analyse how the political and cultural 
battle over Kird/Zaza identity has been conducted in Çewlig/Bingöl between 1980 and 
2015. Furthermore, it will examine how the Kird/Zaza identity is being constructed by 
different political actors and groups in Çewlig/Bingöl.  
 
This research argues that the process of ‘identifying’ the locals has begun by the 
Turkish state taking a direct position in identity politics. Since 1930s, the Turkish state 
has introduced the idea of ‘the Zazas are not Kurds’. This idea was opposed by the 
Kurdish movements’ counter-argument claiming that Zazas have always been one of 
the main pillars of Kurdishness. Since 1980s, the Zazas have initiated to become a 
subject group of these identity discussions that have been played over them. Thereby, 
the main timescale focus in this identity formation will be between 1980 and 2015. 
Thus, this research will, particularly, focus on the construction and consolidation of 
Kird/Zaza identity.  
 
The analyses of the thesis will be based on the case study analyses of the Kirdki/Zazaki-
speaking group in Çewlig/Bingöl. Besides, it will take Çewlig/Bingöl as its 
geographical study area. There are Zazaki and Kurmanji speaking groups as well as 
Sunni Muslim, and Alevis as religious groups in and surrounding areas of 
Çewlig/Bingöl. Therefore, it will also explore the neighbouring areas such as 
Dersim/Tunceli, Elazig, Diyarbakir and Mus to compare local identity dynamics. This 
research has been based on interdisciplinary approach, applying theories of political 
anthropology, cultural anthropology, political sciences, sociology, ethnicity and 
nationalism. This study will adopt qualitative research approaches and main aspects of 
qualitative research, such as interviews, observation, participant observation and 
discourse analysis are used in this research. Finally, the analysis of this thesis is 
accomplished through examination of various contemporary resources such as identity 
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Chapter 1: Introduction, Research Question, Methodology and 
Theoretical Framework 
As maintained by Michael M. Gunter, the Kurdish issue is currently at the centre of 
most of the political discussions in Turkey1. The ways in which Zaza/Kird2 identity is 
constructed and perceived by different political actors forms an important part of these 
discussions. The aim of this research is to explore the dynamics of contemporary 
Kird/Zaza identity construction in the area of Çewlîg/Bingöl in eastern Anatolia/Turkey 
or Turkish Kurdistan3. I will trace and analyse how the political and cultural battle over 
Kird/Zaza identity has been played out in Çewlig/Bingöl since 1980s until the present 
day, and how the Kird/Zaza identity is being constructed by different political actors 
and groups in Çewlig/Bingöl. My analyses will be based on the case study analyses of 
the Kirdkî/Zazakî-speaking group in Çewlig/Bingöl. This thesis does not classify itself 
in diaspora studies. This study does not aim to include the Kird /Zaza speakers in 
diaspora as one of the main identity subject group. However, it will cover how those in 
diaspora have played a role, especially in the first two decades from 1980. The majority 
of the intellectuals that played a role in the 1980s and 90s have returned to Turkey in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s following the democratisation process during the Turkey 
EU negotiations as part of Turkey’s EU membership. Furthermore, I will analyse ‘how 
the Kird/ Zazas of Çewlig/ Bingöl identify themselves in contemporary discussions of 
identity. The thesis will attempt to limit its analesis with Çewlig/ Bingöl mainly but in 
a dialogue with the other Zaza speaking city (Dersim/ Tunceli) and other towns of other 
surrounding cities.  
 
                                                 
1 Gunter, Michael M. `The Kurdish Problem in Turkey`, Middle East Journal, 42:3 (1988), 389-406.  
2 Kird is a term that the locals of Çewlig/ Bingöl use to identify themselves. Zaza is the version that the 
Turkish state prefers to use in an attempt to point out this group of people as different ethnicity from 
broather Kurdishness. Term Zaza has become the dominant one over decades and it is now the overall 
accepted version to identify this group of people internationally. The locals prefer to call their city Çewlig 
or Çewlik. This thesis will use both the local and the international version throughout the paper. This 
research suggests that one should respect the self-identifying of locals in their historical way of 
expression. 
3 Bingöl/Çewlîg is a city in Eastern Turkey. The city is surrounded by mountains and a large number 
of glacier lakes, hence the name (Turkish for a thousand lakes). Bingöl is the centeral name of Bingöl 
province. It is one of the 81 provinces of Turkey currently. Cewlig/Bingol was announced as an 
administrative city in 1936 and was named Capakcur. In 1946, the administrave name was changed from 
Capakcur to Bingol.  Çewlig/ Bingöl’s neighbouring provinces 
are Tunceli, Erzurum, Muş,  Diyarbakır, Erzincan and Elazığ. The majority of the province's population 
is Kurdish Zazaki, for more about the history, geography and socio-political and cultural compositon of 
the people of Bingöl/Çewlîg,  




Turkey, between Europe and the Middle East, comprises a plethora of ethnicities and 
minority groups. There is, however, very little official data about many of its main 
minorities4. The Zazas are one such group: a Kurdish group of people speaking the Zaza 
dialect, and living as a distinct community in the eastern Anatolian provinces, or the 
‘Kurdistan’ region, of Turkey.5 Although originally the territories of today’s Turkish 
republic used to hold many diverse groups of different ethnicities and religions, this 
area has been assembled into one nation state.6 As Andreopoulos mentions, since the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the state ideology has been based on the 
notion of one nation, one flag, and onenation (tek devlet, tek millet, tek bayrak). This 
policy of nation building in Turkey resulted in a comprehensive policy of assimilation 
enforced by Turkish nationalist having Ataturk7 as their leader. In Latif Tas’ words as 
part of the national-state building process;  
 
Attempts were made to transform the vibrant diversity of the early and mid-Ottoman periods 
into a monolithic identity. In the pursuit of ‘One language, one identity, one nation, one flag 
(tek dil, tek kimlik, tek millet, tek bayrak), many different reports between the 1920s and 1940s 
proposed various assimilation policies… The assimilation policies cost many individual lives 
and divided many Kurdish families. The state incurred huge debts and deep divides were 
created between communities. Some Kurds surrendered while others chose to erect barriers and 
retreat quietly behind them8. 
 
The creation of the new state has resulted in the Kurds living within a nation, which, 
up until 1991, not only banned Kurdish names, but also restricted the practical use of 
Kurdish language. This has, contrary to other ethnicities in Turkey, resulted in the 
growth of Kurdish nationalism, which has grown in response to the official state policy 
                                                 
4 For more information of the minority statues, particularly the statues and civil rights and challenges of 
the ethnonational and religious communities in Turkey  
See: Kaya, Mehmed S. The Zaza Kurds of Turkey: A Middle Eastern Minority in a Globalised Society, 
London: I. B. Tauris, 2011. 
5 Arakelova, Victoria. The Zaza People as a New Ethno-Political Factor in the Region, Iran & the 
Caucasus, 3:4 (1999/2000), 397-408 
6 Andreopoulos, G. J. Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1997, p. 11. 
7  Mustafa Kemal Pasha who was an army commander during the late Ottoman era became the 
charismatic leader of Turkish Liberation Movement during the fight against the allied power of WW1 
and founded the Republic of Turkey as the founder president in 1923. By Surname law introduced in 
1934, Mustafa Kemal was honoured with Ataturk (means Ancestor of Turks) for his surname by the 
Turkish Parliament.  
8 Tas, Latif.  Legal Pluralism in Action: Dispute Resolution and the Kurdish Peace Committee, Routledge, 




of ‘Turkification.’9 Led from 1923 to 1938 by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, later known as 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the new Republic sought a homogenous state with a single 
Turkish identity, despite the fact that today’s Turkey is home to the largest number of 
ethnic Kurds in the region,10 who constitute around twenty per cent of the population.11 
This policy of Turkey challenged and located the Kurdish identity and identity 
formation in a hard position. Mesut Yegen describes the condition of enforcing 
Turkification as following; 
[The] Kurds were considered as outside of the circle of Turkishness, and were left 
subject to the discriminatory practices of citizen ship. In general, however, Kurds have 
been regarded as a part of the circle of Turkishness and have been subject to intense 
Turkification. In other words, the idea that Kurds are prospective-Turks has worked 
almost as a meta-image during the Republican period.12 
 
The province of Çewlîg/Bingöl borders with Elaziğ, Dersim/Tunceli, Erzincan, 
Erzurum, Muş and Diyarbakır. These areas are within the two administrative regions of 
Eastern Anatolia and South-Eastern Anatolia. Çewlîg/Bingöl is mainly populated by 
Kirdkî/Zazakî speakers13, predominantly Sunni Muslims14, but there is also a small 
number of Alevis15 in the areas situated in the vicinity of Dersim/Tunceli and Erzincan 
provinces, who make up around 15% of the population of Çewlig/Bingöl, according to 
unofficial estimates. There are also a small number of Kurmanji speakers in this area, 
who make up around 20% of the population of Çewlig/Bingöl.16 This study does not 
aim to discuss on linguistic aspect of the field extensively as that field is a vast one, 
which would need a focus in primarily linguistic field. There are discussions whether 
Zazaki should be classified as a dialect of Kurdish or as a separate language and it helps 
in shaping of this identity formation process. The dominant argument is that Zazaki is 
a dialect of Kurdish. However the Turkish State have begun to advocate for Zazaki 
                                                 
9 McDowall, David. A Modern History of the Kurds, New York, I.B. Tauris, 2004, p. 127. 
10 Van Bruinessen, Martin, Agha Sheikh and State, London & New Jersey, 1992, p. 14 
11 As no official census has been conducted in Turkey regarding the number of Kurds living there. This 
was parallel to the idea that as far as the state was concerned Kurds were simply ‘mountain Turks’. 
12 Yegen, Mesut. `Prospective-Turks or "Pseudo-Citizens, Kurds in Turkey`, Middle East Journal, 63:4 
(2009), 597-615. 
13Paul, White. Ethnic Differentiation among the Kurds:  Kurmancî, Kizilbash and Zaza,  
http://members.tripod.com/~zaza_kirmanc/research/paul.htm (Last accessed 26 April 2017). 
14 Sunni is a Muslim sect, and majority of population in Turkey is Sunni. 
15 Alevi means followers Ali, one of the four main caliphs after Prophet Mohammed’s era. There are 
both Kurdish and Turkish Alevis live in Turkey. 




being a separate language lately. As there are different judgements about what are the 
limits of a dialect or a language in the world over all. Acccording to many Zazaki should 
be branded as one the Kurdish dialects. Nevertheless, there are also some small-scaled 
discussions that Zazaki could be a language on its own. This is a rather complex issue 
and therefore this thesis will not take a decisive position but rather will benefit from the 
arguments around it. 
 
 
Map 1: Map of Turkey, Source: Turkish Ministry of Education.  
Map 1 illustrates that Turkey is divided into seven main administrative regions, as 
following (clockwise); Doĝu Anadolu Bölgesi/Eastern Anatolia region (big majority of 
the Zaza population live in this region, including the two main Zaza provinces: 
Çewlig/Bingl and Dersim/Tunceli), Southeastern Anatolia (there are several towns in 
this region that have a considerable number of Zaza population, e.g., Lice, Hani, Hazro, 
Çermik, Egil, Dicle, Siverek, Gerger, etc.). Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi/South-eastern 
Anatolia Region, Akdeniz Bölgesi/Mediterranean Region, Ege Bölgesi/ Aegean 
Region, Marmara Bölgesi/Marmara Region, Karadeniz  Bölgesi/ Black Sea Region 
and İçanadolu Bölgesi/ Mid- Anatolia Region (that is in centre of all regions, coloured 
in blue). Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia Regions are manily Kurdish 
populated and referred as Turkish Kurdistan, Kurdistan region of Turkey or Bakur 
(means North in Kurdish terminology in referenece to the Greater Kurdistan.  The other 
regions of the Greater Kurdistan are: Bashur/Southern, Rojhelat/Eastern and 
Rojava/Western), that are used by the Kurdish nationlists and the non-Turkish 





Map 2 shows the main areas where the Zaza (Kird, Kirmanj, Dimili) people live.  
There are only two provinces in Turkey where mainly populated by the Zaza. Those 
provinces are Çewlig/Bingöl and Dersim/Tunceli. The ‘red highlighted’ area indicates 
the mainly populated region of Zaza inhabited areas. There are also some towns of other 
cities in the region that are majorly populated by the Zazas in this red highlighted area 
of the map. Due to the lack of ethnicity information of Turkish Census Survey, the 
certain number of Zaza population is unknown.   
 
 
Map 3, Mehrdad Izady's language distribution map of Kurdish languages. Mehrdad Izady 1998.  
The purple highlighted areas of above map indicate the Zaza populated cities, towns 





1.1 A Brief Definition of Kirds/Zazas 
Although the word Zaza, which was historically used in Elaziğ17 province, has become 
the dominant name for this group of people, there are three other names for them 
depending on which area is being referred to.18 Since the main area of this research is 
Çewlîg/Bingöl, for an in-depth study of identity dynamics locally, I will refer to them 
the way they name themselves in Çewlîg/Bingöl – Kird, with the language or dialect 
they speak accordingly called ‘Kirdkî’. The word ‘Kird’ was largely unknown 
internationally until recently, as not only were the Kirds/Zazas hidden from view, but 
also Kurdishness itself was hidden in Turkey until the 1960s. Although certain 
prominent researchers such as Malmisanij and Ihsan Espar suggest otherwise, 
Zaza/Zazakî has become the accepted term to identify this group of people 
internationally.19 Moreover this word is becoming dominant one to use due to the 
Turkish state’s promotion in favour since the it has all the state institutions and media 
means to use as tools. The state prefers this version- Zaza as it does not contain any 
linguistic similarity or reference to Kurdishness as oppose to other three versions Kird, 
Kirmanc and Dimilî. Therefore, this version (Zazaki and Zazas) will be used in this 
study when the group is mentioned as a whole, and Kird(ki)/Zaza(ki) will be used in 
discussion of the smaller area of Çewlig/Bingöl.20 Even though Zazas did not mobilise 
politically until the 1980s, there was always a distinct Kird/Zaza-ness in Çewlîg/Bingöl, 
both socially and geographically. Moreover, starting in the 1980s, there has been an 
identity-focused movement, claiming that Zazas have their own position in identity 
discussions of the region. This could be regarded as the ‘third’ position in reaction to 
‘Turkishness’ and even to ‘Kurdishness’.  
 
                                                 
17 Elazig is a province, located on the west border of Çewlig/ Bingöl. It was historically majorly Zaza 
populated but vastly assimilated in the 20th century and became stronghold of Turkish Nationalism. 
18 There are four different ways to call the subject group of people for this study. These are Kird/Kirdkî 
(In Çewlîg/Bingöl and most towns of Diyarbakir where Kirdkî is spoken); Kirmanc/Kirmanckî (in 
Dersim, Erzincan and Varto - Muş); Dimilî/Dimilkî (in Siverek- Urfa, Gerger- Adiyaman Çermik and 
Çüngüş- Diyarbakir); and Zaza/ Zazakî(in Elaziğ province).  
19 Andrews, Peter. Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey, Reichert, 2002. 
20 Interview conducted with Malmisanij, who is considered an expert on the language and political 
aspects of the Kirdî/Zazakî, on 23th September 2011, he suggested this himself and the standardizing 
group for Zazakî dialect not really sure what you mean here. Vate would strongly recommend that one 
should avoid using the term Zaza to name this group, since that is what the Turkish state would prefer 




The 1980s coincides with the trend in many other countries regarding the rise of local 
identities.21 Elise Massicard argues that there was a trend in demands over identity. 
Particularly the Kurds and the Islamists wanted their differences to be recognised by 
the Turkish state.22 Since the 1990s, the Zazas have not been as invisible in the identity 
politics as before. The most obvious proof of this is that the Turkish state makes 
reference 23 to them more often, and the Kurdish movement regards them as a dynamic 
power group within the movement.24 
  
Çewlîg/Bingöl is one of the 81 cities in Turkey, located in Eastern Anatolia, one of 
seven administrative regions. Together with South-Eastern Anatolia, the region is also 
called Turkish Kurdistan. It is a mountainous area where the way of traditional 
subsistence is pastoralism. Çewlîg/Bingöl was once a rural area, which was declared a 
city only after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, in 1936. In the 1945, the 
administrative name of Çabakçur was changed to Bingöl as the part of the 
Turkification25 of place names. It is worthy to mention that the preferred local name for 
Bingöl is Çewlîg, which will be used alongside Bingöl throughout this thesis. The 
demographic picture of Çewlîg/Bingöl contains several sub-identities both on religious 
and linguistic levels. There is the majority of Sunni Zazas, but also Alevi Zazas, and 
Sunni/Alevi Kurmanj inhabitants26. One of the main reasons that encouraged me to 
undertake this research is the fact that Çewlîg/Bingöl holds all these micro identity 
features. 
 
Unlike most other areas in Turkey, there are no Turkic tribes or people who speak 
Turkish as their mother language in Çewlîg/Bingöl province. I would like to examine 
the multiple processes of identity construction and of “Kirdki/Zaza-ness”, in 
                                                 
21 Fearon, James D. and Laitin, David D., `Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity`, 
International Organization 54:4, (2000), 845–877. 
22 Massicard, Elise. The Alevis in Turkey and Europe: Identity and Managing Territorial Diversity, New 
York, Routledge, 2013, p. 2. 
23 Zazalar kimdir? Kürt mü, Türk mü, ayrı bir millet mi?,  
https://www.timeturk.com/tr/2012/12/22/zazalar-kurt-mu-turk-mu-ayri-bir-millet-mi.html  
(Last accessed 12 May 2016). 
24  Wilgenburg, van Wladimir. Is Ankara Promoting Zaza Nationalism to Divide the Kurds? 
https://jamestown.org/program/is-ankara-promoting-zaza-nationalism-to-divide-the-kurds/  
(Last accessed 27 July 2017). 
25 Jongerden, Joost. `Crafting Space, Making People: The Spatial Design of Nation in Modern Turkey`, 
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 10, (2009), 2- 20. 
26 Kaya, Mehmed S. The Zaza Kurds of Turkey: A Middle Eastern Minority in a Globalised Society, 




Çewlîg/Bingöl in particular. Currently, there are three main views on Kird/ Zaza origins 
among people in Çewlîg/ Bingöl, which are used to identify them both by themselves 
and the ‘outsiders’: firstly it is claimed that Zazas were originally a Turkic tribe (this 
the formal Turkish state’s discourse used since the 1930s which seems to have gain 
some support mainly in Elazig province). Secondly, it is argued that, Zazas are neither 
Turks nor Kurds but a separate people. Finally, Kirds/ Zazas are a Kurdish identity 
group who speak one of the main dialects of the Kurdish language. These three main 
views currently still dominate the academic and political discussions around the 
Kurdish issue debates. The research will also focus on the historical aspect of the 
Zazakî-speaking Çewlîg/ Bingöl area’s political and cultural characteristics and trends 
under the Republic of Turkey. 
 
The Turkish state, beginning in the 1930-40s, has claimed that the Zazas are not Kurds 
as part of its political programme. 27  In response to this, the Kurdish national 
movement28 argued that Zazas were indeed a sub-group within the Kurdish nation. In 
these early decades, the Zazas were only the objects of this political conflict, in which 
they did not have much say in the construction of their own identity. It was only in 
the1980s that the Zazas themselves started to take part in becoming the subject in this 
identity formation process, a rather tense issue in Turkey that has ultimately resulted in 
armed conflict. Until the Zazas themselves became an active component in the 
diametric identity construction of being Kurds or not being Kurds, they did not separate 
between one or the other.29 With the Zazas as the third subject group of the rapidly 
shifting identity construction process in Çewlîg/Bingöl, the avenues of expression of 
local identity have now become much more diverse. 
 
This thesis will critically analyse the ways in which the Kird/Zaza and/or the Kurdish 
identity have been politicised in the Republic of Turkey, as part of the conflict between 
the state and the Kurdish movement(s). 30  This condition put the Kird/Zaza in an 
extraodrdinary challenged position where according to Krisztin Kehl‐Bodrogi;’ 
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28 There are a number of Kurdish groups in history of modern Turkey. They are refered as Kurdish 
Movement as a whole. 
29 Interview with Mehmed Selim Uzun, during the field trip in Sweden. 2011.  
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Throughout this century, the Zazas have been the subject of two competing political 
ideologies. Both Kurdish and Turkish nationalists still lay claim to the Zaza as a 
constituent part of the Kurdish and, respectively, Turkish nation. However, both 
ideologies define ‘nation’ as an entity of people having common language, cultural and 
historical origins. This means that claims to the Zazas deny their distinct ethno-linguistic 
position.31 
 
Furthermore, it will question whether there ever was one homogenous Kurdish identity 
including the Kird/Zaza group. Although scholars such as Van Bruinessen and Tezcür 
have suggested otherwise, most of the literature regarding Kurdishness in Turkey 
presents the Kurds as one unified entity.32 Therefore, the analyses laid out in this thesis 
will focus on the Kurdish identity as a whole, including the Kird/Zazas, until the late 
1970s. The thesis will aim to explore the reasons why some Kirds/Zazas have been 
ethno-nationally mobilised within Kurdishness, whilst others respond more to religious 
and/or social rhetoric, which can be regarded in the context of the whole of the Kurdish 
region in Turkey. The research will therefore explore two aspects of identity and/or 
identity mobilisation in the region. These are the ethno-national identity and the 
religious identity.33 
 
The local identity of Çewlîg/Bingöl is ‘an object’ identity for what appears to be a 
political identity struggle between the Turkish state (Turkishness) and the Kurdish 
movement (Kurdishness) from the 1980s. With the 1980 army coup, the dynamics in 
politics shifted majorly. In the conservative cities like Çewlîg/Bingöl, the new political 
parties such as the Motherland Party (ANAP), the True Path Party (DYP), and the 
Welfare Party (RP)34 have become the main political/institutional parties in this shift of 
                                                 
one hand used the policy on full annihilation of the Kurdish identity and their struggle for improving 
their rights of equal citizenship, on the other hand the state through different polities attempt to 
manipulate and divide the Kurds (Kurmanji, Alevei and Zazaki).    
31 Kehl-Bodrogi, Krisztina. `Kurds, Turks, or a people in their ownright?  Competing collective identities 
among the Zazas`, The Muslim World, 89:3,4 (1999). 439-454. cited in p. 444. 
32  Wilgenburg, van Wladimir. Is Ankara Promoting Zaza Nationalism to Divide the Kurds? 
https://jamestown.org/program/is-ankara-promoting-zaza-nationalism-to-divide-the-kurds/  
(Last accessed 27 July 2017). 
33 This is not to argue that the regional identity is limited only to the above-mentioned main aspects; 
several other possible sub-identities, such as gender and class identities, are omitted from the research. 
34 ANAP and DYP were central right political parties who had different times of forming governments 
as single party and took part in coalition party governments for two decades following the 1980 Turkish 
Army Coup. RP was a religious party who had a religious ideology. It took part in coalition governments 




political features.35 Therefore, the two main areas of focus of this thesis will be on 
ethnic identity and religious identity. The linguistic aspect will mainly remain in the 
ethnic identity area, and sometimes will overlap with the domain of religious identity. 
Furthermore, the other sub-identities, such as gender identity, clan identity and social 
class identities will remain secondary in these analyses. 
 
The analysis will begin in 1925, when the first major Kurdish revolt took place in the 
history of the Turkish Republic36, and it will conclude with the local elections of March 
2014. The time selection will serve one main purpose, which is indeed to focus on the 
Kirdkî/Zazakî identity. If there is a differentiation between Kird/Zazas and the Kurds, 
it is likely that the first identity arguments could be connected to the 1925 Sheikh Said 
revolt, which took place in the studied region. Even though some Sunni Kirds/Zazas 
argue that the Sheikh Said revolt did not receive enough support from other parts of the 
Kurdish areas in Turkey, or even from the Zaza Alevis and/or Sunni Kurmanjs37, the 
pattern of the development in this period provides with events and evidences that 
showing further politicization and institutionalisation of the political mobilisation of 
the Kurdish ethnic-national identity, especially from the 1970s and until the present. 
For the phenomenon of Kirdkî/Zazaness, this study will work from the hypothesis that 
such mobilisation started only in the 1980s and onwards. Furthermore, it will be argued 
that the 1980s witnessed the new phenomenon of the Zazas, when they themselves 
became active subjects of Zaza identity construction. 
 
The other major revolt which is often referred to, is the 1937-1938 Dersim uprising, 
which was led by the Alevi Zaza Seyyid Riza from Dersim.38 This revolt is often used 
to claim that no unified political aim exists to hold the Kurds or Zazas together as a 
nation. For instance this issue has been highlighted through Mehmet Orhan’s study of 
the Kurdish movement in Turkey contemporary to the time of the formation of the 
Turkish republic. Orhan refers to the lack of a common political claim since the Seyyid 
                                                 
35 Interview conducted with an Imam of a mosque in Solhan, a town of Çewlîg/Bingöl. August 2012. 
36 Olson, Robert. The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925, 
Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991.  
37  O’Shea, Maria Theresa. Trapped between the Map and reality, Geography and Perceptions of 
Kurdistan, New York: Routledge, 2004. p. 38. 
38 Dersim or by its Turkified name Tunceli is the other majorly Zaza populated province along with 
Çewlig/ Bingöl. Vast majority of it is Alevi and it holds a Kurmanji speaking population too. Dersim 




Riza’s revolt suffered from lack of integrity related to including/gathering the different 
actors and section of the Kurdish movement under the same roof.39 
As with Sheikh Said’s movement, some Dersimi Zazas and Turkish state officials often 
point out that Seyyid Riza’s Dersim uprising received hardly any support from Sunni 
Zazas or the Kurds in general.40 David McDowall asserts that the Sunni Zazas and Alevi 
Zazas did not support the two mentioned revolts as a national movement.41 One could 
argue that the lack of support from different fractions for the two revolts should not be 
judged with today’s context. It could be argued that the lack of communication in those 
times was an important difficulty for any plotical mobilisation. It was difficult to send 
any ‘dangerous’ message due to the state’s security structure. Furthermore, both of the 
revolts began without a proper organisation, and the short durations of each revolt, 
could be counted as strong reasons why they did not garner wider support and why they 
failed to succeed.42 
 
For the majority of Sunni Kirds/Zazas and Kurds, supporting a Kurdish political 
movement(s) became a way of showing opposition to the Kemalist regime of the 
Turkish state, which existed until the 1960s, when conservative parties seized the power 
from the Republican People’s Party, in Turkish Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, (CHP).43 
Thus, this period represents a critical time in the identity formation of the Kurds in 
Turkey in general44. The secular party CHP, which was founded by Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk, formed single party governments until 1950, but the secular face of state 
controlled the state burocracy for a further period after the single party era. The secular 
dominant era was a considerably easier period for Alevi population in Turkey for their 
religious identity. However, a liberal environment had begun after 1950s when the 
conservative Democrat Party (DP) won the first multi- party elections in 1950. 
Although DP formed a single party government in 1950, the state burocracy was still 
vastly controlled by the secular state institutions such as army, education, and judiciary. 
The Turkish Army and Judicary have always been dominant in Turkish state structure. 
                                                 
39 Orhan, Mehmet, `Kurdish Rebellions and Conflict Groups in Turkey during the 1920s and 1930s`, 
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 32:3 (2012), 339-358. 
40 Sevgen, Nazmi. Zazalar ve Kizilbaşlar, Ankara, Kalan Publications, 2003. 
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These Kemalist Turkish Army and Judicary system were harsly reactionary towards 
anything or any group that risked the Kemalist regime and the ‘unity of Turkish Nation’. 
Furthermore, they reacted harsh against the Kurdish Movements’ mobilisation attemts. 
Therefore it was difficult for the Kurdish political groups to mobilise. From 1960s and 
70s some conservative and non-secular Kurdish groups begun to affiliate with the 
conservative governments in Turkey. This considerably freer period in Turkey’s history 
led to many previously silent groups such as Kurdish Movement’s freactions and 
Turkish leftist groups, who opposed the state, to develop a form of oppositional fronts. 
The state reacted to the strong opposition by force, and the army took control with a 
coup in 1980.45 
 
Finally, the period from the 1980s to the current day has witnessed a noticeable 
transition in the politics of Turkey. After the military coup of 1980, which led firstly to 
a period of security policies, a new stage for political Islamic and conservative parties 
to grow in Turkey has opened. The election of Turgut Özal in 1983, the charismatic 
prime minister who was internationally recognised as a liberal politician, opened the 
way for a sizeable number of Islamic parties to come into the mainstream political 
arena.46 Under the banner of Islamic unity it has become easier to mobilise a large 
number of Kurds, who had disregarded the state for decades. This can be clearly 
observed in Çewlîg/Bingöl, and also for the majority of Sunni Zazas in Turkey. On 25th 
February 1994, in a political campaign speech in Bingöl, Necmettin Erbakan, the leader 
of the Islamic party the Welfare Party, stressed that ‘Kurds should not have to say we 
are Turks, they should be able to stress their ethnic identity which indeed is Kurdish’.47 
Erbakan’s aim here was to assert Muslim unity as the primary identity and, at least in 
the Kurdish region, to convince the citizens that ethnicity is either not important, or 
comes after religious identity. Before the 1990s, publically identifying oneself as being 
a Kurd led to an automatic exclusion from legal politics, but with the rise of Islamic 
parties on the political scene, Kurds could find legitimate commonality under the 
inclusive idea of a Muslim brotherhood. Religious parties such as the Welfare Party 
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(RP), the Felicity Party (SP) and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), all 
institutionally found a way of using religious identity in gaining Kurdish support. After 
the decades of oppression following the Sheikh Said revolt, this was an exit strategy for 
the Çewlîg/Bingöl area of Sunni Muslim inhabitants. On the other hand, the same 
period also witnessed a revival of the Alevi identity, which has led Alevi Kurds to 
question their identity, as well as raising questions of loyalty to the state and to the 
Kurdish movement. This, as a result, positioned some Alevis closer to the Kurdish 
Movement and others closer to the Republican Peoples Party (CHP) or secular state 
ideology.48 
 
There are several reasons for choosing to focus on the ethnic and religious identities. 
As in this case linguistic identity overlaps on both of the identity markers in various 
ways, it prevents the linguistic identity from being identified as the third marker, but 
rather a factor that finds itself in both of the main identity markers above. Firstly, for 
the Kurds in 20th Century, ethnicity has proven to be a powerful political commodity, 
as the Turkish state focused on applying the assimilation policy to diminish all 
ethnicities other than Turks. As maintamend by Ahmet Icduygu; 
the Turkish-Kurdish conflict has caused an international division in Turkish society which arose 
from the Kurdish question during the republican period in response to aggressive assimilation 
towards Kurdish minorities, the dominance of Turkish culture and identity and the dismissal of 
Kurdish identity.49 
 
As the aggressive policy that deployed by the Turkish state reveals the Kurds were the 
principal objects to this policy. The state did not tolerate the other ethnic groups to 
promote their linguistic and cultural rights. In fact, it applied a harsh and direct 
assimilation policy towards the other ethncies rather than Turkish-ness to establish its 
so-called unity. This can be attributed to the fact that Turkey is an ethnically diverse 
nation state in which the state has displayed intolerance towards the non-Turk 
ethnicities, which is indoctrinated in state policy.50 As a reaction to this intolerance, the 
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Kurds began to seek a way to form their own nation/ethnic identity following the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic51. The very nature and history of Turkish politics 
have allowed the politics of ethnicity to take centre stage rather late for the Kurds. 
Moreover, this still continues to form an unwavering point of reference for the other 
ethnic groups of Turkey. Furthermore, following both the WWI and WWII, the trends 
of ethnic identities and nation/nation state building influenced the Kurds to seek to 
follow this trajectory.  
 
The history of Zaza and Kurdish in ethnicity relations ground has been in conflict with 
the new Turkish state since the Sheikh Said revolt in 1925.52 With the arrival of the 
socialist wave’s effects in the region from the 1960s to the1970s, the hopes of gaining 
ethnic rights for the Kurds were boosted once again. The Kurdistan Workers Party 
(PKK)’s arrival on the political stage in the late 1970s, which tended to tolerate the 
minor identities within ‘Turkish Kurdistan’ territories, led the sub-identity groups to 
form their own institutions. On the other hand the publications on identity, ethnicity 
and nationalism, together with the new media means have helped to bring to light the 
struggles of the Kirds/ Zazas in Çewlig/ Bingöl and other parts of Turkey. They also 
served another purpose, namely the collectivisation of the Kurdish identities and 
particularly the Zaza identity. As such there are continual references to the Kird/ Zaza, 
Sunni-Zaza, Alevi-Zaza, Zaza- Kurd, Kurdish, Turkish citizen identities. Furthermore, 
Kurdishness in the sense of a greater Kurdistan has become an attractive goal among 
the Kurds. 
 
This line of research not only reaffirms ethnic differentiation, but also does not ignore 
the most fundamental questions regarding the nature of the ethnic identity, which in 
this case are:  
- Who are we? 
- What makes us who we are? 
- What is it like to be us in a nation state that takes its name from another ethnic group? 
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All the above questions will be dealt with in reference to studies on identity, especially 
those that have a special focus on Turkey and Kurds, such as studies by Mehmet M. 
Kaya, Cengiz Güneş, Denise Natali, Henri J. Barkey, Michael M. Gunter, Ömer 
Taşpinar and Lois Whitman. 
It is simply not enough to study the politics of ethnicity in Turkey; this is a well-trodden 
path and can offer very little to the ongoing debates regarding the nature of ethnicity. 
To find out what it means to be a Kird/Zaza or Kurd to the people of the Kurdish areas 
in Turkey, there needs to be a deconstruction of the Turkish and Kurdish ethnic identity. 
In regards to Çewlîg/Bingöl, it can be said that there are several identities which can be 
identified locally/nationally in Turkey, and internationally. For instance as held by 
Krisztin Kehl‐Bodrogi “the lack of a common ethnicity among the Zazaki-speaking 
population is evident even in the lack of a common ethnonym”.53 These are: Zazas that 
are happy to express themselves as Turks when they are outside the context of 
Çewlîg/Bingöl; Kirds/Zazas that express themselves with a sense of Zazaness as a 
people on its own; and Kirds/Zazas who see themselves as part of Kurdishness and 
acknowledge Kirdki/Zazakî as a dialect of Kurdish alongside the other dominant dialect, 
Kurmanjî.54 Furthermore, political Islam has become an identity factor in the last two 
decades in Çewlig/Bingöl. All of the above mentioned groups could be regarded as a 
part of the new phenomenon of identity construction in the region. This new 
phenomenon of identity is due to the Turkish state’s attempts to implement a sense of 
Turkishness, and, as a reaction to this, the Kurdish movement’s counter-argument, 
which stresses that Zazas are Kurds.  Furthermore, Zazas have themselves entered the 
stage to claim that they are their own identity makers since the 1980s.55 
 
By looking specifically at how these identities have been politically mobilised by both 
the Turkish state and those who react to or resist it from the Kurdish side, it is almost 
impossible to ignore the current efforts of the locals for becoming the constructors of 
contemporary identity. One should bear in mind that the trend of discussions of identity 
arrived in the region later than in the modern or the Western World. After all, it is only 
from the 20th Century onwards to see it is obvious through the scope of ethnicity that 
the politics of languages, gender, class and religion have been negotiated in the region. 
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To this end the thesis project will contain a detailed discussion on debates surrounding 
ethnicity in Turkey. Following that, there will be specific definitions of the Zaza(ki) 
language, social class, gender and religious identities. The research project aims to 
make a significant contribution to the existing debates regarding who the Zazas are 
within the Kurdish struggle in Turkey and in Turkey’s colourful ethnic diversity.  
 
1.2 Research Question  
The aim of this research is to explore the dynamics of contemporary Kird/Zaza identity 
construction in the area of Çewlîg/Bingöl in Eastern Anatolia/Turkey or Turkish 
Kurdistan. In order to do this, an examination of how the political and cultural battle 
over Zaza identity is played out in Çewlig/Bingöl will be undertaken, with a particular 
focus on the role that Kird/Zazas play in the process themselves. Thus, the key research 
question that will be asked in this thesis is:  
How is the Kird / Zaza identity constructed by different actors in 
Çewlig/Bingöl?  
In addition to this there will also be an analysis of how the locals of Çewlig/Bingöl 
identify themselves in contemporary identity discussions of the region. The second 
research question which will be put forward in this thesis is, how have the local 




In order to answer these two main research questions, three main sub-
themes/questions will be investigated.  
1. Who are the actors in the battle over Kird/Zaza identity? To answer this 
question the role of three Zaza groups will be analysed; those who are pro-Turkish state, 
those who are pro-Kurdish movement and those who have a localist tendency, i.e. pro-
Zaza. 
2. How is the battle waged on the ground? In order to answer this question, the 
actions and methods of the varieties of three actors previously mentioned needs to be 
analysed and their daily discourse with regards to identity needs to be closely examined. 
3. Why has there been a recent surge in the battle over the Zaza identity? What 




to locals of Çewlig/ Bingöl residents’ perspective of the new identity trends, this study 
aims to shed a light on the Kid/ Zaza identity construction process. 
 
There is a need to address the reasons behind the recent surge in the distinct Kird/ Zaza 
identity and to inquire whether it was a result of political engineering by the Turkish 
state and/or Kurdish Nationalism, or an expression of a wider localist tendency that the 
world has witnessed since the second half of the 20th century. In order to answer this, 
an examination into the political advancements in Turkish Kurdistan due to the political 
struggle and global occurrences (such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU-
Turkey negotiations, and the end of Cold War) also has to be undertaken. Moreover, 
Turkey’s desire to become part of the Europian Union has lead to a democratisation 
process to a certain extend.  
 
The main research question of this thesis is concerned with the dynamics of 
contemporary identity construction in Çewlîg/Bingöl. In order to seek an answer to this 
overlying identity problem and/or to answer, “how have the locals became the 
contemporary identity constructors in Çewlîg/Bingöl and what are the outcomes of 
this”, several areas need to be examined. Furthermore, what is the motivation point for 
each of the three groups should also be looked at. This is important as there are links 
between the position of each group, either parallel with each other or in counter position 
one to another. The Turkish State backed group was the only advantaged group on the 
ground for some decades in its identity engineering process over the Zazas. The pro-
Kurdish Kird/ Zaza group gained a strong position following the empowerment of the 
Kurdish movement from late 1970s and onwards. And the third emerged group of pro- 
Zazas appeared with their so-colled third position that says they are neither Turkish nor 
Kurdish.  
 
Firstly, to examine the historical path to the Çewlîg/Bingöl local identity, the thesis will 
aim to explore the question of when and how did the modern Kird/Zaza identity of 
Çewlîg/Bingöl emerge, and what are the dynamics of its construction. As part of this, 
several factors need to be considered, for instance, who the actors in this formation are, 
and what its components are. The issue will be addressed through looking at the 




construction. Also, it will examine the roles of insiders and outsiders 56  from the 
Çewlîg/Bingöl perspective of Kird/Zaza identity.  
 
Secondly, to elaborate on the ‘cultural actors’ of the Çewlîg/Bingöl ethnic picture, the 
question of identifying the main cultural characteristics of the Kirdkî/Zazakî speaking 
people and their ‘identity constructors’ in Çewlîg/Bingöl will be explored. To answer 
this, the local oral culture including music and folklore, and state and NGO institutions, 
will be investigated for signs of these particular characteristics. Furthermore, the study 
will explore the details of how this culture has evolved in recent times due to the process 
of political engineering.  
 
Finally, the question of the existence of a distinct Zaza nationalism will be dealt with. 
This could be argued within the framework of political nationalism versus a cultural 
nationalism.57 The project will compare this possibility with the tendencies of local 
identity of pro-Turkish or pro-Kurdish nationalisms. Altogether, by raising these 
questions about the numerous facets of ethnic identities, the project aims to allocate and 
define the local Kird/Zaza identity of Çewlîg/Bingöl.  
 
1.3 Conceptual Framwork 
Theoretical Approach to Identity Construction  
Different scholars, who have argued for the relevance of the self-definition of a nation, 
have concluded that a nation is imagined, invented or constructed. A nation has been 
depicted as an “imagined political community” that emerged with the development of 
print capitalism, which enabled vernacular languages to spread faster.58 Another similar 
approach argues that the nation depends on an “invention of tradition” by means of 
attempting to establish continuity with a “suitable historic past”.59 Moreover, a nation 
is defined as a product of nationalism, which in itself is the product of particular 
economic and social circumstances connected with the emergence of industrial 
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societies. In the Kurdish or Zaza case, similar factors can be identified in the creation 
of a Kird/Zaza ‘identity’.  
 
Both Anderson and Hobsbawm have said that a nation is constructed by certain elites. 
The elites are able to organise the masses. In other words, the masses appear to adhere 
to the national engineering of these elites. In addition to this, Anthony Smith argues 
that the creation of a nation actually involves the reconstruction of a past with which 
the masses must be able to identify.60 These views are in line with the views of Pierre 
Bourdieu’s theories on elite power and the naturalisation of a social field,61 and the 
structuration theory of Anthony Giddens.62 
My research will explore these theories further to provide a foundation for the analyses 
of identity and nation building in the Kird/Zaza case. 
 
Eric Hobsbawm defines ‘invented tradition’ as “a set of practices normally governed 
by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to 
include certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically 
implies continuity with the past”.63 Invented traditions are used by political institutions, 
ideological movements and groups to create foundations for their movements. 
Moreover, as Hobsbawm says: “all invented traditions, as far as possible, use history 
as a legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion”64. In other words, history 
becomes part of the founding knowledge for the ideology of the nation, state or political 
movement.65 This history is not what has actually been preserved in popular memory, 
but what has been “selected, written, pictured, popularized and institutionalized by 
those whose function it is to do so”.66 In the case of  Kird/Zaza identity, the Sheikh Said 
revolt, an event of capital importance for the Kird/Zaza, will be examined as one of the 
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most significant examples in showing how Hobsbawm’s ideas can apply in exploring 
how popular memory and official histories (Turkish, Kurdish, Zaza) may differ. 
Benedict Anderson, who labels nations as ‘imagined communities,’ also considers the 
concept of the nation as an ideological construction. He points out that, “regardless of 
the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always 
conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship”.67The construction of national or ethnic 
identity(-ies) in Çewlig/Bingöl also fits in the  above-mentioned view, so I will explore 
extensively the relevance of Benedict Anderson’s ideas to my own research. 
 
The work of Brass, who considers ethnicity and nationalism not as givens, but as social 
and political constructions, and who focuses on the mechanism of these constructions, 
is also applicable in terms of the aims of this study. Brass assumes that the rise of ethnic 
identities and their transformation into nationalism is not an inevitable process.68 In 
addition, he states that it is only possible to use cultural identities as a political tool 
under certain conditions. Ethnic conflicts do not arise from cultural differences but from 
a broader political and economic environment. Ethnic identities are a product of the 
process of an ethnic identity formation, and this process necessitates the very definition 
of the ethnic group and its social continuity. At this point, cultural practices of 
politicised ethnic groups become political resources for elites in the struggle for power 
and prestige.69 To return to Benedict Anderson, his idea of print capitalism is another 
argument that would fit in Kird/Zaza case. Printed materials70 were extensively used 
both by the Turkish state and the Kurdish movement in the identity ‘battle’ over 
Kird/Zazas. Especially, the Turkish state and its institutions have published bumerous 
books, magazines and propaganda leaflets aiming a direct assimilation policy. 
 
1.3.1 Ethnicity as an Identity Marker 
Much academic work has been conducted on the nature of ethnicity. Hutchinson and 
Smith’s definition of ethnic identity as “the individual level of identification with 
culturally defined collectivity, the sense on the part of the individual that he or she 
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belongs to a particular cultural community,”71 is generally repeated among scholars 
whose interests lay in the area. Kurds generally claim that they are decedents of the 
Medes,72 although this is the subject of much debate.73 For the Kurds, in reference to 
them being decedents of the Medes, Martin Van Bruinessen argues that, although there 
has been some continuity in the population of the area as a whole, there is not enough 
historical evidence to support this idea. He goes on, stating that it is not clear when a 
distinctly Kurdish identity emerged, although the ethnic label ‘Kurd’ was first 
encountered in Arabic sources from the first centuries of the Islamic era, referring to a 
specific group of pastoral nomads. The term was eventually used to describe a nomadic 
group speaking an Iranian language and inhabiting the mountainous region around Lake 
Van and Lake Urmia in the Causcasus 74 Over the years, these ‘Kurdish tribes’ 
encountered ‘Turkish nomads’, and tribal confederacies emerged.75 This does not imply 
that the argument of Van Bruinessen should be left unexamined and uncompared to the 
findings of my own fieldwork. The fact that Kurdish language and culture are still alive 
despite the documented repression and assimilation policies76 in their history is a strong 
indication that the social structure of tribal alliances has a solid foundation. Furthermore, 
the reason that the language and the culture are still alive despite repression might be 
attributed to the ‘closed’ and/or ‘close’ ties of tribal society among the Kurds in general. 
In addition to this, one could not draw a difference between Zazas and Kurmanjs or 
Kurds in this respect. This has been further compounded by the rise in Kurdish 
nationalist consciousness, where there is an increasing attempt by Kurdish nationalists 
to construct an ancient past in an attempt to make nationalist claims. This phenomenon 
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is not unique to the Kurds alone, and the Turkish state has adopted similar tactics. In 
other words, whole histories have been constructed to legitimise nationalist claims.77 In 
this respect, my study will also make use of the work of Frederick Barth, Thomas 
Hylland Eriksen and Jeffrelot & Dieckhoff. One could argue that the Kurds or Zazas 
follow a similar path to the Turkish state in ‘designing’ a national history of their own 
to use as a tool in a national identity formation. 
 
Rogers Brubaker’s central argument about the study of ethnicity and identity is that 
ethnic groups and formation of their identity should be treated as a processual, 
situational, relational and contextual dynamics of identification, and not as a marker 
signifying essential traits or indicating membership of static, internally homogeneous, 
externally bounded groups out there. This case could be applied in Kird/ Zaza case as 
there can be a shift between the three main Kird/ Zaza groups of identity groups in 
Çewlig/ Bingöl. Brubaker has expanded this view even further by attacking the cliched 
constructivism which dominates the analyses of cultural difference where one finds 
‘constructivist and groupist language casually conjoined' and where some academics 
are ridden by the tension of maintaining their scholarly cool headedness while 
simultaneously shifting to essentialist foundationalism that political mobilisation 
requires. 78  Although the considerably new identity process, Kird/ Zaza identity 
formation, could fall in the area of constructivism, Brubaker’s theory contributes 
greatly in this thesis.  
Highlighted by Brubaker the term identity is “richly-indeed for an analytical 
concept, [yet] hopelessly-ambiguous. But one can identify a few key uses”. Based on 
Brubaker’s categorization of the use of identity, this term (identity) can be understood 
as a basis for social and/or political action, and it is often opposed to "interest" in an 
effort to highlight and conceptualize noninstrumental modes of social and political 
action. Within such as conceptualization the term ‘identity’ is used “to underscore the 
manner in which action-individual or collective-may be governed by particularistic 
self-understandings rather than by putatively universal self-interest”.79  In the local 
identity arguments of Çewlig/ Bingöl often borrow these trended theories but not in an 
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academic style. Each of the three groups, especially the pro-Zaza group and the pro-
Kurdish group of local identities elites tend to make references to similar examples in 
the world. This is done to legitimize their identity position in the on-going identity 
discussions. 
Identity is understood as a specifically collective phenomenon denotes a 
fundamental and consequential "sameness" among members of a group or category. 
This sameness is expected to manifest itself in solidarity, in shared dispositions or 
consciousness, or in collective action. This usage is found especially in the literature on 
social movements 80 ; on gender; and on race, ethnicity, and nationalism. Political 
divisions in identity discussions play an important role in Middle Eastern societies. This 
misinterpretation of identity building process leads complex cases like Kird/ Zaza 
identity process. However the ‘sameness’ common ground that pointed out in 
Brubaker’s ideas still dominates importantly.  
Another usage of identity in the study of groups’ ethnic/national belonging and 
self-identification is that this concept is understood as a core aspect of (individual or 
collective) selfhood or as a fundamental condition of a social being. One would find a 
convincing ground to identify her/himself or on a collective level. In this context, 
identity is invoked to point to something allegedly deep, basic, abiding, or foundational. 
In this case, Brubaker asserts that identity is; 
Distinguished from more superficial, accidental, fleeting, or contingent 
aspects or attributes of the self, and is understood as something to be 
valued, cultivated, supported, recognized, and preserved. This usage is 
characteristic of certain strands of the psychological (or psychologizing) 
literature, especially as influenced by Erikson, though it also appears in 
the literature on race, ethnicity, and nationalism. Here too the practical 
and analytical uses of "identity" are frequently conflated.81 
Moreover, as an element of self-identification, identity is a product of social or political 
action, invoked to highlight ‘the processual, interactive development of the kind of 
collective self-understanding, solidarity, or-and "groupness" that can make collective 
action possible. In this usage, found in certain strands of the "new social movement" 
literature, "identity" is understood both as a contingent product of social or political 
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action and as a ground or basis of further action.82 This, in the example of Kird/Zaza 
identity process, could be interpreted within the pro-Kurdish group of identity 
component. This group functions in a social movement structure.  
According to Brubaker’s furthering categorization of ‘identity’ understood as the 
evanescent product of multiple and competing discourses, "identity" is invoked to 
highlight the unstable, multiple, fluctuating, and fragmented nature of the 
contemporary self. This usage is found especially in the literature influenced by 
Foucault, post-structuralism, and post-modernism (e.g., Hall 1996). In a somewhat 
different form, without the poststructuralist trappings, it is also found in certain strands 
of the literature on ethnicity-notably in "situationalist" or "contextualist" accounts of 
ethnicity.83 
In the words of Brubaker “strong conceptions of identity preserve the 
commonsense meaning of the term-the emphasis on sameness over time or across 
persons. And they accord well with the way the term is used in most forms of identity 
politics”.84 It can be concluded from Brubaker’s categorization of the term ‘identity’, 
that a: identity is something all people have, ought to have, or are searching for, b: 
identity is something all groups (ethnic, racial, or national) groups have, or ought to 
have, c: identity is something people/groups can have without being aware of it.85 In 
this perspective, identity is something to be discovered, and something about which one 
can be mistaken. Nevertheless, strong notions of collective identity, among 
people/groups imply strong notions boundedness and homogeneity. Within the 
existence of such a ‘strong’ sense of collectiveness/sameness, a clear boundary between 
inside and outside.86 Along with the above elements of identity, religion is another 
strong identifier, taking account the identity choices among Muslim societies of 
contemporary Turkey. The Kird/ Zaza identity case lays a relevant ground for this 
discussion. 
Despite the presence of a variety of ways of classification and categorization of 
identity and its formation form of identity it is important to bear in mind that one actor 
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more than others plays an important role in this regard. The state is the most dominating 
actor having a powerful ‘identifier’ along with its political agenda, especially in the 
nation state structure of the Middle East society. In Brubaker’s words “not because it 
can create "identities" in the strong sense in general, it cannot-but because it has the 
material and symbolic resources to impose the categories, classificatory schemes, and 
modes of social counting and accounting with which bureaucrats, judges, teachers, and 
doctors must work and to which nonstate actors must refer”.87 The Turkish State has 
always been the dominating power with all its state institutions regarding the identity 
issues. It is indeed an experienced Nation State that has assimilation policies in its one-
century history. Though, pointing the state as a powerful identifier does not mean absent 
of other actors and institutions. Some other actors too, including families, firms, social 
and national movements, would differently leave an identifier impact on individuals 
and groups’ identity and self-identification.88 
 
The social anthropologist Fredrik Barth is also relevant to this study due to his 
distinguished perspective on ethnic and national identity. Chiefly, Barth rejects the 
prevailing notion that describes ethnic groups rigid and bounded entities, formed 
through responses to ecological factors (primordialist bonds and biologically 
determined), and defined by territorial boundaries and objective cultural traits. Barth’s 
theoretical framework sets out a different perspective mainly based on the presence of 
the interconnectedness of ethnic identities and the continuity of ethnic groups.89 Barth’s 
(and some on other scholars of ethnicity and nationalism, e.g., Leach, Moerman, etc.) 
studies of identity and ethnicity provide the groundwork for what later become the 
‘constructivist’ approach' to identify. Mainly, Barth’s Ethnic Groups and Boundaries 
pays attention to people of communities that for different reasons and under different 
circumstances have changed their ethnic identity. In addition to this 
flexibility/changeability of identity within ethnic groups, as asserted by Barth, they are 
also capable of promoting their own, new cultural identity, even as their old identity is 
eroded.90 This angle of Barth’s theoretical work offers a parallel perspective to this 
paper. Although, in Kird/ Zaza identity formation, their old/ wider identity (Kurdish-
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ness) is not eroded, it still helps to understand the complex issue of this new identity 
process. In this case, it is mainly the state (Turkish) that appears on the stage that wants 
divide the Kirds/ Zazas from broader Kurdishness as part of their divide and rule 
policies.  
Concepts of ‘ethnic and inter-ethnic processes’ are among instrumental 
terminologies that Barth in his studies of identity within different ethnic groups in 
different parts of the world. These processes include the emergence, continuation, and 
change of inter-ethnic relations.91 Here, Barth contributes with a valuable stance to this 
thesis. Applying it to the Kird/ Zaza field, this identity process has reached to the stage 
two of the three pointed out by Barth above. It has passed the emergence stage and is 
exploring the stage two of continuation. Taking into account Barth’s models and 
conceptualization of identity within ethnic groups, it is identifiable that his three major 
and fundamental assertions on this topic has challenged the established anthropological 
conceptions of ethnicity. According to Barth; a: ethnicity is not defined by culture, but 
it is a social organisation, b: ethnic identifications are based on ascription and self-
identification, and therefore any change within it can be situationally dependent, and c: 
the roots of this social organisation are not cultural content but dichotomization, so that 
the ethnic boundary is a social boundary formed through interaction with ‘others’. 
However, despite the change and transition of identity and cultural features the ethnic 
group continues its existence via “continuing dichotomization between members and 
outsiders”.92 In this context what matters for the boundaries is “the assignment of 
particular social meanings to a limited set of acts”. In addition, establishment and 
maintenance of social controls and sanctions,  as some crucial elements of inter-ethnic 
relation depends on its relationship with other ‘ethnic groups', defined as ‘us’ and 
‘them’, in which inclusion of the first is tantamount to the exclusion of the second.93 
Along with its identity formation process, the ‘us’ and ‘other’ phenomena is also in the 
making in the Kird/ Zaza case. It is still in search of finding its shape and it is in a 
constant shift due to the main two political (Turkish State and Kurdish movement) 
players’ positions and political strengths and weaknesses.   
In the ethnic and inter-ethnic relation, language is a critical cultural feature that 
provides a revealing example that culture and ethnicity are interrelated but not 
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interchangeable concepts. According to many, the Zazaki is a dialect of Kurdish, which 
has certain differences, compared with general Kurdish language (other three main 
dialects of Kurmanji, Sorani and Hewrami). The language element is also used vastly 
both in an attempt of unifying the Zazas with Kurds or when arguing it is a different 
ethnic group with its own language.  
 
According to Barth ethnic groups are socially determined and socially constructed and 
the ethnic boundary is a social boundary. This articulation of ethnic gives reason to 
suggest ethnic identities to be relative and situational, dependent on different spheres 
of interaction and behavioral management.94 Assumed by Barth ethnicity is the product 
of specific kinds of inter-group relations. This interaction a product of a specific kind 
of need. Also, an ethnic group cannot exist in isolation, therefore its formation and 
continuation dependent on interaction with the ‘others’. This interaction with others can 
be counted as an element of ethnic processes.95 Since the identity construction process 
is still an ongoing one, it would make the ground for the discussion of whether the 
Zazas could be regarded a separate ethnic group or not is to be witnessed in the coming 
decades in Zaza populated areas. Therefore, Barth would be a reference to apply.  
 
There is a lack of ethnic identity definition due to the practices of Turkish state in 
Turkey. This situation is more complicated in the eastern and southesatern Turkey. Let 
alone the definition of Zaza ethnic identity, the definition of a Kurdish ethnic identity 
can arguably be referred to as a near impossible task, as there is not a Kurdish state that 
could function as the political unifier. In this case it should be considered that Kurds 
live in several nation states, and have arguably built a unified counter-identity in 
opposition to the suppression they have faced during recent history, particularly in the 
last century in the greater Kurdistan. The trend of local cultures and identities has 
flourished with the use of sovial media and new media means in the recent years. 
 Michael Moerman suggests that the voice should be given to the ‘object’ group itself.96 
In this case, if Kurds or Kirds/Zazas refer to themselves as Kurds or Zazas, they should 
simply be allowed to state whatever they would like to express as their identity. In 
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relation to Moerman’s argument, the present study highlights that the majority of the 
Zazas do not argue a distinct ethnicity apart from ‘Kurdish’.97 To claim that the Zazas 
are a different ethnicity to Kurds is a recent trend following the active assimilation 
policies of the Turkish state in response to Kurdish nationalism becoming a powerful 
ideology, after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. This has become more 
apparent, especially following the announcement of the 1924 nationalist Turkish 
constitution. The outcomes of the fieldwork are a strong indicator to back this 
argument.98 David Romano points out that the ethnic identity issue is usually dependent 
on whether an ethnic group has a nation state to which they do not have a problem of 
belonging.99 Since neither the Kurds nor the Zazas have a nation state of their own, or 
any other form of autonomous structure in Turkey, it can be misleading to compare 
them with ethnicities that have a nation state, such as the Turks in Turkey or Greeks in 
Greece. The cultural definition of the Kirds/Zazas, both on a national and a regional 
scale, must therefore be sought elsewhere. 
 
Although it is generally accepted that ethnic groups must share certain commonalities, 
there is less agreement on the nature and definition of ethnicity. Two prominent strands 
of thinking have emerged from the debate, from those scholars who use what is called 
the primordial approach, and those who use a structuralist framework. The cases of the 
Sunni Zazas and Alevi Zazas stand as a good example in this regard. Although they 
would be expected to have common identity interests, the Sunnî Zazas are culturally 
closer to Sunni Kurmanjs, and even to Sunni Turks, compared to their cultural affinity 
with the Alevi Zazas and vice versa.100 The political parties’ support bases in the region 
can be a source to use here. Currently, the CHP (representative of secularism in Turkey) 
is the dominant political party in Dersim (a predominantly Alevi Zaza city) and the 
AKP (known as the Sunni Muslim representative of political Islam in Turkey) is the 
dominant party in Çewlîg/Bingöl. Dersim and Çewlîg/Bingöl are the two provinces in 
Turkey that are known to be the two majorly Zaza cities. Çewlîg/Bingöl has always 
stood with its Sunni conservative identity, and Dersim with its secularist/left identity. 
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The Turkish State has systematically used this division as a tool and kept the 
neighbouring provinces in a position of ‘othering one another’. 
 
For structuralists, ethnicity is an imagined identity, which has been constructed through 
generations. Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities deals with many of these 
issues, arguing that communities are socially constructed using past fictions and myths, 
and thus nationalism and national identity are not fixed facts but a collection of 
imagined traditions. Anderson assesses how the development of the printing press in 
Western Europe began to influence the masses, and books/publications were used in 
the creation of a national culture.101 Thus, this entity can be used by some groups and 
individuals, to make certain political, economic and social claims in the case of 
structuralist views of identity.  
 
1.3.2 Religious Identity 
In the second half of the twentieth century, religion has grown in prominence as a tool 
of ethnic mobilisation and separation in Turkey. As religion plays a dominant role in 
most ethnic boundaries in the Middle East, ethnic groups have had to accept the reality 
of its highly factionist nature, especially in a world where one’s religious identity 
increasingly takes precedence over other forms of identification102. Elise Massicard 
argues that each ethnic-political group in Turkey such as the Turkish State, Kurdish 
nationalist groups, and even Zaza nationalists, use religion for their own political 
identity programs.103 
 
Religion as an identity marker has become even more significant given the many 
contemporary conflicts, such as in Northern Ireland, Central Nigeria and the former 
Yugoslavia, where conflicts which started along nationalistic and ethnic lines took on 
a religious dimension with the use of religious symbolism.104 Turkey is a different case, 
as there is no definitive partition along religious lines. Also, where there is conflict 
involving religion, it is manifested in the continuous dialogue/conflict between 
religious conservatives and the secular state. According to surveys, the vast majority – 
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around ninety per cent – of Turks and Kurds living in Turkey consider themselves as 
Muslims. 105  Looking at the Kurdish and/or Zazas specifically, in particular the 
Kurdish/Zaza Sunni Muslims, the situation becomes rather peculiar, given the current 
political environment. The Kurdish religious identity has been mobilised by Turkish 
Islamic parties which were also historically and constitutionally opposed to the Kurdish 
national and ethnic identity. This has been the case, especially from the 1970s until the 
present day.  
 
Islam has historically been a strong catalyst of mobilisation and control 106 . This 
mobilization/control capability of Islam is identified with different society within the 
Middle Eastern community, in which in the case of the Kurds and the Kurdish 
movement religious leader of Kurds particularly before the 20th century and the raise of 
politicization of Kurdish nation identity and the Kurdish national movement the 
Kurdish religious leader were the those who led the movement against the Kurdish 
superior regimes in Iran and Turkey. This mobilization came to expression in different 
forms for instance as a means of mobilising for an uprising, negotiation or 
settling/intermediation peace within the Kurdish society or between the Kurds and its 
counterparts. For instance, Michiel Leezenberg describes the role of Islamic religious 
leaders of Kurds in the premodern era and before the 20th century as following;   
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, it was the Sufi orders that were a prime vessel for 
social organization and mobilization, and it was primarily their charismatic leaders, the shaykhs, 
that were the leaders of the early Kurdish rebellions. The shaykhs were particularly well-placed 
to act as middlemen in conflicts, and hence to act as leaders or figureheads for broader Kurdish 
nationalist movements, as they were in a position to overcome the tribal divisions that had 
increased in importance since the Ottoman authorities had abolished the local Kurdish emirates 
in the mid-19th century.107 
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David McDowal points out that, during the Ottoman era and after, the Kurds became 
an important provision to the Islamic armies fighting Byzantium, Armenians and the 
Crusaders. Currently, it is estimated that over seventy-per cent of the Kurds living in 
Turkey are Sunni Muslims, and a similar percentage would apply for the Zazas as 
well.108 Following the Ottoman policy of centralisation, Turkomans living in Eastern 
Anatolia (today’s East and South-Eastern Turkey) who adhered to an conservative 
extreme and heterodox form of Shiite Islam (known in Turkey as Alevism), led by the 
Safavi order in Azarbaijan, were brought into the fold of Empire.109 As mentioned, 
there are Alevi and Sunni Zazas and Kurmanjs in Turkey. Within these different 
branches there have been issues of mistrust and non-recognition historically. David 
Shankland has observed that in many of the villages he visited, he witnessed very little 
social contact between Alevi and Sunni neighbourhoods. This will be discussed for the 
Çewlig/Bingöl region as well, especially in the towns of Kiği, Yayladere and Yedisu, 
the towns of Çewlig/Bingöl bordering the Dersim province. Shankland goes on to 
highlight that this separation is often expressed in religious terms, and reinforced by 
mutual distrust. For instance, in some Sunni villages, claims were made that the Alevi 
were not proper Muslims because they did not pray in mosques, and that their women 
were promiscuous. On the other hand, the Alevis tend to regard all Sunnis as fanatics.110 
The two groups have taken politically opposite sides, with the secular and the Sunni 
influences of the Turkish state working against each other. Furthermore, for the same 
reason, the number of marriages between Sunnis and Alevis in Çewlig/Bingöl and the 
surrounding areas is still small.111 
 
According to Krisztin Kehl Bodrogi “about half of the Zazas are religiously affiliated 
with the Shafi‘i school of Sunni Islam, while the other half profess Alevism 112”. 
Çewlig/Bingöl has a strong element of conservative Muslim inhabitants. The fact that 
religion has always played a significant role in the region indicates that it has always 
had its part in the politics of identity regionally. One could argue that it is still the 
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biggest identity marker for the Çewlig/ Bingöl province. As well as having a majority 
of Sunni Kird/ Zazas, the region also has numerous (around 15 or 20 per cent of the 
population) inhabitants who are Zaza Alevis, Kurmanj Alevis and Sunni Kurmanjs.113 
Taking all these identities in consideration, the Kurdish and/or Kird/ Zaza ethnic 
identity provides a wealth of opportunity to analyse some of the debates and theories 
that appear in the field of social identity construction. Given that the Kurds are likely 
to have originated among various nomadic groups who encountered each other around 
the same geographical location, it stands to reason that within this collection of tribes 
and groups there was and still exists much diversity and division. Firstly, the 
introduction of Islam to the Kurds added a new and significant facet to the Kurdish 
ethnic identity. Secondly, there were various tribal conflicts, which were not helped by 
the informal system of the Ottoman Empire, which allowed tribal chiefs a certain degree 
of autonomy giving them the opportunity to do as they pleased. Finally, the historical 
linguistic diversity underlines the variation of Kurdish expressions of identity.114 
 
1.3.3 National Identity 
The Kurdish national identity in itself is a relatively modern construction. The 
intensification of its politicization started develop and spread around the breakdown of 
the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the modern day Middle Eastern states, the 
majority of which have been based on dominant ethnic groups.115 According to Hakan 
Yavuz, the gradual process of politicization took place in lines with the rise of 
dissatisfaction and emergence of deprivation within the semi-confederative Kurdish 
system under the role of the Ottomans, mainly as result of the Ottomans attempt of 
centralising power. This periods has been categorized as the first stage (1878-1924) of 
the Kurdish national movement, however, the politicization and formation in a more 
modern sense of nationalism is a process accelerated mainly following the 
deconstruction of the Ottoman empire and formation of the Turkish nation state on the 
hand Mustafa Kamal Ataturk, also a nation building process that resulted in exclusion 
of the Kurds of Turkey from the rights of equal citizenship and equal partnership. Yavuz 
describes the second stage (1925-61) of Kurdish national movement in Turkey.116 
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Ethnicity and ethnic groups have thus gained a huge amount of political importance in 
the region, unlike during the Ottoman era when ethnic groups, although recognised, 
remained submissive.117 Since the Ottomans did not aim at direct assimilation and 
Turkification of the ethnicities in their territory 118, especially among the Muslim groups, 
the division of ‘us’ and ‘them’ was less likely to be addressed. Let alone Zaza or Zaza-
ness, Kurdish culture as an identity can only be regarded as an obvious cultural unit 
from the late 19th century or/ and from the beginning of the 20th century. The 
politicisation of this identity took place even at a later stage. For the Kird/ Zaza identity, 
as it was previously mentioned in this paper, the process of political identity only started 
in the 1980s.119 The politisiation of Zaza by temselves only seen towards the end of 20th 
century. 
 
The politicisation of the Kurdish ethnic identity and the growth of a national, Kurdish 
consciousness is a topic of much debate among scholars and Kurdish nationalists. Some, 
mainly among the latter, go back as far as three hundred years, pointing to the work of 
Ehmedê Xanî, the seventeenth century Kurdish writer and philosopher, whose writings 
dealt with the Kurds as a separate unity making the distinction between ‘the others’ and 
‘us’.120 Others such as Robert Olson, point to figures such as Sheikh Ubaydulla of Nihri, 
who reportedly sent a letter to British Consul-General (for instance his letter in the 1880) 
explaining that “(… The Kurds are) a nation. Their religious practices are different and 
their laws and customs are distinct”. The letter goes on by saying that “we want our 
affairs to be in our own hands.” Sheikh Ubeydulla’s words are important, as this appears 
to be the first time such an important figure has singled out the Kurds as a people. Olson 
marks it as the first stage of a greater consciousness of Kurdish nationalism.121 Sheikh 
Ubeydulla’s nationalism could be pointed as the first institutional nationalism and as 
the seed of Kurdish nationalism.  
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Despite these points of contention, it is probably more accurate to conclude that the 
Kurdish national awareness as a mass popular nationalism only emerged around the 
time of the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire in the second decade of the 20th 
Century.122 For the Kurds, the political and social climate of the time provided the 
conditions for the renewed focus on their ethnic identity, which manifested itself into a 
strong, nationalist perception. The loss of an empire, which had caused so many 
regional Kurdish chiefs and tribes to flourish, the political strategies involving 
competing ethnic groups and the rise in Turkish nationalism and, consequently, the 
claim for the independence, meant that Kurdish identity became a powerful factor. 
Kurdish elites and nationalists began the process of mobilisation in an attempt to regain 
regional power, which they had lost as a result of defeats in a series of revolts following 
the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Along with a number of other 
revolts, both the Sheikh Said in 1925 (in Sunni Zaza areas) and Seyyid Riza in 1938 (in 
Alevi Zaza areas) are counted among the Kurds’ lost battles against the young Turkish 
Republic.123    
 
The recent surge of Kurdish national identity was a response to the changing political 
situation between the 1930s and 1980s. It has flourished as a reaction to the nationalist 
policies of Turkey. Despite the Kurds still being a people without a nation state, it is 
precisely because of this that the Kurdish national identity has taken precedence over 
other forms of identification. However, it follows that such a national identity could not 
exist without an ethnic base, as the Kurdish national claims are along ethnic lines. Both 
the pro-Kurd Kird/Zazas, and the Kurdish national movement, have continually 
stressed that the Kurds are one distinct ethnic group who have been denied their own 
nation state, and that the ‘outsiders’ influence the identity issue in a negative way. By 
using ethnicity as the foundation for their claims, Kurdish nationalists have been able 
to draw upon cultural traditions, imagery, myths, a shared land, and a shared pain and 
destiny to successfully construct and mobilise the Kurdish ethno-national identity. For 
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the group of pro-Turkish Zazas and pro-Zazaist Zazas,124 this is not the case. In fact, 
identity construction is being carried out as opposition to the pro-Kurdish Zazas and 
the Kurdish nationalist movement(s).125 
 
Today’s identity formation in the Kurdish region generally bears a link to political 
mobilisation. Birgitta Nedelmann points out that mobilisation is generally defined as 
“the development of relationships between individuals and the institutionalised 
representatives of a political elite”.126 This definition entails several problems. Firstly, 
it assumes that the ‘actor’ has to be an institutionalised representative of a political elite, 
i.e. government. However, various actors, as is seen in Turkey, can pursue political 
mobilisation. For instance, during the 1960s various leftist organisations, responding to 
the social and political inequalities at the time, mobilised individuals who had long felt 
marginalised by the state policies. On one hand, as Cengiz Güneş argues, the PKK and 
Union of Kurdistan Communities (KCK) movement continues to mobilise a large 
number of Kurds both at home and in the Diaspora.127 On the other hand, Islamic 
organisations and parties, which had long been denied their places in mainstream 
politics due to the Turkish government’s secularist policies, have used religion as a tool 
for mobilisation from 1970s and especially from the 1980s and onwards. In this 
example, political mobilisation can be seen on a micro and macro level. In the present 
Çewlig/Bingöl, the micro levels of religious and national/ethnic identities are in co-
existence and at the same time clash with each other. During my fieldwork in 2011, an 
interviewee stressed that he sees himself both as a Kurd and as a Sunni Muslim, and he 
does not want to choose one of his identities over another. He pointed out that he feels 
that both the Kurdish movement and the current Turkish Islamic government push the 
locals to choose one or another, when they feel both Kurd and Muslim. He went on 
saying “the Turkish State has, for decades, tried to impose on us that we, the 
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Kirds/Zazas, are not Kurds. But we are aware of the fact that the state is doing this as 
part of ‘divide and rule’.128 
 
As a politically loaded phenomenon, identity itself is easy to mobilise through different 
actors, both individuals and groups. As highlighted by Francesca Polletta and James M. 
Jasper “Collective identity seemed to capture better the pleasures and obligations that 
actually persuade people to mobilize. Identity was appealing, then, as an alternative to 
material incentives”.129 I have witnessed that, during my fieldwork, in many cases, 
claiming one identity automatically created a counter-identity, in the case of those who 
did not conform to that particular identity they feel they belong to. A lady interviewee 
of this research informed that, she used to be a lot more active in the pro-Kurdish party’s 
political activities. However, she wanted to keep her religious identity side too and 
continue practising it. This was not greatly respected by her comrades and it annoyed 
her she expressed. She added; “I will still vote for my party but I will not take part in 
the political activities as active anymore”.130  Nevertheless, just because identity is 
already pre-politicised, this does not necessarily mean that it will automatically lead to 
mobilisation. After all, many societies have individuals and groups co-existing with 
multiple identities. Where there is a political cleavage, there is often social and political 
unrest. Gabriel Almond describes the term political as “national, ethnic, linguistic and 
religious divisions that affect political allegiances and policies.” 131  Although these 
divisions may not lead to conflict, if one group feels marginalised, or if another 
monopolises control of certain state resources, the two groups will be facing a possible 
conflict. This applies to the Zaza – Kurdish case in Turkey. The groups that place 
themselves as oppositional to the Turkish state have felt the consequences, and 
consequently have less access to the state resources, and this creates a tension between 
the pro-Kurdish groups and pro-Turkish state groups of Zazas. An example of this took 
place in Çewlig/Bingöl during the earthquake of May 2003. One of my informants who 
is a public worker and a member of the Human Rights Association (IHD) Bingöl branch 
committee, told me in a personal conversation: “The humanitarian aid was distributed 
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according to those who were in support of the government party AKP, which led to a 
tension directed towards the government institutions”.132 
 
1.3.4 Local Identity: ‘Us’ and ‘Others’ 
In the field of social sciences, it is often noted that identity is used as an umbrella term 
to describe an individual’s comprehension of his- or herself as a discrete and separate 
entity. Thomas Hylland Eriksen argues that the first fact of ethnicity is the application 
of systematic distinctions between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’: between ‘us’ and 
‘them’.133 An individual can then use his or her identity to join like-minded groups to 
mobilise against the ‘others’. The shift in the identity construction is a dynamic process, 
which rapidly changes. In an attempt to apply this to my research field, the identity 
choices of individuals and sometimes groups can change depending on political 
developments nationally and locally. The constant shift in preference of political parties 
(mainly two sides: advocates of ethnic identity/pro-Kurdish movement, and of religious 
identity/pro-Turkish state) in the elections could be pointed out as a strong indicator.  
 
To define identity in this way is not to say that all groups or individuals that share the 
same characteristics are automatically opposed to the ‘others’ or indeed gravitate 
towards each other. ‘Others’ can differ depending on the conditions. For instance, 
during the socialist wave of the 1960s and the 1970s in Turkey, Turkish activists 
mobilised against the state policies regarding class equality. At the time, to be identified 
as an ‘extreme leftist’ meant one would automatically be referred to as a 
‘communist/infidel’ and denied certain citizen rights, whilst on the other hand the 
‘white Turks’134 enjoyed most of the benefits offered by the state. Rogers Brubaker rise 
the complexity and in some regards vagueness associated with the usage of the term of 
‘identity. For instance he asks that “’what do scholars mean when they talk about 
"identity"? What conceptual and explanatory work is the term supposed to do?”.135 
Then Brubaker responding this questions asserts that how to deploy the term identity 
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depends on the context of its use and the theoretical tradition from which the use in 
question derives. According to Brubaker the concept of identity can be used in different 
respects and contexts, however generally speaking;  
Identity is “Identity is something all people have, or ought to have, or are searching for … 
Identity is something all groups (at least groups of a certain kind-e.g., ethnic, racial, or national) 
have, or ought to have … Identity is something people (and groups) can have without being 
aware of it. In this perspective, identity is something to be discovered, and something about 
which one can be mistaken. The strong conception of identity thus replicates the Marxian 
epistemology of class, [or identity is] strong notions of collective identity imply strong notions 
of group boundedness and homogeneity. They imply high degrees of groupness, an‘identity’ or 
sameness between group members, a clear boundary between inside and outside.136 
 
Roger Brubaker argues that the terminology of identity “is also used by political 
entrepreneurs to persuade people to understand a political program they aim to apply, 
their interests and their predicaments in a certain way; to persuade certain people what 
they are (for certain purposes), whether they “identical” with one another (us) and at 
the same time different from ‘others’, and to organise and justify collective action along 
certain lines. In these ways the term “identity” is implicated both in everyday life and 
in “identity politics” in its various forms”.137 This shows that identity has multi-faceted 
functions. It can be used by several sub-groups within a certain group, or by a certain 
group against other groups. This point of Brubaker is a valuable contribution to thesis. 
Zazas are one the several sub-groups within Kurdish identity and they also see 
themselves as the group against the other sub-groups of Kurdishness. Thus, the issue of 
‘us’ versus ‘them’ comes from the notion of identity, and how to perceive this notion 
from within and outside any particular group. 138  When applied to this research, a 
Kird/Zaza in Çewlîg/Bingöl could consider him/herself as part of his tribe, or belonging 
to Kird/Zaza-ness, Sunni Zaza-ness, Kurdishness etc. 
 
In the Zaza case, the ‘other’ for the Sunni Zazas is often considered to be the Turkish 
state/the Kemalist regime, or the Alevi Zazas, or even, in some cases, the Kurdish 
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movement.139 Çem argues on the other hand, the ‘other’ for the Alevi Zazas can be the 
Turkish state’s pro-Islamic governments or institutions/bodies, the Sunni Zazas, and in 
some cases the Kurdish movement or the PKK.140 All these factors, in the considerably 
small province of Çewlîg/Bingöl, shape the research topic as a complicated case. Over 
the decades the term Zaza-ness has earned more acceptance, not only by the ‘outsiders’ 
but also by the ‘insiders’- the Zazas themselves. One could argue that the political 
project of Turkish State did work in certain angles on this topic. The Turkish State had 
planned from early stages for the term Zaza to be used as oppose the other three versions 
(Kird, Kirmanc and Dimilî) that were/ are used by the Zazas themselves. This would 
contribute to divide the Zazas from the Kurds as the other three versions of this identity 
names have direct links to over all Kurdish language and make reference to the 
Kurdishness.   
 
The apparently uneven distribution of state power and benefits led to demonstrations 
and violent clashes between the 1960s and the 1980 army coup. For instance At the 
beginning of the 1960s decade, Turkey was challenged by several forms of financial 
difficulties, such as irregular inflation, high level of unemployment, large deficit in the 
balance of payments, and escalating urban violence between leftist and right wings 
political groups. Consequently, the national army intervened in Turkish politics by 
different means among them warning the government about the potential threat of such 
as domestic problematics facing the Turkish state and society. However by the 
escalation of the condition what the Turkish society and surrounding world were 
witnessing emerging a military coup in the early 1960s that altered the entire political 
landscape in the country141. Then as things were getting worse and shown to be out of 
control in the Turkey has in September 12, 1980 experienced another however more 
controversial military coup, where Turkish Armed Forces launched a military coup 
d’état –the third in the history of the Turkish state. This coup was a product of the 
following domestic condition cross the whole Turkey, also; 
In the late 1970s, Turkey erupted into a low grade civil war.  The civilian government was 
helpless to stop it. Terrorism, assassinations, riots, and open battles with the military became 
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commonplace.  In 1979 and the first nine months of 1980, there were nearly 9,000 violent 
incidents.  Over four thousand were killed and more than ten thousand wounded.  By 1980, 
almost half of Turkey’s 67 provinces contained so-called “liberated zones,” or pieces of 
territory under the control of non-state armed groups.  Political parties and the security services 
are said to have had shadowy connections to the militants.  Some of these groups set up 
governance and dispute resolution structures. This conflict met most standards of what 
constitutes a civil war, although it is not often recorded as one.142  
 
Following the 1980 coup, the issue of class differences had become more apparent. This 
notion offered more problematic and multi dimensional approaches to the way of 
considering other-ness by a particular ethnic group (Zazas). Furthermore, the economic 
factors have started playing a role in the identity in formation for the last three decades. 
In terms of their religion, Alevis are mainly considered as ‘others’, no matter if they are 
Zaza or Kurmanj or even Turks. Thus, the notion of otherness can be regarded as 
including multiple issues. In the forthcoming discussion, in the analytical chapters, this 
notion will be elaborated in detail. 
 
The ‘them’ and ‘us’ scenario becomes more prevalent as the power balance becomes 
more established. This scenario has been played out globally throughout history where 
identity has continually been used as a political and social marker. This is also the case 
in Turkey, where the Kurdish identity and the Kirdkî/Zazakî identity have been 
politicised by both the state and Kurdish national movement(s). In the Kird/Zaza 
example, if one chooses to identify oneself as a pro-Kurd in Çewlig/Bingöl, one is 
immediately labelled as ‘other/outsider’, from the perspective of the state and by pro-
Zaza groups. On the other hand, for the perspective of pro-Kurdish Kirds/Zazas, the 
position is the opposite; they would find ‘others’ in pro-Turkish state groups and among 
groups who claim that Zazas are a people on their own. This phenomenon is even 
clearer in the current norms of the societal structure in Çewlig/Bingöl. The group(s) 
that distance themselves from the pro-Kurdish stance enjoy the monopoly of power, 
acting as the established. 
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In the case of current Turkey, the outsider always has the opportunity to be assimilated 
into the established group on the condition of relinquishing their ethnic identity as Kurd 
and assuming the Turkish culture.143 However, for the last two decades, the rise and 
militarisation of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey/Turkish Kurdistan has been a tool to 
prove that, despite facing political and social marginalisation, many Kurds are strongly 
opposed to surrendering this identity. This could be said for the case of pro-Kurdish 
Kird/Zaza group(s). 
 
 In the field of anthropology, the common stance is that the ethnicity is an optional 
identity, which is often overshadowed by other identities, such as regional, gender, 
religious and class identities144. The mainstream argument is that the Kurdish ethnic 
identity consequently stands as one of the most important of identities, and will be used 
in this instance as the ‘umbrella’ for all other sub-identities145. It is also vital to point 
out that this does not necessarily mean that the ethnic identity always takes precedence 
over others. In the example of Çewlig/Bingöl, the religious/Muslim identity can be 
considered the ‘umbrella’ identity holder in some cases. Both the Turkish state and the 
Kurdish movement as the two main ‘outsider’ political players on the stage of policy 
making in the current Çewlig/Bingöl, can be considered successful in their programmes: 
the Turkish state/the AKP government applying the religious entity of Muslim unity, 
and on the other hand the Kurdish movement (KCK) suggesting a Kurdish nation as the 
umbrella identity to gather people together for a common goal. 146  The Kurdish 
movement is applying new strategies on a grassroots level, such as introducing the KCK 
social movement structure and maintaining that it will accommodate all ethnic, 
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religious and social differentiations and empower local governments. This new project 
is aiming towards the creation of a unified nation where the people are ‘Kurds’. 
  
1.4 Literature Review 
Although there are no shortages of sources related to the theoretical discourses on 
identity in general, and Kurdish identity in particular, there is limited published material 
work focusing specifically on Zaza-speaking Kurds in Turkey. In most of the literature 
dealing with the ‘Kurdish question’, Zazas are principally referred to in terms of their 
linguistic difference. Zaza-related identity issues only account for a very small part of 
the literature. Scholarship on the Zazas such as Mehmed S. Kaya’s book on Zazas 
(2010), Elise Massicard’s book on Alevis and Identity (2013), Arakelova’s article 
regarding Zazas (1999) and Van Bruinessen’s book Agha Sheikh and State (1992) will 
be extensively utilised throughout this thesis as they cover many aspects of this research 
topic. Although not directly focused on Zaza identity construction, other sources such 
as Lale Yalçin-Heckman’s Tribe and Kinship Among the Kurds (1990) Carol Delaney’s 
The Seed and The Soil: Gender and Cosmology in Turkish Village Society (1991) and 
Paul J. Magnarella’s Tradition and Change in a Turkish Town (1982) will be used, 
mainly for their anthropological perspectives on identity. These sources are explained 
in more detail below, in the literature review section. They contribute immensely to this 
research since they deal with similar topics and/or geographical and social community 
structure in Turkey and Turkish Kurdistan. 
 
All the above-mentioned works play an important role as they offer direct information 
to this relatively new topic in academia. The further sources presented in the literature 
review, although they lack in presenting direct relevancy to the topic, also contribute 
significantly since they deal with similar topics or geographical and social community 
structure.  
 
One of the main works focusing on the Kird/Zazas is Mehmet S. Kaya’s book, The Zaza 
Kurds of Turkey: A Middle Eastern Minority in a Globalised Society (2010). The fact 
that Kaya himself comes from Çewlig/Bingöl makes his work more important for my 
own research since it deals with same geographical and therefore social structure. It is 




a work of social anthropology. The book presents some insightful information 
regarding the Kird/Zaza society’s structure; it contains general information on class and 
religious aspects of different groups, kinship, gender relations, tribal relations and 
economic dynamics in Çewlig/Bingöl. It is therefore one of the most relevant sources 
for my research. Although it contains some structural limitations, this book is the most 
relevant both socially and geographically. It is also similar in its methodological 
perspectives.   
 
The work of Kaya, which is based on field research about the Kird/Zazas, attempts to 
illuminate how the Zaza people carry on their way of life and maintain their cultural 
identity despite the influence of globalisation. Kaya argues that the premise of his study 
was to analyse how the Kird/Zazas perceive their own identity. He looks mainly into 
this group’s cultural aspects, such as customs, tradition and folklore.  Kaya argues that 
although Kird/Zazas have a distinct way of practicing certain cultural traditions such as 
music, dance and festivals on a local level, one could not argue that it differs from the 
Kurdish cultural practices in the broader picture. Furthermore, he points out that there 
is a common sense (with Kurdishness) of feeling in reaction to the Turkish state’s 
policies applied in the region.  
 
Kaya’s study has become one of the main available sources of general information on 
the Kird/Zazas. It presents the local picture in a detailed way, which allows the book to 
offer the readers detailed information about the region. However, Kaya’s book focuses 
mainly on the area of Solhan, one town of Çewlig/Bingöl province. It therefore, 
presents only a limited picture of Kird/Zaza identity and culture. In contrast, my 
research will aim to look at the identity issue of Zazas more broadly. In other words, I 
will mainly carry out my research based on Çewlig/Bingöl province but will also 
consider the bordering provinces of Diyarbakir, Elazig, Dersim and Muş so as to better 
frame and assess Çewlîg/Bingöl’s identity dynamics. This comparative perspective will 
include an examination of the various religious, ethnic, linguistic, folkloric identities 
and micro-identities (in terms of local specificity).  
 
Although Kaya’s work is the most directly involved in my research field, he has not 




perspectives, which results in a narrow analytical discussion. Moreover, his book 
contains a limited bibliography that restricts the perspective of the research. Another 
factor that could be down side to his work is, the fact that he has been living in Europe 
for most his life, which in a way makes him an outsider researcher. Thus, when he 
analyses his data, it is usually done from an ‘outsider’ perspective, which could be 
counted as a limiting factor in his case.  
 
“The Zaza People as a New Ethno-political Factor in the Region” (1999), an article 
written by Victoria Arakelova, is another important work on Turkey’s Zazas. Arakelova 
points out that, for various reasons, the Kurds (or/and the Zazas) started becoming 
aware of their ethnic specificity only in the 20th century, under the rule of the Turkish 
Republic. Victoria Arakelova emphasizes that the Zazas are victims of assimilation 
policies applied by the Turkish state. Arakelova presents an informative overlook of 
the Zazas in Turkey, but she hardly mentions the Zazas of Çewlig/Bingöl, which limits 
the usefulness of the article for my case. 
 
Arakelova emphases that in the 1990s the Turkish state, by giving Alevis more freedom 
than before, wanted to encourage the left to politically adapt to the Alevis. On the other 
hand, it wanted to create opposition, by encouraging the right-wing/conservative groups 
to affiliate themselves with the Sunnis. This argument takes into account the Turkish 
state’s ‘rich history’ in dividing oppositional groups in various ways. This is relevant 
to the Zaza situation in modern Turkey. Therefore my thesis will adopt a similar style 
of analysis to understand further why the identity dynamics are so various in my 
research area.  
 
During the 70s, 80s and 90s, there was a group of intellectual Alevi (mainly Kurish 
Alevis) advocating for separatism or cultural rights, often immigrants in Europe, trying 
to attract international attention to their agendas of claiming a distinct identity as 
Alevism. Zaza intellectuals followed much the same path, with immigration mainly to 
Sweden. One of the leaders of this movement was Ebubekir Pamukçu who created the 
Serbestî (meaning independence) movement which explicitly announced that it was a 
Zaza movement in the early 1980s. Arakelova argues that the term ‘Zazaistan’ was first 




acquired academic legitimacy. Arakelova’s attempt in presenting Pamukçu as an 
important Zaza movement leader is similar to the efforts of the Turkish state. It was 
apparent in the court documents of the Ergenekon case147 that Pamukçu worked in co-
operation with the Turkish state as part of the state’s political agenda against 
Zazas/Kurds.148 
 
Although its lack of updated information, the article is nonetheless still highly 
informative and useful to my own research. Arakelova is successful in presenting a 
clear picture of identity politics of the separatist groups of Zazas. The analysis that she 
presents about the Zaza nationalist groups in her article would, therefore, make a 
valuable contribution to my research. In general, although her article is limited in some 
ways, the fact that there is a paucity of directly relevant sources in this field points her 
work as a valuable source for this research. 
 
Despite being a valuable addition to the scholarship on the Zazas, Arakelova’s research 
also raises some points for concern. She presents Zazas as if all of them were Alevis, 
and mostly ignores the existence of the Sunni Zazas. The fact is, Zazas are not all Alevis; 
in fact the majority of the Zazas are Sunni Muslims, as in the example of Çewlig/Bingöl, 
where 80 per cent of the population is Sunni Muslim.149 She did not base her article on 
fieldwork, and neither did she conduct enough interviews to allow different voices 
within Zaza communities to be heard, ultimately making her analyses factually 
contestable. Furthermore, the information in her article is mostly not relevant to the 
current picture (politically and socially) of Zaza identity.  
 
Arakelova primarily adopts a political focus, in her attempt to make implicit political 
connections between the Zazas and Armenians prior to the Armenian Genocide in 1915, 
during Ottoman rule. Her approach is simply political, containing a discourse of 
                                                 
147 The Ergenekon case was one of the most important issues in Turkey since 2007. The Ergenekon 
movement is a Kemalist and Nationalist movement, which attempted to take down the current AKP 
regime in Turkey. However, the government arrested senior members of it, and it was no longer a serious 
threat. 
148 Ergenekon Davasi ve Bazi Zazacilari, http://www.zazaki.net/haber/ergenekon-davasi-ve-bazi-
zazacilar-829.htm (Last accessed 18 July 2017).  




political propaganda. Therefore, this article stands weak in academic style, as the 
political stance is the primary goal. 
 
The anthropological works that have been written about the cultural aspects of Kurds, 
or more generally about Turkey, are taken into account to help the framework of this 
thesis. One of these works is Lale Yalçin-Heckman’s study, Tribe and Kinship Among 
The Kurds (1990). Lale Yalçin’s book gives an informative insight regarding tribal and 
semi-nomadic society in Hakkari. Hakkari is a predominantly Kurdish province in 
Turkey bordering Iran and Iraq, frequently referred to as ‘stronghold of pure Kurds and 
Kurdish tribes’. This geographical position (an important Kurdish city in Turkey) 
makes the book crucial for my study. It is important to question how the region has seen 
the interaction of outsiders and insiders. How did this affect political and economical 
factors? And finally, what sort of role did these different elements play in the dynamics 
of identity?  
 
During her anthropological fieldwork, Lale Yalçin Heckman chose to stay in a small 
village where she was hosted by a lower class family, rather than a more prestigious 
one. She notes that she deliberately chose to stay with a more lowlyfamily, so that she 
could have closer contact with the inhabitants of the village. In the structure of village 
life, it is easy to access all aspects of daily life, including men’s routines as they mostly 
gather in a central house in the evenings, from which the women are not excluded. On 
the other hand, in cities (such as Hakkari’s city centre), men mostly have their 
meetings/gatherings in tea houses during the day, with women not having such an easy 
access to these discussions. The above-mentioned picture applies in many ways to my 
fieldwork experiences. I also chose to interview people in the settings of daily life, such 
as tea houses, summer leisure parks, and home gatherings. These environments are 
helpful in the sense of having a less formal environment, which encourages the 
participants to speak their thoughts more naturally.  
 
One of the main aims of Heckman’s book is to examine how the Kurdish identity is 
being shaped by the effects of the political awareness, or the on-going assimilation 
policies applied by the Turkish state. Yalçin also wants to observe the differences 




Kurdish groups contribute to the economic, political and social structures of modern 
Turkey.  
 
Taking in account Hakkari’s leading role in the Kurdish national movement’s history, 
the stages that its society went through in the 1980s could give an idea of how the social 
structure is shaped for areas such as Çewlig/Bingöl and its towns. Although 
globalisation is constantly present in terms of changing the local customs and traditions, 
Bingöl’s being close to Hakkari geographically and culturally, makes it advantageous 
for my research to benefit from this example. Thus, using Yalçin’s book will help in 
making general judgments.  
 
Even though Yalçin’s work deals with a similar area, her centre of attention is more on 
cultural aspects. On the other hand, my research will rather focus on the construction 
of identity, also in a political sense. This is to emphasise that the main focuses are 
different. Therefore, my approach will be different and may lead to different results.  
                        
For the aim of contextualizing the case of Zaza people theoretically, some works, such 
as Carol Delaney’s The Seed and The Soil: Gender and Cosmology in Turkish Village 
Society (1991) and Paul J. Magnarella’s Tradition and Change in a Turkish Town (1982) 
will offer valuable contributions for this research.   
 
In her book The Seed and the Soil, Carol Delaney reveals the powerful meanings 
condensed in the seemingly innocent words, ‘seed’ and ‘soil’. Conducting her work in 
a Turkish Sunni Muslim village in mid-Anatolia, she shows the readers that images are 
categorically different. She argues that the different ways in which the creation of a 
child is understood in Turkey is a way of understanding the people’s attitudes toward 
sexuality and gender, honour and shame, time and space, inside and outside, open and 
secret. In addition, the symbols and ways with which they represent protection, provide 
the means for understanding of elements such as the family, house, village, nation, 
religion, this world and the next world. Delaney points out that these symbols do not 
seek to beautify reality; they provide the key to a particular conception of reality, a 





Delaney’s anthropological work looks into the ordinary village life in Turkey. The main 
motivations in her research are gender, power and religion. The fact that God has been 
symbolised as masculine, indeed affects how the village people think about man and 
woman, the nature of authority and the structures of power, the share in daily life. The 
symbolism of the seed (man) and the soil (woman) indicates that one would not be able 
without the other. Man appears to provide the creative spark of life, and the essential 
identity of a child, while woman, like soil, contributes the material that sustains it. 
 
Paternity has meant a begetting, primary, creative, engendering role, and it is the same 
no matter whether the male is a human being or God ‘the father’. If one can identify a 
difference between the two, it is not the role that they play, but the human and divine 
realms. On the other hand, even though a woman has an important and necessary role 
in procreation, her role has been imagined as secondary and not superlative, not that of 
a creator or co-creator. Many elements that Delaney presents in her argument are 
relatively applicable to my research in some ways. 
 
Delaney started to do her field work in 1980, in a Sunni Turkish village in mid-Anatolia. 
The army coup, which took place during her fieldwork in Turkey, made conditions 
more difficult for her, but as she states, ‘life itself was not put on hold’. In this sense it 
did not make a difference for her research fieldwork. Her book discusses the theory of 
procreation, as it constructs notions of embodied persons, both man and woman. It then 
goes on using the symbols and meanings of procreation to review the Mediterranean 
concepts of marriage, which includes the complex of attitudes and practices known as 
the honour code. Life of an individual, family and village are analysed in detail. In her 
research, she uses the symbols and theory of procreation to illuminate the lives of the 
locals (villagers), notions of how people are related to each other through time (descent) 
and space (how near or how distant they are). She then goes into more detail dealing 
with actual lived space (the house, the village, the country and the world), the division 
in daily routine work for reproduction on the household, and the rhetoric of nationalism. 
All these elements are examined within the framework of Islamic life. 
 
The relations within the family structure, the way that the family members contribute 




phenomena to the Çewlig/Bingöl area. Thus, Delaney’s work will contribute to certain 
extent to my research. 
 
Looking in depth to the internal (domestic) cultures of mid-Anatolia and Eastern 
Turkey, one could say the ways of practising religion are different, more conservative 
in the Bingöl area. Also, the ‘belonging relationship’ ties with the state are obviously 
different between the two regions in Turkey. Mid-Anatolia, identifying themselves as 
Turkish Muslims, have a much stronger ‘belonging relationship’ compared with the 
non Turkish Muslims of the Çewlig/Bingöl area. In addition to the above reasons, the 
time difference (over three decades) between the two pieces of research may be another 
disadvantage for my research when questioning whether Delaney’s book can be useful 
or not for my work. 
 
One of the older anthropological books written on Turkey is Paul J. Magnarella’s 
Tradition and Change in a Turkish Town, which also introduced some remarkable ideas 
about routine life in Turkey at the time. Magnarella argues that the modernisation 
process is usually encouraged by the international arena in underdeveloped countries. 
Experts such as economists, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists and 
historians contribute to this process. 
 
Magnarella argues that for Muslim societies in Turkey, the radical changes within 
family life only started changing in the second half of the 20th century. The marital and 
kinship relationships also started being reshaped by the society or ‘social engineers’. 
This could be said more clearly for Western Turkey from the 1950s and onwards.  
Magnarella gives some detailed information on the historical and geographical aspects 
of Susurluk, a town in Balikesir province, in the West of Turkey. The writer moves on, 
giving the political picture of the Turkish state during the era of the Democrat Party’s 
power in 1950s. Democrat Party (DP) took the power in the first election of the multi-
party period in Turkey. Therefore, it is important for the history of Turkish state, in 
terms of the DP’s role in changing the society’s life.  
 
The changes in the economic structure also started contributing to the dissolution of the 




soon as they were financially able. People who were employed in some official 
government jobs were regarded as members of the ‘official class’ (memur sinifi). With 
change in the community’s economic and working structure, increased integration with 
Turkey’s modern urban centres, closer contact with the West, and the adoption of the 
Western civil code, alterations in this system were inevitable. 
 
Magnarella points out that one of most remarkable phenomena in the changing social 
structure is the process of individualization (the emergence of the individual from the 
larger kin group). These elements are important for individuals and groups shifting 
identity. In my case study, strong reference could be made in this regard. 
 
In the Ottoman period, Islam influenced all areas of daily life, such as kinship, the 
market, politics, and education. Given this, one could argue that the aforementioned 
conservative structure controlled everything and reduced the flexibility and range of 
human behaviour. The reformers who established the new state of the Republic of 
Turkey, believed that their revolution could be successful only if Islam’s prominent 
position as the central influence was significantly weakened/eliminated. The secular 
ideology of the state started to have an impact on people’s daily life, much more 
significantly in some parts of Turkey than others. 
 
As Magdarella argues, Susurluk’s example fits a general pattern of change shared by 
various small communities throughout Turkey. With establishment of the new state, 
Susurluk’s economic and social life improved rapidly. Formerly characterised by 
agriculture and a limited market economy, this small town was transformed into an 
industrial, commercial, and governmental centre, having a greater regional and national 
position. This new role of Susurluk encouraged people from surrounding rural areas to 
move to the city. The new arrivals in cities had to change their former peasant lifestyle 
into a new urban socio-cultural heterogeneity.  
 
It could be argued that the speed of change in the norms of society between Susurluk 
in 1970s and Çewlig/Bingöl’s in the 1980s and 90s are similar. The difference in period 
could be explained by the ethnic difference and even the differences of religious 




difference in feelings of ‘belonging’, the situation in Susurluk could differ from 
Çewlig/Bingöl. Although there is time and field difference between Magnarella’s study 
and mine, I could still apply a similar approach for my fieldwork and analyses.  
 
Magnarella tends to present a number of cases for his study as facts for the whole of 
Turkey, which is a down side to his analyses. In other words, because fieldwork takes 
place in a specific time and place, analysis of the research should avoid making 
generalisations.  
 
Martin Van Bruinessen is one of the pioneers in the field of Kurdish studies. He has 
written a number of books and articles on Kurds of all areas. Van Bruinessen is one of 
the most referenced academics in the world within Kurdish studies. He still produces a 
high volume of work in the field, and more importantly his publications are still relevant 
to the Kurdish issue and sub-groups of the Kurds. His publications on Kurdish identity(-
ies) offer broad information to explore the issue from historical, linguistic and 
anthropological angles. Van Bruinessen explains the struggle of Kurds and the 
historical formation of Kurdish identity in Turkey. He has visited many areas of ‘greater 
Kurdistan’, including the Zaza populated areas, which gives him a broad perspective 
on Kurds. Thus, his observations and fieldwork data are valuable for the field of 
Kurdish studies. 
 
Martin van Bruinessen’s book Agha Sheikh and State: The Social and Political 
Structures of Kurdistan (1992) is one of his main works for my research subject. This 
work underlines a perspective about the nature of the Kurdish national struggle. Further, 
it also draws a picture of social class in the Kurdish communities. Van Bruinessen 
highlights important aspects of Kurdish perspectives in their struggle against the 
Turkish Republic since it was established in 1923. Furthermore, he covers the issue of 
assimilation policies applied by the Turkish State. The areas that he covers in Kurdish 
studies significantly overlaps with the main concerns of my own study. 
 
One of the main focuses in his work, which could be counted as a direct source for my 
research area, is the revolt of Sheikh Said (a Sunni-Zaza from Palu, a tawn between 




Bruinessen highlights the question of whether the revolt of ‘Sheikh Said’ was religious 
or nationalist. He then argues that the revolt was a mix of both elements. He also writes 
vastly about the Dersim revolt in 1938, another major revolt against the Turkish state 
led by Seyyid Riza (an Alevi Zaza from Dersim). He offers insightful information about 
the revolt and seeks an answer to whether the main theme of that revolt was national or 
religious. The way he seeks for an answer for the above question involve issues of 
identity formation that are directly relevant for my research topic. Thus, his collection 
of academic works stands out as extremely valuable for my research.  
 
One major criticism could be that Van Bruinessen has undervalued the importance of 
the social and political outcome of the Sheikh Said revolt. Arguably, Sheikh Said’s 
revolt has had an important influence on Kurdish-Turkish relations throughout the 
twentieth century in Turkey. Van Bruinessen does not stress this enough in his analyses 
regarding ‘Turkey’s Kurdish issue’. 
 
In order to understand the case of Kird/Zazas, the question of Kurds in Turkey has to 
be examined thoroughly. The Zazakî speaking group has mostly been mentioned as part 
of Kurdishness until recently. However, in a number of important academic works by 
McDowall, Van Bruinessen and Kirisçi, the main two uprisings (Sheikh Said and 
Dersim revolts) of Kurds in the early era of the Turkish Republic have been labelled as 
‘Zaza uprisings’ rather than Kurdish. This was done for analytical purposes, rather than 
to argue that there is a separation between Zazas and Kurds from a political identity 
perspective. My study will benefit from the abovementioned books both for their 
methodological and historical information. However, the information can be regarded 
as data that is not directly parallel with the main interest of my study, since Kird/Zaza 
identity has not been dealt with in a specific way. 
 
The Alevis in Turkey and Europe: Identity and Managing Territorial Diversity (2013) 
written by Elise Massicard, is one of the newer books published which can significantly 
benefit this research, primarily for its similar way of dealing with the structural 
framework. Although this book’s focus seems to be on religion, with a closer look it 
can be regarded as having a similar approach to the current thesis, as it also uses religion 




mentioned as one of the main identity markers, the analyses will have similarities in 
this respect. Alevism, like Zaza-ness, is extensively used by the Turkish state to stress 
that the Alevis are ‘not a different ethnicity (Kurdish) but are Turks’. Unlike the case 
of Çewlig/Bingöl’s Sunni Zazas, it is the Kemalist face of the Turkish state which 
convinces them or attempts to convince them to stress Turkishness in their identity.150 
This strategy has worked well in Dersim, known to be Alevi-Zaza city. Election results 
in Dersim are a strong indicator for this argument. Currently, both (only two as it is a 
small city) of the Dersim MPs are members of pro-Kemalist party, the Republican 
People’s Party (CHP), the party that was founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1924.  
 
Elise Massicard’s book offers valuable information, as well as an interesting framework 
for my own research. For example, the notion of ‘identity without identity’ can be 
fruitfully adjusted to my study of identity construction. The book also introduces a well-
structured outlook on Alevi politics and contains serious anthropological observations 
and data concerning Turkey in general, but also Turkish Kurdistan. It moreover makes 
references to certain processes of asserting collective identities from the 1980s onwards 
that may also be observed in my own fields of research. Such processes, the book shows, 
have put an – at least partial – end to the invisibility of some groups in Turkey. 
 
Massicard’s terms of ‘Aleviness and Alevism’ can be applied to Zazaness and Zazaism. 
She defines these two (-ness and –ism) as different things, the first referring to identity 
itself and the second to an identity claim made by a group. Alternatively, the first may 
be what outsiders consider a separate group, and the latter is the identity claim made by 
the group itself. Applying this to my case, one might argue that –ness refers to a 
permanent social and cultural reality seen by outsiders such as the Turkish state, while 
–ism has appeared since the 1980s.  
 
Massicard sets 1980 as the breakthrough point in Alevi identity, in Turkey and Europe, 
which is also true of my subject. Comparing my finds to hers will provide me with 
useful research standards.  Massicard is one of those who see Alevism as a higher 
identity over ethnic identity (that is over Kurdishness, Turkishness or Zazaness). She 
                                                 





regards Alevism as a kind of ethnic identity, which contrasts with my own findings on 
Zazaness. This contrast will provide standards and points of comparison and reflection 
in my own study. In all, Massicard’s book offers a parallel perspective to my research, 
and it will be of great help to my work, providing certain guidelines (concerning for 
example identity shifts, geographic considerations, etc.) in the way this study will deal 
with in its analytical chapters. It also offers a number of examples of, and paradigms 
on how, the politics of identity construction are structured at a popular level. 
 
Güneş Murat Tezcür’s article Kurdish Nationalism and Identity in Turkey: A 
Conceptual Reinterpretation in the European Journal of Turkish Studies (EJTS) in 2009 
is valuable for my study, especially in the way it conceptualizes its topic. Tezcür argues 
that the development of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey contains many uncertain and 
controversial sides. He stresses that it is difficult to draw clear lines between different 
political stances in the relations between the Kurds and the Turkish state. 
 
Tezcür claims that it is specific organizations rather than ethnic groups in general that 
should be the focus of scholarly analyses. He critically questions the analyses that rely 
on the dichotomy of ethnic nationalism versus civic nationalism as well as the 
dichotomy of state versus society. Tezcür believes that neither of these two approaches 
adequately capture the richness and ambiguity of the broader Kurdish political identity 
in Turkey. His idea that it is more the organizations that have an impact in designing 
identity choices, seems to also apply in Çewlig/Bingöl, as the battle over Kird/Zaza 
identity by different political groups is an ongoing one.  
 
Tezcür points out that Turkish nationalism, which is perceived to promote a Turkic 
ethnicity at the expense of other ethnic groups, has fostered and radicalized ethnic 
Kurdish nationalism. There is a similar argument made by the pro-Zazaist groups in 
Çewlig/Bingöl, which claim that it is not only the Turkish state that applies assimilation 
policies to the Zazas, but also the Kurdish movement. This multiplicity creates a 
dynamic puzzle over identity debates in Çewlig/Bingöl.  
 
The article underlines the existence of different views on identity among the Zazas (as 




Turkified Zaza area). He bases his assumptions on his fieldwork, which produces 
results comparable to my research. He speaks about general identity dynamics in 
Turkey as well as about Kurdish identity(-ies) in particular. However, Kird/Zaza 
identity construction is not central to Tezcür’s article.  Moreover, although he mentions 
the Zazas, his paper does not present different Zaza groups’ prespectives, especially in 
what concerns the Kird/Zazas of Çewlig/Bingöl. Furthermore, Tezcür does not consider 
the role of the Zazas in the Kurdish nationalist movement, which weakens his analyses 
on the interactions between the Zazas and the general Kurdish movement.  
 
Peter Alford Andrews’ Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey (1989) is another 
pioneering book that is important for my work. Andrews argues that groups are 
recognized by the way they produce themselves in successive generations, as distinct 
from other (usually neighbouring) groups. In this sense, he makes a point of not 
confusing ethnicity with nationality. In the context of Turkey, it is particularly 
important to emphasise this difference, since the ethnic group upon which the Republic 
is based has, since its earliest years, integrated the use of the word ‘Türk’ in an ethnic, 
as well as a national sense, without any very clear distinction between them. The 
Turkish Republic intentionally misuses the civic use of belonging, citizens of the 
Turkish Republic for its political agenda. Therefore, many Zazas/Kurds and other 
ethnic groups, especially under the influence of Ankara’s assimilation policies, consider 
that ‘citizen of Turkish Republic’ is equivalent to the term ‘Turk’.  
 
Andrews argues that there is no attempt made to condone the fiction by which it is 
pretended that these groups in Turkey are ethnic Turks. He also points out that for the 
Zaza or the Kurdish case, the Turkish state has called them Dağ Türkleri (mountain 
Turks) or Türk Kürtleri (Turkish Kurds), treating them as if they have somehow 
confused their identities and therefore call themselves Kurds or Zazas. This argument 
will be discussed and analysed in my work.  
 
In his book, Andrews points out that although the Sunni Zazas are different from Turks 
and even from Alevi Zazas, their religious practices are similar to the Sunni Kurds in 
the same region. Except for the people who have learned both dialects (Zazakî and 




communication between the two groups.  In spite of this, Andrews goes on, the majority 
of Zazas regard themselves as Kurds. My paper tends to take a parallel viewpoint, based 
on my own research.  
 
There is some useful information in Andrews’ book that my research will benefit from. 
The book gives some factual data such as the religious and linguistic composition of 
different ethnic groups in Turkey and especially in Turkish Kurdistan. He presents an 
estimated the number for the Zazas’ population, two million in Turkey but he then 
stresseses that it is only an estimated number. The Turkish censuses, after 1965, have 
not included the question of ethnic origin, since all the population in Turkish Kurdistan 
is considered as Turkish. All in all, Andrews’ book will be important to my study for 
its content of detailed data and identity analysis. 
 
On the other hand, Andrews’ book is not unchallenged for some points. It has been two-
and-a-half decades since the book was published. Therefore, the analyses with regards 
to identity dynamics that are made in his book are in a sense out of date, as the shift in 
identity construction in Kird/Zaza identity is by scholars dealing of this subject 
considered to be a new and ongoing process. Political identity construction for the case 
of the Kird/Zaza started in the 1980s, which coincides with the date of the publication 
of Andrews’ book. Since then, the identity dynamics for Çewlig/Bingöl or/and all the 
Zaza population have changed, which weakens the contribution of this book to my 
research. 
 
Abbas Vali’s article “Genealogies of the Kurds: Constructions of Nation and National 
Identity in Kurdish Historical Writings” in his book Essays on the Origins of Kurdish 
Nationalism (2003) has a great deal of information and a different perspective that could 
potentially contribute to this paper. Vali argues that, although nationalist discourse 
recognises the present fragmentation of the nationalist political plan resulting from the 
division of Kurdistan, it retains the idea of uniform community and identity, conceived 
as expressions of the common origin, which supersede the existing political boundaries 
and the structural diversity of Kurdish societies in the region. This is similar to the 





In his article, Vali points out that notions of Kurdish community and identity are both 
premised on the common constituent elements of Kurdish national origin and identity. 
His article arguably attempts to posit a political identity as opposed to the assimilation 
policies of all the four states (Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria) where indigenous Kurds live 
as citizens of the countries. Ethnicists’ construction of the common origin thus provide 
the discursive field for the construction of national identity, which always involves 
essentialist claims to the common origin.  This set of the discourses of origin and 
identity in the ethnicity method means that ethnic categories alone define the 
boundaries of the Kurdish community. Moreover, they explain a historically and 
culturally defined zone of inclusion and exclusion which persistently affirms the 
uniform identity of the Kurdish community by contrasting its ethnic origin to those of 
the surrounding Turkish, Arab and Persian communities.   
 
Vali’s argues that the denial of Kurdish identity and the destruction of civil society in 
Kurdistan were the necessary conditions of the construction of a uniform national 
identity in these multi-ethnic nation-states. This allocates a specific character to 
Kurdish nationalism, setting it apart from classical nationalism in Europe. The shift in 
the Kird/Zaza identity in Çewlig/Bingöl or in wholly Zaza-inhabited areas in Turkey 
seems to follow this path too. Therefore, the article will be used to broaden the 
analytical perspectives in my thesis.   
 
Vali’s article presents a perspective that includes references to identity in historical 
bases, a style that does not exist in much other contemporary research in the field of 
Kurdish studies. It attempts to make connections to the past, to the key historical events 
and key personalities, which could help in the argument sections of this thesis. 
Furthermore, it makes references to the Sheik Said revolt in 1925, an important 
historical event as a base for Kird/Zaza identity, from which my research will make 
connections and benefit stylistically. Nevertheless, Vali’s article includes limitations, 
especially applied to my research. Although he counts Zazas as a Kurdish sub-group, 
he rarely makes direct references to the Zazakî speaking group in his paper. This 





I.5 Methodological Considerations 
1.5.1 Broader Research Context 
The 20th century proved to be a difficult period for researchers within all disciplines 
concerned with ethnic minorities within the Turkish territories. Significantly, research 
regarding ‘the other’ (sunni)Muslim ethnicities was mainly supported directly or 
indirectly by the Turkish state in order to prove that ‘the others’ were not actually that 
different from the Turks but, in fact, were originally Turks or Turkic tribes. This was 
more obvious in the rural areas. The Kurds, including the Zazas, are mainly Sunnis, like 
most Turks, but constitute, nevertheless, the biggest ethnicity after the Turks in the 
Turkish Republic151. The state has attempted to Turkify them for decades. It has been a 
process started from the very early of the establishment of the Turkish nation state, 
however, this process in the 1908s stepped into a new form152.  What is the hallmark of 
this new era is that this Turkification has in this period in addition to the assimilation 
policy aimed also at dividing the Kurds as best as possible. 
 
Çewlîg/Bingöl’s Kird/Zaza identity is a field where hardly any academic research has 
been conducted. Although several academic and non-academic studies have been 
carried out on the subject in a broader sense (on Kurds generally or on Dersim’s Alevi 
Kirmanc/Zaza identity) 153 , there is hardly any work dealing with Çewlîg/Bingöl’s 
Sunni Muslim Kird/Zaza identity. Furthermore, given the topic’s academic novelty, as 
well as its political sensitivity, my research approach has been adjusted so as to better 
address these two issues, as will be presented below.  
 
Identity construction has only recently become important for the inhabitants of 
Çewlig/Bingöl. The subjects of this identity, who previously were mainly the 
‘objects’154 in these identity debates, the local Kirds/Zazas themselves, were not asked 
to define their own identity. Until the early 1980s, this was rather done by ‘outsiders’ 
such as the Turkish state and the Kurdish nationalist movement, which made identity 
                                                 
151 Yavuz, `Five stages of the construction of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey`, 1-24. 
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considerations rather detached from the people whose identity was being debated. In 
the results of my fieldwork, this assertion is clearly visible. One can also mark a reaction 
to ‘outsider’ identity constructors on the ground.   
     
1.5.2 Research Methods 
This study will mainly adopt qualitative research approaches: as will be shown, such 
approaches can better make sense of the multiplicity of data available without 
compromising validity or credibility. As Brady and Collier suggest, such research 
should “maximize the validity of measurements”. 155  In other words, it should use 
reliable data-collection procedures that, if applied again, should yield almost the same 
data. Although studies in identity construction may not be measured on a scientific level, 
the case in my fieldwork area tends to be in line with the above argument of Brady and 
Collier. 
 
The present study on the construction and consolidation of Zaza identity, can be 
methodologically placed within the tradition of sociology, as well as political and 
cultural anthropology. 156  Although the main approach of this study aims to take 
advantage of the political anthropology field, 157  it will also benefit from other 
disciplines, such as sociology and political sciences, and subject fields where identity 
construction research topics can be placed.158 
 
For methodological purposes, the study will draw on the multi-disciplinary approach 
of general qualitative research.159 It is worth further explaining the importance of a 
qualitative research approach in gathering and analysing data. Denzin and Linkoln have 
defined qualitative research as: “multi-method in focus, involving an interpretive, 
naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This would mean that qualitative researchers 
study in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in 
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terms of the meanings people bring to them”. 160  They then argue that qualitative 
research involves the studied use and collection of a variety of empirical materials - 
case studies, personal experience, introspectives, life stories, interviews and 
observational, historical, interactional, and visual texts that describe routine and 
problematic moments and meanings in individuals’ lives. This definition clearly links 
qualitative research methods with my own research needs, thus demonstrating the 
importance of this method for my own study. The main aspects of qualitative research, 
such as interviews, observation, participant observation and discourse analysis, will be 
used extensively in this work, which further explains why the qualitative method has 
been selected.  
 
One important point to consider is the way of analysing data through an interpretive 
process within the qualitative approach. As Brady and Collier suggest, the research 
should “maximize the validity of measurements”.161 Furthermore, researchers “should 
use reliable data-collection procedures which, if applied again, would yield the same 
data”.162 Finally, there are many elements that need to be considered when designing 
qualitative research in the social sciences,163 such as the rationale for choosing certain 
methodologies, and how one contends with the obstacles which will inevitably arise 
during the research process. 
 
This research makes use of several methodological tools: semi-structured interviews, 
observation and participant observation, group interviews and discourse analysis. Since 
the study will tackle different identity markers, such as cultural, national, religious, 
linguistic and political features amongst the Kirdki/Zazakî speakers of Çewlîg/Bingöl, 
it urges the researcher to consider both individual and collective levels of identity. 
Moreover, the fact that I come from the area, speak Kirdkî/Zazakî, am a Sunni Muslim, 
and have lived there most of my life, has partly defined my choice of study and, coupled 
with the relative lack of published sources, has led me to prioritise primary sources.  
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Qualitative approaches are also preferable due to the local specificity of the topic, 
especially considering the great number of variables, which are present in the local 
identity construction. As Creswell points out, “qualitative researchers rely on a few 
cases and many variables”.164 Moreover, this study has three methods of collecting data, 
which are all qualitative. Firstly, it uses discourse analysis. Secondly, it benefits from 
interviews, both semi structured and open-ended. Finally, it makes use of observation 
and participant observations. 
 
When using secondary sources such as historical accounts on Çewlîg/Bingöl, 1925 will 
be taken as main starting point. This is the year when the Sheikh Said revolt against the 
Turkish Republic took place, two years after the Turkish Republic’s establishment. It 
is an extremely important moment for the Kurdish and Zaza identity construction, and 
also on a political level, and is still referred to today. That moment is considered, 
particularly among the elderly generation in the region, as an important breakthrough 
point in the region’s history. They argue that this moment was the beginning of a new 
era when Kirds/Zazas and/or Kurds in the region started to seek a future apart from 
Turks.165 This, in a sense, could be pointed out as one of the significant times for the 
Kird/Zaza identity, since the revolt took place in Çewlig/Bingöl and in the neighbouring 
areas.  
 
My study will try to specifically examine the most important turning point in local 
identity construction: how the Turkish state applied policies of Turkification in the area, 
and later on how the state conceptualised Zazas as being a separate people, mainly by 
stressing the religious marker of identity and undermining the ethnicity marker. By 
undermining the ethnic identity of the Kird/Zazas, the Turkish state was aiming to 
separate them from the Kurmanjs166 or Kurds in the region. In addition to this, this 
thesis will also deal with language as a marker of identity, examining the role of 
language in defining the potential Kurdishness of the Zazas. Furthermore, it will also 
examine the identity discourses utilised by intellectuals and politicians in the region.  
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Other significant factors such as folklore, music, dances and celebrations, will also be 
analysed as part of the Kird/Zaza identity. To what extent does localised culture differ 
from that of the surrounding Kurmanj, Alevis and Turks? More importantly, who uses 
what discourse and how do they use it, when it comes to discussing identity matters in 
the region or in the discussions regarding the Kird/Zazas? It is significantly important 
to highlight these different perspectives in Çewlig/Bingöl, as they will support the main 
arguments that this thesis asserts. 
 
I have conducted over forty interviews with politicians, intellectuals, public servants, 
writers, researchers and members of the public to acquire as many perspectives as 
possible, from whoever has had a say on the identity of Kird/Zazas in Çewlîg/Bingöl. I 
have a total of forty five hours of interviews during my seven fieldwork trips for this 
study. Interviews were held in Çewlîg/Bingöl and in the surrounding region, other areas 
of Turkey, and in Sweden. Secondly, I have many audio records, tapes, recordings, 
photos etc., which I have collected during my fieldwork trips. Thirdly, I have analysed 
written sources such as books, journals and magazines. Finally, this study analyses 
audio and visual sources, including videos from social media, musical records, 
videotapes and maps from the Internet. Creswell points out the importance of audio and 
visual sources in such studies.167 
 
One of the main methods of collecting data in this thesis is through interviews. There 
are over twenty semi-structured, open-ended interviews with important personalities in 
the construction of Kird/Zaza identity. Silverman suggests, “interviewing provides a 
way of generating empirical data about the social world by asking people to talk about 
their lives. In this respect, interviews are special forms of conversation”.168 This applies 
especially during face-to-face interviews. The whole dynamics of the interview, 
sometimes beyond the word, are assessed:  how the respondent(s) act(s) during the 
interview, how they react to the questions and how they convey meaning through body 
language. Thus, a combination of the verbal and non-verbal information, as well as 
general observation, can give a fuller image of the dynamics in place. Thus, the 
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researcher must carefully take the social and political circumstances into account while 
conducting interviews. This is also the case when the researcher observes a speech, a 
political or cultural gathering, a meeting, etc.  
 
Oral history sources are of great use for research that focuses on ethnic identity, as in 
the case of this thesis. Since this research makes extensive references to the past, as far 
back as 1925 when the Sheikh Said revolt took place, the importance of collecting data 
from oral history means cannot be ignored. On the other hand, oral history/memories 
have a number of critics in the field of social sciences. Sometimes memories are flawed, 
and there are specific political/cultural/social motivations to why people remember 
certain things and forget others. Arthur Marwick and Eric Hobsbawm169 tend to critique 
oral accounts as sources. Jan Vansina on the other hand argues against these scholars, 
and instead suggests that oral history is valuable for such studies.170 There is a tendency 
to make more use of oral history in contemporary studies, and this thesis argues that 
oral history can be of great benefit when examining the construction of identity in this 
case.  
 
Having stressed the importance of face-to-face interviews, it is crucial to make use of 
visual data during political discourses, where all the reactions of the informants can be 
observed. Moreover, during a face-to-face interview, it is likely that interviewer and 
interviewee interactive, much more involved in the subjects that concern the research. 
Silverman stresses that face-to-face interviews are mainly “collaborative 
accomplishments, involving participants in meaning-making work in the process”.171 
This was the case in many examples for my fieldwork. 
 
As a native of the area being researched, it should be noted that, my whole life 
experience there is in some way participant observation. I have made extensive use of 
both participant and non-participant observation during my field trips. These were 
mainly conducted in politically tense times, during cultural activities, educational 
activities etc. In group gatherings such as seminars, conferences and social activities, it 
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was always informative to observe not only what was being said, but also how it was 
said, and how the activities were presented/visualised. I believe I have collected 
substantial and insightful information from these experiences, which I will make use of 
extensively throughout this thesis. The fieldwork data will present a clear perspective 
of Kird/Zaza identities, and how they are lived, negotiated, presented and voiced in 
Çewlîg/Bingöl. Finally, the data will contribute greatly to the further main analytical 
chapters.  
 
1.5.3 Positionality: Advantages and Disadvantages of Being an ‘Insider’ 
Since I am a local of Çewlig/Bingöl myself, which helps me to have an insider 
perspective in identity building, I have an informed knowledge of the actors and 
contributing sources in identity construction in the region, as well as the ways to best 
approach informants and material. The correct selection of informants is always 
important. Earlier stage of my life as the researcher, gives an insigt that an outsider 
would not possibly have as an advantage. The author of this thesis was grown in the 
region, his identity was sahped by the events and cultural inputs and as a result he chose 
to study this topic. The politisition of this topic was less in the earlier decades; it became 
politised with political actors taking a more direct role and with the accessibility of 
media means. In this selection the voice is given to all the different parties for the 
desired outcome of the fieldwork. What they say would contribute fundamentally in the 
this study. 
 
On the other hand, being a local also entails some disadvantages. Firstly, it can 
compromise neutrality, which is crucial to research. However, every researcher will 
carry a certain amount of bias.172 This is therefore an obstacle every social scientist will 
have to overcome. Secondly, the informants may know who you are, which can easily 
lead them to label you either as ‘other’ according to local levels of micro-identities, or 
‘local-from us’ enough to know all the answers they could possibly offer. This can put 
the researcher in difficulty to access all the sides equally. Moreover, participants might, 
for instance, expect you to act as an activist, a family member or a friend, rather than 
as an academic researcher. In all of these cases, the researcher’s relation to the locality 
                                                 





may also result in informants’ adjusting or limiting the provision of information. In 
addition, they might not be aware of the procedural ethics of academia or may simply 
not give as much priority to these rules as a researcher would.  
 
Thirdly, if the researcher-local displays a neutral stance, this can result in the informants 
regarding him/her as someone who holds different political views from themselves, 
which may again limit his/her access to relevant informants. Finally, delicate issues like 
identity construction can put the researcher’s informants, friends and family members 
in a politically difficult/dangerous situation. 
 
However, being a researcher who is a native to the region being researched also has 
several advantages. One of the main benefits is being able to speak and understand the 
relevant languages, in this case Kirdkî/Zazakî, Kurmanjî, Turkish and as well as in my 
case English, which is of great value for any social research. Moreover, familiarity with 
the socio-political landscape of the area will help me to access the most relevant places 
or people of interest for the research topic. Also, if the informants trust the researcher 
and believe that the study will make an academic contribution which is beneficial to 
them, they may share the information to the best of their knowledge. Lastly, travels and 
accommodation for a local researcher are less complicated. I, as an insider researcher, 
will no doubt reflect my ideas throughout the thesis. However, I will aim to respect the 
ethic aspect of a social sciences research and bare that in mind. The reflection a life 
experience will be part of the thesis and it is tolerated to a certain extend.  
 
1.6 Fieldwork Undertaken From 2011 – 2013 
Criteria in Choosing My Sources: 
While choosing the relevant primary and secondary sources, I considered what is 
relevant according to the research questions of my thesis. In particular, while choosing 
the primary sources and informants, I always had in mind the three main identity actor 
perspectives: pro-Turkish state, pro-Kurdish nationalism, and the pro-Zaza nationalist 
groups. I have also considered the sub-groups of these three main stances. Furthermore, 
I followed the same criteria in the selection of local media, social media, satellite 
sources, journals etc., thus aiming to give voice to all the actors of Kird/Zaza identity 




identity construction phenomenon is still relatively new and is an ongoing process in 
the region. The selection of the informants does play an important role in this thesis as 
this identity process is a new and still ongoing one. 
 
1.6.1 Some Data Collected from Fieldwork Trips Undertaken (2011 – 2013)  
I went to observe an international two-day conference on the Dersim genocide held at 
the European Parliament in Brussels on the 26-27 May 2011. This was the fourth 
conference held in Europe on the genocide. There were presentations by intellectuals 
from Dersim, journalists from Turkey and Kurds in the diaspora, who stated that it was 
a part of a systematic ethnic cleansing campaign. Furthermore, they stated that as a 
result of this campaign, tens of thousands of people lost their lives and many more of 
Dersimis173 were forced to migrate. I also met two prominent figures from Çewlig/ 
Bingöl whom I interviewed Kadir Armanc, an ex member of pro-Turkish state state 
religious group and a writer stressed that;  
Over yaers of dealing with Turkish state closely, I came to realise that he Turkish state 
was always aiming for disappearance of any form of Kurdish existence. The Conference 
we are attending here in Brussels would not be allowed to orginise in our home state, 
Turkey. This is because it wants to hide the crimes against its own citizens. This 
conference laid out the crimes commited against our Dersim people by the Turksih, 
once again. This state could do these crimes again, even in this 21th century.174 
 
The data extracted from the interviews in the early stage of this thesis, contribute in a 
way that reperesents the local voices which essential for such a study. By eessentiality 
I mean that local people via interviews have been given chance to express their 
understanding of this process which this thesis includes in the identity discussions of 
Kird/ Zaza and Zazaness. My first fieldwork trip was to Çewlig/Bingöl, the region being 
studied in this thesis, where I stayed from May until August 2011. I was acting as an 
interpreter, for the UK election delegation, which was there to observe the 2011 
parliamentary elections. This allowed me to do a participant observation. In these 
meetings with the local political individuals, parties, NGOs, associations, activists and 
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other actors, I was not only translating the questions and conversations, but also 
including my own questions which I aim to benefit from as part of my thesis fieldwork. 
Taking part as a translator allowed me access to inside information, which the subjects 
would not be likely to share if I went there to meet them as an individual researcher.175 
I suggest this could be considered as me being the participant observer as I was raising 
questions, not only as the translator but also as a researcher during those meetings. I 
had informed the interviewees for each group meeting we conducted during the trip that 
I was going to use the information for my research.   
 
During the election campaigns, I mainly observed the two leading political parties’ 
election propaganda meetings. The two main parties are the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which also share the majority 
of the votes in Çewlig/Bingöl.176 For this research it was important to observe what 
kind of rhetoric they were using in their political speeches, which arguments they 
applied to attract the voters, and which language they actually employed in speeches.  
 
Although Zazakî was used, parallel with Turkish, for invitations to their main election 
meeting, the AKP would use only Turkish in their political speeches. The rhetoric was 
centred on the economical improvements which they had succeeded in implementing 
since they came to power in 2002. The BDP on the other hand, mainly used Zazakî 
alongside Kurmanjî and Turkish in their election propaganda. Their arguments mainly 
focused on how the Turkish state did not deliver the same services in the Çewlig/Bingöl 
region as they did in the West of Turkey, and how the state administration did not aspire 
to give collective rights to the Kurds as the second biggest ethnicity after the Turks 
within the Republic. They proposed to the inhabitants that, “we should vote ourselves 
to manage ourselves” locally. They also suggested that the dominance of central 
government should be diminished.  
 
On the same trip, I interviewed academic researchers and intellectuals such as Wisif 
Zozanî (a researcher and writer in Bingöl), Hisar Özsoy (an academic from Bingöl who 
lives in the US), Newzad Dodanij, Ercan Çagdas, Firat Tas (all academics from Bingöl 
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working at the University of Muş), Dogan Karasu (a teacher from Bingöl, and the 
outhor of Dinya’d Yew Darê Ma), Bayram Özdemir (a teacher and human rights 
activist), Mehmud Nêşite (a Zazaki teacher), Bilal Zîlan (an author in the field of Zazaki 
studies), Rosan Lezgîn (a writer in the Zazaki field) and Necati Azak (a teacher of 
theology at a high school in Bingöl). Most of the interviews took place in Çewlig/Bingöl 
and two in Diyarbakir. The main theme of the conversations was the importance of 
mother tongue and why it should become the language of education, not only on private 
courses but also in the public state schools. The majority of the interviewees stressed 
that Zazakî is a dialect of Kurdish, not a language of its own. Furthermore, they stressed 
that the Kurdish movement should not make the same mistake as the Turkish state in 
prioritising the language, and that the same prominence should be given to Zazakî as 
that of Kurmanjî today.  
 
On the same visit, I managed to meet with MPs Idris Baluken (the BDP represenative 
for Çewlig/Bingöl), Altan Tan, Demir Çelik, Ayla Akat Ata, Aysel Tugluk, Hasip 
Kaplan, Adîl Zozanî and Nazmî Gür. All of the delegates above were the BDP’s elected 
MPs in the 2011 parliamentary elections, four of whom are native Zazakî speakers. In 
the 2011 election, the BDP elected 36 MPs, eleven of whom were Zazakî speakers. 
Most of the MP interviewees argued that the only difference between Zaza and Kurmanj 
was that they represent dialects of Kurdish (along with Sorani and Hawrami/Goranî) 
that are spoken in greater Kurdistan. All these different dialects form the language 
called Kurdish, and therefore, help to form Kurds as a nation. They argued that the fact 
that Kurds do not have their own state makes it easier for the Turkish state to interfere 
in discussions of identity and to lead those discussions for its purpose of divide and rule.  
 
As part of gathering the political data of my field research, I attended the Democratic 
Society Congress (DTK) in Diyarbakir to observe the language, rhetoric and discourse 
used there. There were representatives from each city from Turkish Kurdistan, 
including Çewlig/Bingöl. This organisation acts as the umbrella institution for many of 
the pro-Kurdish organisations in the legal arena in Turkey. Some of the Kurdish groups 
opposing the KCK movement do not take part in this umbrella structure. Attending this 
meeting, I observed that the contemporary Kurdish movement plays the role of a mass 




governing system to the Turkish central government. This organization stresses the 
importance of all Kurdish dialects, including Zazakî, as equal. 
 
My second round of fieldwork was a trip to Sweden in September 2011 for ten days. I 
chose Sweden because many Kurdish intellectuals, many of whom fled Turkey during 
and after the army coup in 1980, have permanent residency there. In Sweden, I visited 
the Kurdish Library in Stockholm where I met with the predominant researcher in the 
Zaza/Zazakî field, Mehmed Malmisanij. He introduced me to the archival collection in 
the library. Alongside Malmisanij, I interviewed some other important figures in the 
field such as Cemil Gündoğan, Ihsan Espar and Mehmed Selim Uzun, who are the 
founder members of the VATE group. VATE is a voluntary group of intellectuals all 
of whom are Zazakî speakers from different areas in Turkey, which they themselves 
call ‘North Kurdistan’. They meet every six months to work on a standardisation of the 
Zazakî language, so that it can be written in a form that all Zazakî speakers in Turkey 
can use as their common written and spoken language. Bearing in mind that Zazakî is 
not a language of education in its homeland and that it is classified as ‘vulnerable’177 in 
the UNESCO list of endangered languages, this standardisation group seems vital to 
keep it alive. Furthermore, this group also plays an important role in discussion of 
discussion. The group currently have a publishing house, Vate, which publishes 
extensively on the field of Zazakî. They also organise conferences, seminars and panels 
regarding identity issues. 
 
For a third phase of fieldwork, I went on a short trip to Çewlig/Bingöl in December 
2011 for two weeks to conduct further interviews with local ‘common citizens’. Once 
there, I met with local citizens for both one-to-one and group interviews.178 These 
people had not previously reflected seriously on the local identity issues. What the ‘big’ 
names (such as MPs, academic staff of the Universities, and directors employed in the 
state institutions) said in the media and in academia regarding ‘who we are’ did, 
however, matter to them. These profiles are usually the local figures that work in co-
operation with the AKP government, and whom are locally well known, often on a 
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personal level. Nevertheless, when I asked questions with regards to cultural aspects 
such as what music they listen to, what folklore they think of as theirs, and which 
traditions they carry forward, the answer was generally that they consider themselves 
‘Kurds’ and/or ‘Eastern’,179 indicating that they consider their culture is different from 
Turkish culture. 
 
I went on my forth trip to Çewlig/Bingöl in August 2012 for four weeks, where I carried 
on interviewing locals regarding the research topic. There I managed to interview 
common citizens, who were not involved in formal politics, including four elderly 
people from whom I gained valuable information regarding the perspective of an elder 
generation. 
 
The fifth research trip which I took was in February 2013 to Istanbul for two weeks. 
My aim for this trip was to arrange an interview with the Vate publishing house, which 
was established in 2003, and publishes mainly in Zazakî. As previously mentioned, 
Vate is also the name for the Zazakî standardization group, which was founded in 1996 
in Sweden. I failed to meet with Deniz Gündüz, the founder of the publishing house, 
due to unexpected schedule changes. Instead, I managed to arrange an interview with 
Süleyman Çevik, the editor-in-chief for Nûbîhar magazine and publishing house, who 
is a Zaza from Diyarbakir himself. This publishing group has publications in both 
Kurmanjî and Zazakî. The Nûbîhar magazine is known for its religious perspective and 
pro-Kurdish tendency in Turkey, and it has been publishing journals and magazines 
since 1992. In my interview with Çevik and two other of his colleagues, they expressed 
in short their opinion that Kurmanjî and Zazakî together form a Kurdish language, and 
difference of dialect is not a marker to distinguish the speakers of these two dialects as 
two different ethnicities. In fact, they stated, “there is richness to this language, which 
should be secured through education in the mother tongue”. They made a strong 
reference to their Kurdishness as the Zazakî speakers of the Kurds. 
 
I went on my sixth field trip in June 2013 and stayed Çewlig/Bingöl and the region for 
three months. There I conducted some further interviews with intellectuals, academics 
and politicians that I failed to meet on my previous trips. I collected extensive data, 
                                                 




which I made use of in my analytical chapters. There was shift in the politics of the 
region as the BDP party began securing its place in the political arena of Çewlig/Bingöl 
following the position that it gained in the last parliamentary election. It dominated the 
local politics along with the government party the AKP. 
 
1.6.2 The Visit To Observe the Parliamentary Elections Çewlig/Bingöl Province 
(30/05/11 – 24/06/11) 
 
My visit this time, apart from Solhan - a town in Çewlig/Bingöl where most of the 
populations speak Kirdki/Zazakî - took me to Çewlig/Bingöl, Diyarbakir, Mardin, 
Batman, Lice (town of Diyarbakir/border of Çewlig/Bingöl with its Kurmanjî and 
Kirdki/Zazakî speaking population), Genç (town of Bongöl, Kirdki/Zazakî speakers), 
Karliova (a town of Çewlig/Bingöl and predominantly Kurmanjî speakers) and certain 
villages in Solhan, Çewlig/Bingöl and Karliova. I spent a week in Solhan and 
Çewlig/Bingöl talking with a selection of their inhabitants, to get their perspectives on 
the elections. It seemed to me that everyone knew everything about the local politics 
and identity dynamics, or at least they thought they knew. I then moved on to Diyarbakir 
on the 8th of July, to meet the British Delegation to observe the elections.  
 
On the first day of the visit with the delegation, I went to Mardin with two members of 
the group. I had the chance to visit Mardin Artuklu University.  Although under the 
name of ‘the living languages’, a department there was one of the first Kurdish 
departments in Turkey, established in late 2009. This holds a historic importance in 
Turkish academia since the establishment of the state in 1923. At the Artuklu University, 
the academic staff including Prof Kadri Yildirim, Dr Ibrahim Bor and Dr Abdurrahman 
Adak, welcomed us warmly. Furthermore, I met with some teaching assistants and 
postgraduate students, some of whom were working on Zazakî in personal and 
academic capacities. We were informed about the work that the department carries out, 
as well as discussing the interest shown amongst the students. Bearing in mind that up 
until recently Kurds were not even able to speak their language within their own 
homeland, or declare themselves as Kurdish, this small achievement seemed to all of 
them as significant. The overall view there was that Kurmanjs and Zazas are sub-groups 





On the 9th of June, in Batman we briefly met Serhat Temel (who was replacing Nejdet 
Atalay, the imprisoned mayor as part of the Peoples' Confederation of Kurdistan (KCK) 
trial) and the two Batman MPs who were running as independent candidates, Ayla Akat 
Ata (a Kird/Zaza from Dicle/Diyarbakir) and Bengi Yildiz. They briefed us on the main 
BDP principles: a) reducing the 10% parliamentary threshold in order to give voice 
more political parties in the national assembly; b) the right to use the Kurdish language; 
c) stopping the military operations in the region; and d) the release of so-called 
Kurdistan Societies Congress (KCK) suspects from prison, in particular the elected 
politicians. I also had the chance to briefly interview Ayla Akat Ata, a Kird/ Zaza 
herself, about their party’s tolerance policies towards the Zaza identity. She said in short 
that:  
The Kurdish movement and their party, BDP, does not make any differentiation in 
terms of identity. The fact that the Kurdish language has sub-dialects does not mean 
that they are different identities; it is indeed a richness that Kurdish language and the 
culture consist of, and they would keep it alongside with the variety of cultures in 
Mesopotamia.180 
The presence of Turkish state security forces was not as obvious as in Çewlig/Bingöl. 
However, it could be observed that there was mistrust between the people and the state’s 
security forces.  
In Lice, I observed the Friday prayers as part of civil disobedience, and an alternative 
way of locals conducting their religious activity. The locals told us that Lice was 
destroyed twice, in 1993 and 1994, for its support to the PKK, and its population has 
been reduced by almost a half because of this. The pro-Kurdish movement people there 
had chosen alternative prayers organised by the Democratic People’s Congress (DTK). 
They prayed outside the mosque with their backs turned to the mosque. We were told 
that this was an alternative against the Turkish state’s mosque prayers. They added 
saying “the state uses the mosques for its political propaganda and uses religion as a 
tool to assimilate the Kurdish people”. The prayers were conducted in Kurdish and 
without the standard Friday speech, which we were told, is written by Ankara clerics in 
line with the central state policies. In his speech, the Imam was simply pointing out the 
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importance of a mother language, self-determination and the struggle for homeland, 
and he backed all his speech with references either from the Qur’an or Islamic religious 
leaders.  
 
As a local of Çewlig/Bingöl, I have witnessed all the election campaigns for the last 20 
years in the Kurdish region, particularly in my hometown of Çewlig/Bingöl. For the 
last five elections – accordingly in 2002, 2004, 2007, 2009 and 2011. I   have been 
acting either as an interpreter or as a member of the various election 
delegations/observers from different countries in Europe. Those election campaigns 
have always been exciting and colourful, full of political discussions, which were 
always in line with my current research topic. This has also helped me to shape my 
research project.  
 
When I arrived to the region two weeks before the elections in 2011, surprisingly, the 
election campaigns were not as apparent on the streets in comparison to previous 
elections. This was probably because of the new methods of the campaign. The new 
media, such as local newspapers, websites, Facebook and Twitter, were now being used 
as the main way to deliver political messages. When it got closer to the Election Day, 
the campaign started to become more apparent on the streets as well.  
 
Traditionally, the ruling parties have always used the state resources to gain the votes. 
For instance related to this kinds of deploy of state resources amied at gaining or 
remaining in power Sabri Sayari holds that 
The DP, which came to power in 1950 and remained the governing party for a decade, 
played a major role in the growth of party-directed patronage in Turkish politics. The 
DP’s leadership understood the importance of party patronage and used its access to 
state resources to broaden its popular support by rewarding rural communities which 
voted for it (or pledged to vote in the next elections) with new roads, electricity, water, 
and various public works [for instance] during the 1950s, political clientelism and 
patronage increasingly became established facts of Turkish political life.181 
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The ex-Diyarbakir MP, a representative of the Republican Peoples Party (CHP), Mesut 
Değer, informed the press that the AKP has manipulated the election by giving the 
voters direct benefits from public funds.182 Those resources were/are promising jobs, 
delivering services, promising contracts for state projects (to family and business 
leaders), and giving gifts such as white goods for households, food packages, money 
etc.183 In Çewlig/ Bingöl, on the local scale, there were also claims by inhabitants in 
line with Mr Deger’s argument. During the local interviews in Çewlig/ Bingöl, Mr 
Yanilmaz pointed out that this bribery mostly takes place in the last weeks of the 
election campaigns, and it has become more systematic during the AKP’s period of rule 
in the last nine years.184 
 
In Çewlig/Bingöl province, the AKP won all the three MP seats in the 2002 
parliamentary elections.  It nominated three different candidates and won all the seats 
again in the 2007 elections, and it nominated only one of the previous candidates 
alongside two new members for the 2011 parliamentary elections. All those changes of 
candidates in each election were due to the dissatisfaction of their voter base in 
Çewlig/Bingöl. The local intellectuals stressed that, by losing one parliamentary seat, 
the AKP would start losing more of its popularity to the BDP or other pro-Kurdish 
political parties in the future elections.185 
 
The independent/BDP candidate, now MP, is a doctor who worked at the 
Çewlig/Bingöl’s state hospital for five years before he moved to Diyarbakir in 2009. 
He has a good reputation among the people in Çewlig/Bingöl, most of which comes 
from his time in service at the hospital as a medical doctor. An old citizen in 
Çewlig/Bingöl pointed out: ‘He was one of us, sharing our values, talking in our own 
language when needed, who genuinely cared about us’. I have witnessed several people 
saying: ‘even though I will not vote for him, I have nothing to say against him’. In 
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contrast to the previous elections, this time the BDP candidate carried out an intensive 
election campaign, visiting all the towns including many villages, and having one-to-
one contact with as many people as he and his team could.186 
 
The state has always paid massive attention to Çewlig/Bingöl province, as it is 
geographically, socially and politically in a crucial position. Being situated between 
Elaziğ (mostly Turkified), Dersim (mostly in line with the Kemalist CHP with its 
predominantly Alevi population), Muş (a large percentage of its population being 
ethnically Kurd and generally pro-Kurdish movement) and Amed/Diyarbakir (the 
symbolic city/unofficial capital of the Kurdish struggle in Turkey), Çewlig/Bingöl 
holds an important position both for the Turkish state and for the contemporary Kurdish 
movement. Ironically, the Turkish state seems to have ‘succeeded’ in assimilating most 
of the Elaziğ province and huge area of thef Dersim provinces where the two major 
Kurdish revolts (the Sheikh Said revolt in 1925 and Seyyid Riza’s Dersim revolt in 
1938) took place following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. The state had 
a special focus on the region, applying assimilation methods by using various policies. 
The state had used education for its assimilation strategies. Furthermore, it introduced 
the ban of the Kurdish, language and the ban of cultural rights. This left a traumatic 
effect on today’s older generation. An informant said “I remember when the uprisings 
started taking place in other parts of Kurdistan in the 1990s, older people were saying: 
‘Even the great Sheikh Said could not overcome the cruel state, how dare the Kurdish 
movement is standing up against the Turkish state!’187 This was simply a sign of lack 
in confidence on individual and collective levels. For the older generation who had 
witnessed the “historical defeats” of the Kurds, it was dangerous even to dream about 
any sort of self-determination for their ethnic and national existence.  
 
The PKK started spreading in Çewlig/Bingöl later than it did in many other provinces 
in South-Eastern Turkey. Therefore the mobilisation of this region, in the form of 
awakening their national feelings, was also delayed. This was the first time that a pro-
Kurdish nationalist party elected an MP in Çewlig/Bingöl province. The supporters of 
the BDP welcomed the results of the 2011 parliamentary elections with great pleasure. 
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The evening following the Election Day in Çewlig/Bingöl was a historic event with 
much passion, anger, happiness, and finally a great eruption of joy just after midnight 
when the local results were finally announced formally. Çewlig/Bingöl, one of the 
smallest cities in Turkey, which holds only three out of 550 seats of the general 
parliament in Ankara, was the last city along with Urfa (another city in the Kurdish 
region holding 12 seats) to have its election results announced in the whole of Turkey. 
Çewlig/Bingöl’s election results were delayed for four hours after the final results came 
in for the major cities of Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Diyarbakir, and people were 
beginning to worry, telling each other of ‘bad experiences’ from the previous elections, 
and ‘of votes being stolen’, including in the last local elections in 2009. Between 5000 
and 7000 locals gathered outside the Çewlig/Bingöl branch of High Election Board 
building, where the final vote counting took place (with the aim of ‘protecting their 
votes from the state’), and around 20,000 waited in front of the BDP’s main election 
office in the city centre, sometimes dancing, sometimes crying, hugging friends and 
strangers out of joy or sadness and anger. This went on throughout the evening and 
night of the general election day in 2011.188 
 
When the newly elected MP Dr Idris Baluken finally went on the balcony to deliver the 
‘victory speech’ at 1 am, the main street became a massive festival area with groups of 
people dancing around the drum and pipe players. The individuals were simply shouting 
out “this is the beginning of the end for the AKP and central governments; we will win 
the next elections”, referring to the 2014 local elections. They went on saying, “we will 
elect Firat Anli as our mayor in 2014”. Firat Anli was one of the famous KCK trial 
prisoners in Diyarbakir prison who was the previous candidate for the local elections in 
Çewlig/Bingöl in 2009. When the KCK wave of arrests took place following the 2009 
local elections, he was among the first arrests. He was released in early 2013 after nearly 
four years of the trial period that he spent in Turkish state prison.    
 
The police and the army forces in the city were on alert during the election campaign 
in Çewlig/Bingöl. A few incidents happened before and after the elections. For instance, 
following the BDP’s main election meeting in Çewlig/Bingöl, on the 10th of June 2011, 
just two days before the election a well-known lawyer Ömer Faruk Ersöz, the previous 
                                                 




Democratic Society Party (DTP) and BDP chair of Çewlig/Bingöl (whose candidacy 
for the local elections of 2009 was rejected by the High Court) was tortured by the 
civilian polices on the outskirts of Çewlig/Bingöl. When his lawyers met him after three 
days in the local state prison, they discovered that he was left with his nose, arm and 
ribs broken, and had marks all over his body.189 This was once again a sign that whoever 
stands to represent a pro-Kurdish party would be under a threat from the state’s security 
forces.  
 
During the election campaigns, the AKP used a religious rhetoric to gain votes. 
Çewlig/Bingöl is known for its religious identity. The AKP, in its electoral campaigns 
during the last decade, argued that the BDP does not respect Çewlig/Bingöl’s religious 
identity. Its main emphasis has been that the AKP represents the actual identity of 
Bingöl, as it sees the Muslim unity as the primary identity.190 On the other hand the 
BDP stressed that the Kurds do not need ‘the others/outsiders’ as their religious teachers. 
The BDP argued that the locals were aware of their religious identity, which is Islam.191 
The BDP have also stressed the importance of the democratic autonomy project to solve 
the Kurdish issue, suggesting that, Ankara’s central governments do not share resources 
equally and that the Kurdish region was always disadvantaged compared to the other 
areas in Turkey. 
 
To sum up, the emotions of both sides (the BDP voters and the Turkish state 
forces/institutions) were interesting to observe. There were clearly two completely 
different perspectives: neither of the sides felt they belonged with the other, and it was 
a clear ‘us’ and ‘them’ situation that one could observe. Moreover, the people in the 
Kurdish area with a pro-Kurdish perspective were losing their ‘belonging’ relationship 
with the Turkish state.  
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1.6.3 Interview with Mr Idris Baluken, the MP of Çewlig/Bingöl for the pro-
Kurdish party BDP 
 
The current MP of Çewlig/Bingöl, Idris Baluken, is the first MP that has ever been 
elected from any pro-Kurdish party’s list in Çewlig/Bingöl. He is a local and a 
Kirdkî/Zazakî speaker. The importance of this selection of interview comes from his 
election, which is seen as a beginning of new dynamics in local politics. The interview 
was conducted during my fieldwork trip in 2011 following the general elections in June, 
when he was elected as a member of the general parliament. The general topic for our 
conversation was why and how he was elected as the first ever pro-Kurdish 
representative in Çewlig/Bingöl. It was important to get his perspective, as his 
membership in the Ankara parliament is a strong sign of the shifting identity of 
Çewlig/Bingöl. 
 
One of the main pieces of information that came out of our conversation, was when 
Baluken stated that the Turkish state had a special focus on Çewlig/Bingöl and Dersim, 
the two dominantly Zazakî speaking main cities in Turkey, in order to diminish the 
memories of the political heritage of their two legendary leaders, Sheikh Said and 
Seyyid Riza, and their revolts against the Turkish state. However, he said, the Kurds 
are loyal to their leaders and will follow their path until they earn their freedom. 
Baluken argued further saying that “if the Turkish state came to accept giving some of 
the collective rights to the Kurds, it is not because it was in its democratisation program 
but it was indeed a result of the continuous resistance that Kurds performed insistently”. 
He pointed out that the state uses the differences of dialect and religion as tools to 
‘confuse’ the identity phenomena to empower their political agenda that ‘Zazas are not 
Kurds’. Further, he pointed out that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has, for the 
first time intentionally, used ‘Zazas’ and ‘Kurds’ separately in a speech during his 
public meeting in Hakkari, in 2009 and later in Çewlig/Bingöl in 2011. Furthermore, 
Baluken said that normally Zazas and Kurmanjs together form Kurds in Turkey, and 
the reason that the current government started using the discourse of two ethnicities is 
just an indication that they are re-formulating the old type of state policies. They now 
rather apply it not via security means, but with a more professional level of assimilation-
aimed techniques. He added that the BDP along with other pro-Kurdish organisations 




and that internal and external improvements will not allow the state to apply the old 
harsh practices again.   
 
Chapter 2: The Historical Background 
Taking the historical aspect for this thesis is essential since there are strong references 
in history of the Kird / Zaza speaking areas that indicate this group of people are a sub-
group of the Kurds. Common history is an important marker when questioning whether 
groups of people are part of same nation or not? The “us” element in the region clearly 
included both Kird / Zaza and Kurmanj as sub-groups of Kurds until recent decades. 
Historically, a clear differentiation between Zazas and Kurmanjs or Kurds in general 
could not be identified even if the before mentioned claim can be s controversial 
assumption however the literature of the Kurdish studies provide with example that 
underlines my assumption. For instance as Jaffer Sheyholislami through his study of 
Kurdish identity, discourse and new media shows, despite the difference of the dealted 
however the sense of self-understanding as’ Kurds’ is an visible and stroge factors 
within the Zazaki and Hawrami speaking Kurdish communities in Sheyholislami’s 
works. 
 
The Internet has also fostered the maintenance and promotion of Kurdish speech varieties such 
as Hawrami and Zazaki, which have fewer speakers compared to Kurmanji and Sorani. There 
are several websites, for example Hawraman (www.hawraman.com), that that actively use the 
Hawrami variety and promote its status. Other sites, such as Dibistana Kurdî (Kurdish School) 
(modersmal.skolutveckling.se/ nordkurdiska/zazaki/start.htm), use Dimli or Zazaki as their 
communication medium and they teach the language. There are sites that are entirely or 
predominantly in Zazaki (e.g.,www.zazaki.net). It is important to note that while these websites 
are very keen in presenting Hawrami or Zazaki as distinct languages, they do insist on their 
Kurdishness192.  
 
A clear dispute is identifiable related who to articulate and view the identity of the Zaza. 
For instance this confusing is clearly reflected in the study of Krisztin Kehl‐Bodrogi 
which is partially related to ‘the problem of ethnic identity of the Zazas.’ Kehl‐Bodrogi 
words;  
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If it ever took notice of them, the world outside generally regarded (and mostly still 
regards) the Zazas as Kurds. This notion becomes less certain, however, when one 
examines the indigenous categories of collective identity in the region based on 
religious affiliation rather than on language or historical origin, the operative social 
boundary running between orthodoxy (Sunni Islam) and heterodoxy (Alevism).193  
However based on my assumption as has in the previous chapters been 
justified/clarified would, the historical background of this study will deal with thesis in 
a manner of common history (for Zazas and Kurmanjs/Kurds in Turkey) until 1970s. 
One of this thesis’s main emphases is that, following the establishment of the Turkish 
Republic in 1923, which was followed by a new (second) constitution in 1924, the 
Turks were proclaimed as the liberators and founders of the state. This has resulted in 
unrest among the Kurds. Kurds began their oppositional stance against the Republic of 
Turkey, and various revolts took place between 1925 and 1937. The Turkish state 
reacted in a rather defensive way and suppressed the uprising of the Kurds militarily. 
After the triumph over the Kurds, the Turkish state designed policies of divide and rule. 
The state institutions initiated a political engineering project to ‘persuade’ the Zazas 
that they were not Kurds. This policy served its designers in some areas of Zaza-
inhabited areas of Elazig, Dersim, and in minor areas of Diyarbakir, Bingöl and Muş. 
Moreover, it impacted even some groups of Kurmanj speakers with a sense of 
assimilation. 
 
The thesis will group the Zazas together with the Kurds until late 1970s in the literature. 
From the late 1970s, some individuals of the Zaza elite and connected groups have 
taken a role as active actors or subjects towards the position that suggests that “Zazas 
are not Kurds”. Thus, the research will differentiate the Zazas from the Kurds after this 
date, and therefore the literature will be discussed in accordance.  
 
The Kurds, like many other ethno-national groups in the world, are comprised of 
various different social groups, dialects and religious groups. The emergence of several 
nation state following the First World War, in particularly in the Middle East, led to the 
weakening of ethnic identification, as national identities were strengthened194. In the 
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Republic of Turkey, the nationalist project resulted in the creation of a strong Turkish 
national identity at the expense of ethnic minority groups such as the Kurds and 
Armenians during the first few decades of the Turkish state. In the Kurdish case, 
‘Turkification’ has served as a divisive tool emphasising intra-ethnic groupings each 
concerned with their specific political, economic and religious grievances.195  This 
process of ‘divide and rule’ strengthened Turkish nationalism while at the same time 
reinforcing linguistic and religious differentiations among the Kurds, especially 
between the Zaza and the Kurmanj, and the Alevi and the Sunni. It can be said that the 
Turkish state has been the architect of a highly coherent and strong nation state, 
cultivated from the elimination of opposing ethno-national identities. 
 
2.1 Kurdish History towards the End of the Ottoman Empire 
It is hard to discern a strong Kurdish identity under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. 
The Ottoman Empire was kept united by the idea of millet,196 which allowed different 
cultures, ethnicities and religions to live freely under Ottoman rule without being 
subject to intervention in their domestic affairs so long as they fulfilled their economic 
responsibilities. Therefore, not only for the Kurds as an ethnic group within the 
phenomena of millet under the Ottoman rule, but also for many other ethnicities, local 
identities were not sources of discontentment. This was the case until the beginning of 
19th century. Following the 1789 French revolution, the world entered into the new era 
of nation states. By the 1830s the direct effect of this event appeared in the Ottoman 
Empire when non-Muslim nations such as the Serbians, Greeks and Romanians began 
to separate from this body to set their own states. This brought the idea of millet, which 
was a project to keep the empire with a multi-religious and multi-national form together, 
to an end.197 George Joffé argues that under Ottoman rule, every individual or group of 
people were able to practice rather freely when it came to religion. He stresses that the 
Kurds’, Turks’ and Arabs’ sense of belonging was stronger as they were Muslim.198 
After it had lost its Christian territories, the Empire had applied the idea of umma – 
                                                 
195 Bernard, Lewis. The emergence of modern Turkey, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
196 Millet is an umbrella term to cover all the ethnic and religious groups of people in the Ottoman 
territories, which was later modified by the Republic of Turkey. 
197 Robben, A. M., and Suarez-Orozco, M. M., Cultures under siege: Collective violence and trauma, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 228-229. 
198 Joffe, George. Islamist Radicalisation in Europe and Middle East, London: I. B. Tauris & Co, 2013, 




people who shared the same religious belief – to keep the remaining peoples (Arabs, 
Kurds, Circassians, and other Muslim peoples) within the Ottoman Empire. The umma 
idea later also came to a collapse with the breaking away of the Arabs from the 
Ottomans.199 This then caused a nationalist reaction in the Empire, leading to the Young 
Turks revolution of 1908, which had an influence on Mustafa Kemal Pasha, later, the 
founder of the Turkish Republic.200 Zurcher also makes a strong reference to the Young 
Turks’ influence on Ataturk and the way this influence was used in forming the new 
state of the Turkish Republic.201 
 
Until the end of the First World War (WWI), the majority of the Kurds lived within the 
Ottoman Empire, whilst the remainder resided in Persia. The vilayets (administrative 
provinces) of Bitlis, Dersim, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mosul, Elaziz (Elaziğ) and Van, were 
areas mostly populated by Kurds. 202  In these areas Kurds lived as subjects in 
communities which were both feudal and tribal in nature.203 The Kurds living under 
Persian rule were in a similar situation to the Ottoman Kurds. When WWI broke out in 
1914, the Ottomans chose to ally themselves with the Germans against the Allied 
powers. The Central Powers lost WWI, and as a result of this, two major Empires ended 
– those of the Ottomans and the Austro-Hungarians. As a direct result of WWI, the map 
of the Middle East was re-drawn and most of the Kurds were divided into four different 
countries, three of which were established out of the Ottoman Empire following WWI: 
Turkey, Iraq and Syria. The fourth main country, Iran, maintained its territory, although 
there was a regime change. A small community of Kurds found themselves under 
Soviet rule in the southern Caucasus, today mainly in Armenia. In other words, the 
results of WWI led to the Kurds being dispersed amongst five states. 
 
National awareness emerged in the 19th Century amongst the different groups in the 
Ottoman Empire. Because of the common religious ties with the Ottoman establishment, 
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the Kurds, especially the Sunni Kurds, were one of the last groups to start challenging 
the rule of Ottoman Empire. The religious element had a great influence on the ‘us as 
religious Muslims’ identity, and ‘them as non-Muslim’ other. This closeness with the 
Sunni Turks continued during WWI and the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. 
However, after the creation of the new state, the Kurds felt that their rights as a founding 
group of the Republic, alongside the Turks, had been ignored. This became clearer with 
the new constitution introduced in 1924. The first two decades of the young state were 
therefore marked by a series of Kurdish uprisings. The first uprising was the revolt of 
Sheikh Said (from Palu, a town of Elaziğ close to Çewlig/Bingöl), which is regarded as 
a Sunni Zaza uprising by scholars such as Ahmet Kahraman,204 McDowall,205 and 
Kirişçi.206 The last in the series of initial Kurdish revolts after the creation of the 
Republic was the revolt of Seyid Riza (in the Dersim area), which was mainly an Alevi 
Zaza uprising. 207  After the uprisings, two decades passed that for Kurds were 
characterised by a sense of psychological defeat by the Turkish state.208 
 
Evolving from Empire to nation state, it can be argued that the new state has denied the 
total existence of any ethnicities other than Turk, in line with its mono-ethnic 
characteristic state policies. The desire to create a mono-ethnic state was stressed in the 
1924 Turkish constitution quite clearly209. The reality of this principle is still very much 
alive in the current constitution of the Turkish Republic.  The state did not want to 
consider ethnic and other differences as contributing to cultural richness, and they were 
rather considered to be a serious threat to unity.210 The state’s tendency of seeing the 
other minorities as a threat was similar towards most of the minorities. It had its 
different tactics designed specifically for each minority group.211 Depending on which 
minority the Turkish state dealt with, it applied an appropriate policy accordingly. 
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2.2 The Kurdish Resistance to the Early State Policies, and an Era of Silence 
The Turkish state, since its creation, has applied a systematic campaign of 
nationalisation, pursuing a state-endorsed policy of ‘ethnocide’ against minority groups 
such as the Kurds, Armenians and Arabs. 212  The historical process of this began 
towards the end of the Ottoman Empire; the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 laid the 
groundwork for modern Turkish nationalism. 213  According to the Young Turks 
movement, a nation should consist of one language, one state and one religion.214 
Binbașioğlu argues that Atatürk’s nationalist ideas did not materialise out of thin air, 
but that he was greatly influenced by the Young Turks Movement, particularly its 
important member Ziya Gokalp, a Kurdish sociologist from Diyarbakir.215 Turkish 
nationalist ideas shaped the ideology (which would later be called the Kemalist 
ideology) of the Republic of Turkey, 216  which resulted in the state ignoring the 
existence of all other ethnic minorities. Thus, Kurds have had to live within a state that 
has not only banned their language, but also to a large extent denied them their own 
ethnic identity. These policies of denial continued until the 1990s.217 
 
Following the end of WWI, the victorious Allies dismantled the Ottoman Empire, and 
it looked as if the Turks would be left without a state of their own. Inspired by the 
Young Turks movement, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who in November 1934 became 
known by law as Atatürk (meaning “father of the Turks”), took the leadership of a new 
war against the Allied powers.218 Atatürk organised the Liberation War (as it would be 
known as in Turkey) in such a professional way, that the people who live in today’s 
Turkish territories came together under a common goal, which was to “clear” the 
country of the “infidels”, such as the Greeks, Armenians, French and British. This 
policy towards a common goal included the different Muslim nations such as the Turks, 
Kurds, Arabs and Circassians. Following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey 
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in 1923, contrary to what he had promised to non-Turkish ethnic groups – in particular 
the Kurds who constituted the second highest population after the Turks – Atatürk 
introduced policies that aimed at transforming Turkey into a Turkish nation, based on 
one nation, one language and one flag. 
 
The Kurds had fought against the ‘infidels’, backing Atatürk’s liberation war. When 
the Turkish state was established in 1923 as a result of this war, the sense of ‘belonging’ 
was not very problematic for the Kurds. Atatürk introduced the new (second) 
constitution in 1924, which aimed to diminish everything but Turkishness. The idea 
was based on the ideology of the new state on a mono-ethnic basis. Atatürk’s new 
stance, not surprisingly, resulted in widespread dissatisfaction among the Kurds, and 
this dissatisfaction resulted in the 1925 revolt led by Sheikh Said. Olson points to this 
rebellion as one of the main events in the Kurdish history.219 The fact that it was the 
first revolt in its time, and that it was born from the heartland studied in this thesis, 
make it valuable starting point in relation to this research topic. A series of Kurdish 
revolts followed the Sheikh Said revolt, such as the Agirî revolt, the Mutki revolt and 
the Zîlan revolt. The Agirî revolt was one of the most effective. Similar to the Sheikh 
Said and Dersim revolts, it was effective in its area (Agirî), and the Khoybun movement 
backed its leader220, Ihsan Nuri Beg, subsequently known as Ihsan Nuri Pasha.221 Those 
revolts were harshly defeated and the leaders were executed. The last of the revolts in 
this era of tensions in the first two decades of the young Republic was Seyyid Riza’s 
Dersim revolt, which also ended with the same fate as the leader Seyyid Riza and six 
other friends of his were executed in November 1937.222 Seyyid Riza was an Alevi Zaza 
from Dersim. One of the main characteristics of the Dersim revolt was it being a Zaza-
Alevi movement rather than a Zaza-Sunni one, as opposed to Sheik Said’s revolt in 
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1925. Similar to the Sheikh Said revolt, the prominent characteristic of Seyyid Riza 
revolt was its being labelled as a Zaza movement rather than a Kurdish movement by 
some. Furthermore, in both the revolts the Palu and the Dersim areas did not display 
enough solidarity to each other due to the religious differences.223 Moreover David 
McDowall points out that there was a lack in support from the Dersim area to the Sheikh 
Said revolt.224 As a result of the uprising, the state proceeded with its mass army 
operations in Dersim, which led to the killing of tens of thousands of people and the 
deportation of groups to western parts of Turkey.225 The defeat of the Dersim revolt 
resulted not only the loss of a battle, but also a loss of hope, which as previously 
mentioned begun an era of silence in Kurdish history in Turkey for two decades. 
 
The revolts, along with other uprisings outside of Kurdish areas, may have led to the 
state taking some further steps in creating new policies of assimilation. It could be 
argued that the state was victorious in defeating all uprisings against it through military 
actions. The state passed new laws aiming to re-structure all the bodies of society in 
order to strengthen its Kemalist ideology. In the same decade (the 1930s), Atatürk and 
his political team brought in various changes such as election rights, womens’ rights, 
and substantial changes in education and law226. Some of the changes, which took place 
in the 1930s, are a source of pride for the history of the Turkish Republic on the 
international arena. Among some of these reform policies approved in the Turkish 
parlimant and implemented into the real life, one can refer to; the ratification of the 
Turkish Republic’s first constitution and the unification of different kinds of schools 
under a single and homogenous  national education system in 1924; the clothing code 
inspired by the Western way of live, the introduction of secular educational system and 
the adoption of the Western calendar and timing system in 1925; adoption of the so 
called  ‘Swiss Code’ (the Civil Law ) in 1926; introduction of the Latin alphabet instead 
of the Arabic one and the change of language (from Arabic to Turkish) of the Islamic 
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call to prayer in 1928; the withdrawal of Persian and Arabic language courses from the 
schools in 1929; granting women’s right to vote in local elections in 1930, and 
participating in general elections and the adoption of the Law on Surnames in 1934, etc.  
All these mentioned reforms as highlighted by Şule Toktaş were initiated aimed at 
realizing the process of “a) nation -building; b) secularization; c) modernization and 
westernization; d) democratization; and e) state formation”, in Turkey following the 
collapse/abolition of the Caliphate of the Ottomans.227 
 
The Turkish Republic’s founders considered the new Republic as the successor of the 
Ottoman Empire in certain respects. Having lost its constituents during the late period 
of the Ottoman Empire, the new Republic’s policy of keeping the remaining 
constituents led policymakers to focus on mono-ethnic policies for the sake of the unity 
of the Turkish state. Kurds as a group were a complicated case, as they were the biggest 
minority in the new territories. In the case of Zazas/Zazakî, it is known that in the early 
days following its establishment, the Turkish state perceived Zazakî speakers as Kurds 
geographically, linguistically and ethnically.228 From the second decade following its 
establishment and onwards, there were certain views (as part of ‘divide and rule’ 
policies) promoted by Turkish policymakers, including scholars and intellectuals, 
stressing that Zazas are Turks/a Turkic tribe, and later that ‘Zazas are a separate people 
[from the Kurds]’.229 Such firmly ingrained ideas were going to be the basis for the 
Turkish state’s approach towards Zazas in the later decades.230 
 
After the Dersim revolt, the Turkish state applied harsh repression policies towards the 
Kurds in all the Kurdish areas, and moved many of the Kurdish tribes and families 
towards the West of Turkey in line with their deportation policy. These groups were 
accused of being responsible for and taking part in the revolts. 231  Ismail Beșikçi 
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describes the Turkish government’s way of ‘solving’ the Dersim issue as genocide.232 
Bozarslan stresses that with important Kurdish activists either being executed or exiled, 
the Kurdish national movement entered a silent period.233 There were around three 
decades of silence for Kurdish movements following the Dersim revolt. During these 
three decades, basic rights such as the use of language, cultural rights, and religious 
madrasas, were denied. From the end of the 1930s, Kurdish villages above a certain 
population were put under the control of a gendarme office, and Kurdish language, 
clothing, and folklore were completely banned.234 It was during this era that the state 
established a rule that all activities, including worship, could not be in Arabic and/ or 
other languages. The majority of Turkish citizens are Muslim, and they traditionally 
worship in Arabic, as the language of the Qur’an. With the new implementations, the 
language of all practices would be in Turkish, in line with the states secularist/Kemalist 
ideology235. 
 
Besides the signs of a new hope in Turkey, there had been some other political 
improvements in other parts of Kurdistan. Despite its short life, the Republic of 
Mahabad, in the region of Iranian Kurdistan, made a great nationalist impression on 
Kurds elsewhere.236 Kurds proved that they could operate state institutions and govern 
themselves. There were state/nationalist elements, such as the national anthem (Ey 
Reqib), the national flag (with colours of red, yellow and green) and the Kurdish state, 
which were introduced with the birth of the Republic of Mahabad in 1946. This helped 
future Kurdish movements.237 The national elements that were created by the birth of 
the Mahabad Republic are very influential for all the Kurds in of terms of national 
aspiration. It can be said that some Zazas also take pride in these historic elements. 
Meanwhile, it was still hard for the Kurds in Turkey to mobilise, because during the 
mid-20th century, the state continued to keep the Kurds in Turkey under strict control.238 
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However, due to the Kurdish movement under the leadership of the charismatic Mustafa 
Barzani becoming stronger, and Iraq acknowledging the Kurdish flag, Kurdish 
language and culture in 1958, paired with the slight improvement of conditions in the 
Turkish parts of Kurdistan, the conditions became more favourable to revolutionary 
ideas. 
 
In the 1950s, Turkey for the first time in its history had a second political party along 
with the Republican People’s Party (the CHP, founded by Atatürk) which was the 
Democrat Party (DP). Taha Akyol, the lead writer of the prestigious Milliyet newspaper 
in Turkey, argues that the CHP was losing its popularity, and therefore people were 
ready to welcome the DP into the Turkish political arena. 239  Not long after its 
foundation, the DP won the elections and assumed power. The Democrat Party era of 
1950-60 was an era of the rapid integration of Turkey into world capitalism, and the 
further development of the bourgeois class. The DP came into power by promising 
democratic rights, which were partially delivered, and a new sense of freedom came 
into being. At this same time there was a ‘socialist wave’ around the world. As for the 
Middle East including Turkey, this was a new phenomenon from the second half of the 
20th century. According to Naci Kutlay, some had the new idea that the Kurds could 
achieve many rights with the support of the Soviet Union, and socialist organisations 
started to gain popularity especially amongst the educated class.240 Due to the new 
government and this socialist wave, people who were not satisfied with the standards 
of democracy in the country started to seek new outlets for expression, such as the 
founding of new political parties, NGOs, student associations, and labour syndicates in 
order to improve social conditions. Ağaoğullari states that the increased politicisation 
of the oppressed classes, the spread of revolutionary ideas amongst the youth, and the 
quick passage from leftist theory to practice, shook the foundations of bourgeois rule 
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in Turkey.241 After the silent era in the second half of the 20th century, the shift in the 
social and political arena was speeding towards major changes.242 
 
The economic, social and political changes of the 1950s paved the way for the later 
acceleration of the socio-political mobilisation of society in Turkey. After 1946, when 
the state elites chose their side with the Western bloc, a preference towards economic 
liberalization backed by private capital began.  Students, peasants and labourers were 
very active politically in the form of boycotts, meetings, protests, labour strikes, factory, 
and occupations of land and academic faculty buildings. Therefore, it is arguable that 
political activity was popularised and the masses were politicised, including the 
Kurds.243 Organised grassroots political activity was prevalent in the form of students 
clubs, labour unions and associations especially in urban areas like Istanbul and Ankara. 
This atmosphere also led to the emergence of a new generation of Kurdish political 
activists. In the 1960s, the Kurds generally took positions within the leftist Turkish-
Kurdish groups, and believed that they could achieve some of their cultural rights 
within the leftist idea of ‘freedom to all minorities’.244 The Kurds began publishing 
newspapers and periodicals in which they tried to reflect the backward situation of the 
East, Kurdishness and Kurdish culture.  Following the ‘socialist wave’, and having had 
the opportunity to read the translated publications about socialist doctrine, Kurds were 
also inspired by the anti-imperialist movements in third world countries such as 
Vietnam, Palestine, Africa and Latin America.  
 
This phenomenon led to the notion that the ‘misfortune’ of the Kurds was not unique 
to the Kurdish people, but was a result of the same cause of the aforementioned cases, 
which is imperialism. Also, it is arguable that the revolt in Iraqi Kurdistan, launched in 
1959, gave a ‘new soul and inspiration’ to the Kurdish activists of the period. During 
the 1960s, the Kurds were mostly acting within organisations of the ‘68ers’ which was 
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a group of leftists of that era were named after 1968245. In the pre-era of the formation 
of the 60ers organization thousands of people crowded the cities and squares in different 
parts (cities and provinces) of the Kurdish populated region of the country (as well as 
in Ankara) organized collective protest actions such as strikes, student sit-ins, factory 
and campus occupations, peasant riots etc., these protest actions took place against state 
policy of remaining the Eastern and Southern Anatolia in economic backwardness and 
state’s discriminatory political, economic and social policy in these parts of Turkey.   
These protest actions owed mainly its emergence to th emergence of the mid-1950s and 
1960s wave of Kurdish political dynamic began among Kurdish intellectulas and 
university students in Ankara and Istanbul, maintained by Zeynep Gambetti, Joost 
Jongerden “this dynamics mainly stemmed from a young Kurdish generation who had 
the opportunity to receive education in institutions located in the regions urban areas, 
such as Village Institutes (Köy Enstitüleri)  and Teachers’ School (Öğretmen Okulları ), 
or in the country’s largest cities Ankara and Istanbul.”246  
 
However, alongside the socialist stirrings, there were also tendencies of nationalism 
amongst the Kurds. In short, after 1965 the Kurdish political movement developed 
along two main paths: the first was the Kurds with socialist tendencies, who were 
mainly organised around the Turkish Labour Party (TIP); the second was the nationalist 
Kurds who established the ‘illegal’ Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan (KDPT).247 
These types of organisations raised feelings of solidarity amongst the Kurds, regardless 
of which group they belonged to. An important example of this is that these two 
branches, despite their different worldviews and prognoses of the situation, could 
nevertheless coordinate and organise meetings, which were called the Eastern 
Meetings.248 By 1969, discussions between the national-democratic revolutionaries, 
and the socialist revolutionaries, could not provide the Kurds with solutions for the 
problems of East Turkey. This witnessed the birth of a new organisation, called 
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Devrimci Dogu Kultur Ocaklari, Cultural Hearths of Revolutionary East (DDKO), 
based in Ankara and Istanbul.249 
 
2.3 The 1960s to 1980s  
The wave of new hope throughout all of Kurdistan also arrived in Çewlig/Bingöl. This 
created a group of activists from the social elites, such as Said Elçi, Zeki Adsiz, Rençber 
Aziz, Cihat Elçi and Idris Ekinci that acted as the representatives of the pro-Kurdish 
movements in local politics.250 This era was right before the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK) came onto the stage as the dominant movement, and at this point there were 
divisions between Kurdish political groups. The influence of pro-Kurdish political 
activists was a continuous phenomenon locally in the Çewlig/Bingöl social dynamics. 
Some of the key personalities of the early PKK cadre were locals, such as Mehmed 
Hayri Durmus, Mehmet Karasungur and Ibrahim Incedursun. On my field trips, I often 
encountered references to these key personalities in locals’ attempts to take ownership 
of the current Kurdish movement as being led by people from Çewlig/Bingöl. This was 
the stance of the locals who felt close to the PKK movement, and believed that the Kird/ 
Zazas are Kurds.251 
 
In August 1984, a previously largely unknown party, the PKK, launched a series of 
attacks and ambushes on the Turkish forces in the Kurdish region.252 The immediate 
steps taken by the Turkish state against this “handful of bandits”253 was to answer these 
attacks with harsh military operations. However, in terms of politics, Ankara did not 
take these attacks seriously at first, and believed that they were being conducted by the 
remnants of a pre-1980 coup terrorist group. As Ismet G. Ismet argues:  
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Turkey’s enforced mono-ethnic identity was so well carved into millions of minds that no one 
even questioned the roots of the PKK [...] whether the ethnic connection in the name was 
anything further than a Marxist ploy to gain regional support.254 
 
In the early 1990s, certain events occurred simultaneously, such as the breakup of the 
Soviet Bloc, the first Gulf War, and the heavy cost of the war between the Turkish state 
and the PKK. These happenings enforced both the Turkish and Kurdish sides to change 
their stance. The first signs of civil solutions were revealed in the year of 1992, which 
allowed new social dynamics to come forward. On a local level, following the army 
coup in 1980, the political space was opened to liberal and Islamic parties. Considering 
that Çewlig/Bingöl is a conservative Sunni Muslim area, which has been sidelined by 
the dominant secular politics in Turkey since the Republic’s creation, this paved the 
way for a more democratic form of local politics. The demography of political 
representation has changed accordingly.255 
 
The region’s political representation has shifted extensively since the 1980s, which has 
first allowed liberal parties, then Islamic parties and finally pro-Kurdish parties, a voice 
in local politics. This has led the local identity trends to the forefront of the complex 
debate of who the Kirds/Zazas are. This shift is of great importance for the present 
project, to be grounded in today’s political identity dynamics. This topic will be 
elaborated on further in the analysis part of this thesis.  
 
2.4 References to Kirds/Zazas in Historical Sources 
 
In order to illustrate the matter of the phenomenon of belonging regarding the Zazas 
historically, there are several elements, which could be taken as the focus points. These 
are language, culture, social life and religious practices. However, in the Zaza case, 
contemporary reference is mostly made to language in the majority of cases. This 
misleading approach can be regarded as a new phenomenon, which was not followed 
historically in the oral literature, folklore and religious practices of the region. On the 
contrary, the history proves that this is the wrong path for trying to reach a conclusion. 
In all the historical sources of Arab, Persian, Seljuk and Ottoman literature, Zazas are 
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stated as a sub-ethnic group of the Kurds. All the relevant sources prove that they were 
either perceived as Kurds, or a group within the Kurds.256 As well as the Arab and the 
Persian sources, in the Ottoman archives, yearbooks/annuals and censuses, the Zazas 
are recorded together with the Kurds, not as a separate group. During the Ottoman era, 
the Kird/Zazas257 are referred to as Kurds in the writings of important figures such as 
Serefkhan, Evliya Çelebi and Katip Çelebi. In his book Serefname, Serefkhan names 
the principalities in today’s Zaza populated areas such as Çapakçur (Bingöl), Egil, Genç, 
Çemisgezek, Palu, Pertek, Siverek, Çermik etc., as the Kurdish principalities, and 
moves on giving more details about them.258 Accordingly, the oral history interviews 
that have been conducted for this study are another vital indicator in helping to clarify 
the idea that the Zazakî-speaking group of people has seen itself as part of Kurdish 
identity.259 
 
In an interview conducted in Çewlig/Bingöl, an elderly local stressed that until recent 
years, the discourse of identity was more straightforward. The Turkish Republic which 
has introduced different ideas in convincing the Zazas that they are not Kurds, has 
historically agreed with the idea of Zazas’ actually being Kurds. The new phenomenon 
of stressing that Zazas are not Kurds is something which the state began promoting in 
line with its mono-ethnic project of dealing with the ‘others’ in Turkey, as a divide and 
rule policy of the state. 
 
Establishing itself after the fall of Ottoman Empire, the new Republic of Turkey 
introduced new policies towards the religious and ethnic minorities. The new Kemalist 
regime took political steps to eliminate or assimilate the religious minorities. On the 
other hand, using the state’s tools such as education, transport and media, it applied the 
assimilation policies to create a monoculture society throughout the country. These 
policies worked well in some regards for the policymakers of the state. However, those 
policies did not work towards the Kurds to the extent that state desired. The young state 
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took further steps to find a formula, which would be successful in assimilating the 
Kurds. Ankara ordered numerous reports to be prepared by its institutions and 
individuals working in line with the state’s goals. Those reports were named Eastern 
reports, South-Eastern reports, Kurdish reports and so on. They were sometimes 
compiled directly for the need of the central government, or for a political party, 
governmental institution or NGO. In the preparation of the reports, prime ministers, 
ministers, MPs and other high-positioned individuals took part. Also governmental 
institutions such as the gendarmerie, state general inspectorship, the special Turkish 
national institute “Turkish Hearts” (Türk Ocaklari), and People’s Houses (Halkevleri), 
have taken leading positions to Turkify the Kurds.260 The ‘Kurdish’ reports earlier in 
the Republic of Turkey contain detailed information about historical, geographical, 
anthropological, social, economical and linguistic details of the Kurds. In the earlier 
reports, Zazas were always mentioned as constituent parts of Kurdishness, and their 
language was regarded as a part of Kurdish.  
 
During the early Republic era, the first piece of work on the Zaza was written by Ziya 
Gokalp in 1922. He was a Zaza from Diyarbakir, and a well-known sociologist and 
Turkolog in Turkey.261 This study was published after Gokalp’s death in 1924 with the 
title Kürt Asiretleri Hakkinda Sosyolojik Tetkikler (A Study of the Kurdish Tribes). In 
his study, Gokalp stresses that Kurds are comprise of five main groups, the Kurmanç, 
Zaza, Soran, Goran and Lurs. Furthermore, Gokalp argues that members of these five 
groups find it difficult to understand each other linguistically, but the tongues of all the 
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groups are derived from old Kurdish, as he refers to it, ‘Kûrdiî Kadîm’.262 Gokalp points 
out that Zazas perceive themselves as Kird, and the term they use for Kurmanjs is 
Kirdasî. He points out that the term Zaza was given by the neighbouring Turks to Dimilî 
Zazas. 263  It should be stressed that, although Ziya Gokalp was one of the main 
policymakers for the new state and the Kemalist regime (he drew inspiration from the 
Young Turks movement at the beginning of 20th century), he still did not use a discourse 
of total denial regarding the fact that the Zazas were a group within general Kurdishness.  
 
One of the reports of early date (1926) is Kürtlere Dair (In Relation to Kurds), which 
was prepared for the Ministry of Education of Turkey. The report stated that it was the 
Şafiî Zazas who mainly supported the Sheikh Said revolt. This group called themselves 
‘Kird’ 264  and they called the Zazas in Siverek, Gercüs, Elaziğ and northwest of 
Diyarbakir, Dimêl/Dimilî. Kirdasî was the term that they used for the Kurmanj speakers. 
The report also pointed out that Sorani and Luri were the other main dialects of Kurdish. 
The same report states the other minor dialects as Kelhuri, Gorani (which are pointed 
out as being close to Zazaki) and Bakhtiyari as a dialect close to Sorani.265 
 
Although, some information in the reports may be misleading, it is interesting to see 
how the state’s discourse has shifted throughout the 20th century. This discourse began 
changing from 1935, with different policy goals arising. In the late 1930s, the state 
changed its strategy and discourse regarding the Zaza case, from stating that ‘Zazas are 
part of the Kurds’, to ‘Zazas are a Turkic tribe’ starting in the 1930s, and later that 
‘Zazas are a separate people’ starting in the 1970s. Those policies have had some 
success for the state’s purposes. Elaziğ would be a good example to note here, as the 
assimilation policies worked best there among Zaza inhabited areas. The majority of 
Elaziğ’s population would proudly stress Turkishness as their identity.266 
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Another important figure who produced reports containing information regarding the 
Zazas, was pro-Kemalist Hasan Reşit Tankut. He presented his report in 1935 to the 
Republican People’s Party (CHP), and to Prime Minister Ismet Inönü. This report was 
later published as a book, Zazalar Hakkinda Sosyolojik Tetkikler (A Sociological Study 
of the Zazas). The book was mainly based on fieldwork in Zaza-populated areas from 
1925 to 1936. Tankut’s reports focuses on Zazas’ social, economic and religious 
structure. Despite the fact that he stresses that Zazas are Turks at some points in the 
text, he still could not resist writing that ‘no matter what, none of them are really Turks 
but they are enemies of the Turks and I don’t agree with those who think otherwise’.267 
 
There is an obvious contradiction in his views. Later in his report following the army 
coup of 27th May 1960, Tankut suggests that the state should create a line corridor 
between the Zazas and the Kurmanjs by settling accommodating Turks brought from 
Anatolia. He argues that creating a corridor of approximately 50 km between them will 
make it easier to Turkify the Zazas. His planned line would be from Erciyes (Kayseri) 
to Dersim, and would keep the Zazas on the north side of the line called ‘the Turkish 
dam’.268 As can be seen, there has been a constant attempt to find the most suitable way 
for the state on a governmental level to convince Zazas that they are not Kurds. Thereby, 
one could argue that the current picture of the assimilated Zazas is a result of what was 
done in those years. Moreoveer, it could be stated similar attempts have been made 
against all the Kurds in Turkey, including the Kurmanjs. However, the assimilation 
policy towards Zazas has been slightly different when compared with the Kurmanjs. 
On one hand in the Zaza case it was applied with somewhat mild policies, which 
resulted in self-assimilation process. On the other hand, the state applied a more direct 
and harsher assimilation practices in regard to the Kurmanjs.  
 
One other important source on how to deal with ‘the problematic Kurds’, and in 
particular with Zazas, is the notes of a meeting of general superintendents on 5th-22nd 
of 1936. One of the important topics of this meeting was on how to Turkify the non-
Turkish population of Anatolia’. The most important outcome of that meeting for the 
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Eastern Anatolian region was the government took the decision to establish 
Çewlig/Bingöl as a new separate province. The decision extended Çewlig/Bingöl’s 
territory to include some town from Mus and Erzincan. Çewlig/Bingöl (other names 
Çapakçur, Çewlig/Çolig) used to be a small district as part of the Diyarbakir province 
in the 17th–18th centuries under Ottoman rule. In 1881, Çewlig/Bingöl with Genç 
(currently a town of Çewlig/Bingöl) were included in Bitlis province with a new law. 
In the early days of the Republic of Turkey, Çewlig/Bingöl was a town of Genç. 
Çewlig/Bingöl was appointed as town of Elaziğ in 1926, and later as town of Mus, and 
finally was announced as a city in its own right in 1936.269 
 
Çewlig/Bingöl was the centre of the Sheikh Said revolt, and it needed to be ‘taken care 
of’.270 On the other hand, another superintendent attending the series of meetings, 
Abdullah Alpdogan, suggested that the state should create lines of Turkish or Turkified 
population settlements which would act as a barrier for the Turkish state. If these lines 
of population were financially, politically and socially supported, they could become 
both a source of power and security, and a role model to be taken up by the locals. The 
policymakers of the Turkish state have been extremely ‘creative’ in designing policies 
to help the structure of the new state change into a mono-ethnic structure. As previously 
stated, by moving new waves of population to and from certain areas they tried to secure 
their assimilation and security policies. Furthermore, during further meetings, it was 
decided that the population of the region should be thought of as Turkish, and ‘a soul 
of Turkishness had to be injected’ to the populace. They should be given Turkish 
surnames, and place names could also be renamed in Turkish. The state should also 
open Halkevleri (People’s Houses)271 and the people should be modernised through 
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watching mobile cinema and theatre shows, so that they can pick up the idea of 
Turkishness faster and easier.  
 
In a meeting on 9th November 1936, a security (police) chief, Sükrü Sokmensüer, 
presented this information regarding the Zazas: ‘The Zazas are originally from 
Azerbaijan and they have settled around Çewlig/Bingöl. Their main economic activity 
is animal breeding; they are clearly are not Kurds, but they are Turks’.272 As seen in 
this case, sometimes the agents of the state were not even concerned whether their 
statements were at all logical. 
In the same meeting, superintendent Abidin Ozmen argued that, ‘we cannot treat Zazas 
separately from the Kurds’.273 There have been contradictions in views of the members 
of state organisations, differing from time and place in the two decades following the 
establishment of the state. This is significant in a way that there has been a “planned 
process” in line with the state’s social engineering, policies which were introduced from 
the late 1930s. 
 
The most important reports regarding the first decades of the Republican era are those 
authored by Necmeddin Sahir Sılan. He was MP for Dersim and Çewlig/Bingöl 
between 1939 and 1954. Having lived in Zaza areas for 15 years, helped him to collect 
a valuable archive relevant to this research, and his reports were published by Turkish 
History Foundation. Moreover, Sılan is one of the pioneers of the idea that the Zazas 
‘are not Kurds but mountain Turks’ policy. Thererby, he stressed that when one goes 
to the Zaza-inhabited areas as an outsider, it is supposedly obvious that they are nothing 
but Turks. According to his reports, the Kurds have never lived in Turkey’s territories, 
and they do not have a common history, literature or language that belongs to them.274 
As a result, it could be argued that the state’s policymakers in assimilation policies have 
moved forward systematically in trying to prove the denial of the Zazas/Kurds. 
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2.5 How Kird/Zazas Identified Themselves Until 1980 
Feeling a sense of Kurdishness seems to have been largely the case among Zazakî 
speakers themselves historically in Turkey. Since 1980, traditional outlooks on local 
identities have started becoming increasingly complex, and questions of Zaza 
cultural/ethnic identities acquired new qualitative as well as quantitative characteristics. 
These shifts occurred for a number of reasons, including an army coup (1980), which 
changed some of the political structures of the Turkish state, and the political/military 
establishment’s relation to “East and South-East Turkey” in particular. Furthermore, 
Turkish schooling and the spread of Turkish media in Turkey’s Kurdish areas led the 
process along a more complex route. The age at which schooling begins dropped to as 
young as age three, in the early 2000s.   
 
Historically, there is a harmony of different ethnic and religious groups of people that 
living in Turkey. In the 20th century, on one hand, the stress of local identies have 
become visible, but on the other hand the young Turkish Republic was motivated to 
assimilate and diminish this different identities. This was done in a way to serve their 
monoethnic state ideology. In the eastern part of Turkey, there were Arabs, Turks, 
Turkomans, Kurds, Kurmanjs, Zazas (Kird, Kirmanc, Dimili), Asuris, Yezidis and 
Alevis as names to identify different groups of people with different identities.  
 
Zaza as a term is the newer and now dominant term that is used for the group of the 
second dialect of Kurds in Turkey. Historically, Kird/Kirdkî, Kirmanc/Kirmanckî, and 
Dimilî/Dimilkî were the names used for this group of people, depending on which area 
they were residing. The term Zaza was the version used in Elazig province, which is 
currently majorly Turkified.275 The fact that the dominant words in naming themselves 
are Zazas and/or Kurmanjs, would not mean that these groups necessarily differ in 
ethnicity. A similar situation is the case in other parts of ‘greater Kurdistan’. In Iraqi 
Kurdistan, internally, Soran, Badini, and Hawrami are used more than Kurd(s) as terms 
to identify people from the different regions. The term Kurds is often used in the 
international arena, not only by the non-Kurds but also by the Kurds themselves. There 
is a usage a similar situation in Iranian Kurdistan. Interestingly, the Kurds of each part 
                                                 




generally prefer to call the Kurds of other parts ‘Kurds’ without going into further 
details of which group (Kurmanj, Soran, Zaza, Badini, Hawrami, Goran etc.) of Kurds.  
 
Politically, the self-identification process in Turkey, and especially in the Kurdish part, 
came under considerable influence dictated by the Turkish state. One could say that 
Turkey is ‘experienced’ in designing assimilation policies using different methods. 
Until the beginning of the 20th century, the map of different ethnicities and/or spoken 
languages in today’s Turkey (then the Ottoman Empire) was rather colourful. When the 
Turkish Republic was established in 1923, the founding clique decided that a multi–
ethnic structure was a threat to the unity of the state, and could result in the division of 
the country. In the following decades after its establishment, the Turkish state 
implemented its vast assimilation policies towards all the groups of the people which 
were seen as ‘others’ by the policymakers of the new state. In the Zaza and Kurdish 
case, the state firstly denied that they were Kurds by arguing that they were ‘mountain 
Turks’. In the later stage, it introduced various strategies to diminish anything other 
than Turkishness. 
 
Following the Crimean War between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in 1856, 
researcher Peter Lerch visited a prison camp in which Russia kept the captives from the 
Ottoman army. Among them there were Kird/Zazakî-speaking soldiers. Lerch studied 
the Zazakî speakers of that camp and collected some linguistic data.276 His study was 
published in Russian and it was translated into German at a later stage. Lerch mentions 
a fight between a Kirdki/Zazakî-speaking Kurdish group, and a Turkish group. In an 
attempt to motivate his small group of fighters, the Zaza leader Xelef Agha announced 
that they may be more than us in number, but do not forget that they are Turks, and you 
are all heroes of the Kurds and your tribes, therefore they cannot defeat you.277 This 
example clearly displays that there was no differentiation between Kurds and Zazas in 
earlier times in the region. Xelef Agha clearly considered himself and his fighters as 
Kurds. Likewise, Ehmedê Xasî, in the concluding remarks of his Mewlid, states that the 
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language of his Mewlid is the Kirdkî/Zazki dialect of Kurdish.278 Currently, most Zazas 
still see themselves as Kurds, but there are still local differences in certain respects. 
 
The Zazakî-speaking population is mainly based in Eastern and South-Eastern Turkey. 
There is also a considerable Zaza population in Marmara, on the Aegean and in mid-
Anatolia due to migration, mainly in the last few decades. The state forced some groups 
of Zazakî-speaking people to move to the Western cities in Turkey following the Sheikh 
Said and Seyyid Riza uprisings. The main Zaza cities are Çewlig/Bingöl, Dersim 
(Tunceli), Diyarbakir, Elaziğ, Erzurum, Sivas, Urfa, Bitlis, Mus, Siirt and Adiyaman. 
There are Zaza speakers also in Malatya, Kayseri, Nigde, Aksaray, Kars, Ardahan and 
Gümüshane. Due to the migration of the Zaza population from the 1960s onwards, there 
are Zazas in the main Turkish cities such as Istanbul, Bursa, Izmir, Kocaeli, Sakarya, 
Ankara, Konya, Mersin, Antalya, Adana, Gaziantep and Osmaniye today. Besides, 
Zazas have also moved to live in Western European countries279.  
 
Zazas name themselves and the dialect they speak differently depending on where they 
live or where they come from. Those names include Kird/Kirdki; in Çewlig/Bingöl and 
some of the Diyarbakir towns (Lice, Dicle, Kocakoy, Egil, Hani, Hazro and Silvan), 
Kirmanc / Kirmancki; in Dersim, Erzincan and Varto-Muş, Dimilî/Dimilkî; in Urfa, 
Siverek); in Adiyaman, Gerger; in Diyarbakir, Çermik, Çüngüş; and Zaza/Zazakî in 
and around Elaziğ.280 The word Zaza is a widely preferred version that is used in all 
areas in addition to the local names for each group due to a number of reasons.281 In the 
researched area of this thesis, in Çewlig/Bingöl, the preferred name is Kird/Kirdkî. 
Malmisanij stresses that, from the 19th century, there are two main sources documented 
that state that Kird/Kirdkî was also historically used to name the Zazakî speakers of 
Çewlig/Bingöl.282 
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The Turkish state’s argument that the Zazas are not Kurds, is a massive problem facing 
Kurdish identity and a huge challenge to create unification among different section of 
the Kurdish society. The process of ethnic identity building in Çewlig/Bingöl is an 
ongoing one. The idea was originally begun by the Turkish state, claiming that the 
Zazas are not Kurds, but are Turks and/or a Turkic tribe; this was later developed by 
suggesting that the Zazas are a separate people themselves. With the two above groups 
of Zazas embracing the idea for economic reasons and directly given benefits from the 
states, they can be said to have been ‘buying’ the ideas that Turkish state has tried to 
sell to them for decades. On the other hand, the Kurdish movement’s approach to these 
two groups is usually not welcoming, which leads the groups drawing closer to the state. 
The Kurdish political party has labelled almost all the Kurds who do not vote for them 
or do not share the same ideological beliefs, as state collaborators.283 These factors 
make the issue more complex in local politics. Furthermore, linguistically, one cannot 
finalize the argument by saying definitively that Zazakî is a dialect of Kurdish, or that 
it is a language independent from Kurdish. On the other hand, the group that says Zazas 
are not Kurds, disregards the importance of common history, geography, social 
structure, etc. Moreover, politically, one could not draw a clear line between Zazas and 
Kurds in general. As the definitions for what is a language and what is a dialect are not 
clear, it would be wrong to label a group by only what they speak284. Besides the 
language, there are other important markers such as history, traditions, homeland, 
religion, sense of national purpose, and common festivals to indicate whether a group 
of people is a separate ethnic group or not.285 The trend of local identities makes the 
case more complex and interesting. 
 
During the early years of the Republic, there were some reports published based on 
surveys. One of the most significant was authored by Basri Konyar, called Diyarbekir 
İl Yıllığı (the Yearbook of Diyarbakir). In these studies, the Kurdishness of the Zazas 
was not yet denied and Zazas were treated as a group among the Kurds. The suggestions 
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of the report advised that the state should teach ‘the modern language, culture and way 
of life’ to the Zazas, but their existence was nevertheless not totally denied. 
 
Apart from the various reports, there were also population censuses, which took place 
periodically after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Most significantly, in the 
censuses between 1927 and 1950 there are strong indications regarding Zaza Identity. 
The mother tongue was one of the main questions in the Turkish censuses until 1965. 
The Institute of State Statistics (DIE) has released the data from the censuses that took 
place between 1927 and 1965. The 1927, 1935, 1940 and 1945 censuses in all of the 
Zaza-inhabited cities and towns gave the native tongue as Kurdish. In the 1950, 1955, 
1960 and 1965 censuses, the language column had Kurdish with its dialects options, 
which were Kurmançca (Kurmanji), Kirdasça (Kirdasî, the preferred dialect for the 
Zazakî speakers of Dersim area) and Zazaca (Zazakî). 286 
 
In the censuses of 1950 and 1965, the majority of the Zazas in Çewlig/Bingöl, Elaziğ 
and Dersim registered their native tongue as Kurdish. For example, in the 1965 census, 
the population of Dersim was 150,000, and only seven households identified Zazakî as 
their language in the language column. As a conclusion from the censuses, one can 
argue that the Zazas perceived themselves as Kurds or as part of the Kurds. 
 
2.6 Important Figures in the Formation of Zaza Identity 
Zazakî speaking intellectuals and activists have taken their places within Kurdish 
uprisings, from Sheikh Said’s rebellion to the contemporary Kurdish movement(s). The 
Sheikh Said revolt was suppressed by the state and the group of 47, most of whom came 
from Çewlig/Bingöl and surrounding areas, were executed in 1925 as a result. Some of 
other well-known figures that were from Çewlig/Bingöl and/or Zazakî speakers, are 
Sheikh Şerif, Sheikh Abdullah, Commander Yado, Sait Elçi, Zeki Adsiz, Rençber Aziz, 
Hayri Durmuş, Mehmet Karasungur, Cihat Elçi, Idris Ekinci, and Ibrahim Incedursun. 
A well-known singer, a blind person who had to flee to Germany during the army coup 
of 1980, Rençber Aziz is a symbolic personage in Çewlig/Bingöl’s oral history.287 
Rençber devoted many songs to societal issues and interests. Rençber Aziz wrote songs 
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referring to the identity of Zazas as Kurds288. On the other hand, the Turkish nationalists 
also managed to convince individuals from Çewlig/Bingöl to co-operate with them. 
During the dark conditions of the late 1970s, a candidate from the extreme Turkish 
nationalists, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), managed to win the mayoral 
election in Çewlig/Bingöl. These were the years when Çewlig/Bingöl displayed a 
tendency to become like Elaziğ politically. Elaziğ’s political tendency had changed due 
to the assimilation programs applied by the state.289 Furthermore, one of the most 
mentioned, if not the most mentioned name with regards to extreme Turkish 
nationalism and deep state-JITEM,290 Mahmut Yildirim also known as ‘Yeşil’, is a 
Kird/Zaza from Çewlig/Bingöl.  
 
This phenomenon that some Zazas began to see themselves as separate from the Kurds 
and sought to produce a new literature to support this notion, first started in Europe, 
mainly in Sweden, following the army coup in Turkey in 1980. The founder of this 
marginal group was Ebubekir Pamukçu, a high school teacher and a Zaza from Çermik, 
a town of Diyarbakir. From 1976 and onwards, Pamukçu and his group published two 
magazines called Piya and Ayre. The publications started out featuring linguistic 
debates and pro-Kurdish politics, but, later on, the political articles of their magazines 
became a pro-Zaza foundation of a separate movement. In my interview with 
Malmisanij in Sweden, he argued that Pamukçu’s views on both Kurdish nationalism 
and Zaza nationalism changed completely after a short imprisonment period in Turkey 
before he fled to Sweden. Malmisanij added that Pamukçu became hostile to Kurdish 
movements and did not oppose the Turkish regime to the same extent after the 1980s.291 
Martin Van Bruinessen argues that Ebubekir Pamukçu is the main leader of the Zaza 
movement, indicating that the Zaza ‘separatist’ movement can be dated back only to 
the 1980s.292  
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The 1980 army coup resulted in many intellectuals fleeing to Europe, mainly to Sweden, 
France and Germany, where they formed groups and associations working on linguistic 
and literary productions. This period in Europe resulted in some divisions and 
ideological clashes among the pro-Zaza groups and pro-Kurdish groups in general, 
which often influenced developments back in Turkish Kurdistan. 
 
Some pro-Zaza online portals in Çewlig/Bingöl, such as Zaza-Der293 and Tavz-Der,294 
often refer Pamukçu as a great Zaza leader from whom they take their inspiration. There 
were also many references to Pamukçu in the conference on Zaza identity which 
Çewlig/Bingöl University held in 2011. Turkish state institutions have recently seemed 
to take the ownership of ‘Zazaism’ as opposed to Kurdish nationalism, on a local level 
including in Çewlig/Bingöl. The central state in Ankara is keen to invest in this counter-
nationalism, for the purpose of its efforts to harm the Kurdish movement(s).295 
 
Chapter 3: The Political Battle: Çewlig/ Bingol Bteween the Turkish 
State and the Kurdish Movement  
The process of identity shifting in Çewlig / Bingöl is a phenomena that has political 
actors who have hopes for different outcomes from it. These political actors are the 
Turkish state and Kurdish movement as argued in this thesis. The pro- Zaza group 
stands as the third group as it is the group that appeared latest as reaction to the first 
two groups. The Turkish state had its political agenda on this identity topic throughout 
the earlier decades. This was done in a way to divide and rule against Kurds over all. 
As it has been referred to throughout the thesis, there are various sources indicating that 
the state had its political engineering program from 1930’s regarding the Zazas. This 
was done in a way to manipulate Zazas that they are a Turkic tribe or at least that they 
are not Kurds. They have somehow succeeded to manipulate or create confusion among 
the Zazas, mainly in Elazig and the surrounding. The Kurdish movement was struggling 
with the broader aspect of exisitance in the earlier decades of the Turkish State history 
following the major defeats of the Kurdish revolts in 1920s and 1930s. During the 
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relatively more relaxed era in 1970s and onwards the Kurdish movement gained a 
poltical strength and claimed the ownership of all the Kurdish sub-groups including the 
Zazas. The Kurdish movement argued that the Zazas are one of the main sub-groups of 
the Kurdish nation. However, the Zazas themselves appear on this poltically pulling 
battle and claim that they will decide for their own faith.  
 
The history of taking position in this complex identity started with the Turkish state’s 
taking a reactionary position towards Zazas with a political agenda. This begun 
following the two major revolts of Sheikh Said Revolt (1925) and strengthened even 
further after Seyyid Riza / Dersim Revolt (1937-38). The state applied harsh security 
policies along with politically designed assimilation policies. The aim of these 
assimilation policies was aiming to persuade the Zazas that they are historically a 
Turkic tribe. This approach was welcomed by some Zazas, mainly by those who lived 
between Turkish Kurdistan and Turkey (close to Turkish inhabited areas/ the border 
with Turkish population) between Turkish Kurdistan and Turkey. Elazig was the main 
field for practising this policy.   
 
The Kurdish movement came up with a position to this stance. It argued that Zazas are 
Kurdish group of people and they speak a Kurdish dialect that is called Kirdki, 
Kirmanjki, Dimilî or Zazaki depending on the specific areas they lived within northern 
Kurdistan. According to this stance, the Turkish state had a political agenda of ‘divide 
and rule’ and marginalise the Kurdish movement’s resistance against the ‘oppressor 
Turkish state’. The Kurdish movement pointed out Amed/ Diyarbakir, where a good 
proportion of the population is Zaza, as a role model province for Çewlig/ Bingöl. 
 
The Zazas in general and Çewlig / Bingöl’s Kirds, after decades of being object of this 
identity challenges, started becoming the subject of it since 1980s. The Shafi’i school 
of Sunni Islam religious identity has always been strong in Çewlig / Bingöl. The 
political Islam’s popularity has an increase in Turkey since the 1980 army coup and is 
being used as a tool to approach the Kurds, especially in the conservative cities like 
Çewlig / Bingöl in the region. This has become more obvious during the AKP rule since 
2002. The identity dynamics on the ground were also in parallel with the new trend of 




the youth particularly, has brought about a new and further complex to the whole 
identity debates in Çewlig / Bingöl. The locals tend to have a Zaza identity that points 
out religion as the main pillar of their identity or affiliate their Zazaness as sub-identity 
either with the Turkiishenss and Turkish state or with the Kurdishness and Kurdish 
movement. 
 
3.1 The Turkish State’s Social Engineering Plan for the Zazaki Speaking 
Areas: The Case of Elazig 
Until recent decades, there was not a clear separation between Zazas and Kurds in terms 
of ethnicity in Turkey. There were minimal differences between the two in terms of 
linguistics and folklore. One could argue that religious divisions were more important 
in the Kurdish region of Turkey, mainly the division between Sunnis and Alevis. 
Looking back at the history of the region, it is notable that since 1920s, the policies of 
denial towards the Kurds have been in practice on the ground. Kurds who disagreed 
with the Turkish policies were brutally oppressed via security policies. This was the 
case for Zazaki-speaking areas too. The two most outstanding uprisings in Zazaki-
speaking areas against the Turkish state’s policies were the 1925 Sheikh Said upraising 
and the 1937-38 Seyyid Riza uprising. These revolts were suppressed by force to ensure 
that no further revolts or any sort of mobilisation for cultural rights would ever be 
planned by the inhabitants of the region. The region became militarized massively in 
an extent that any individuals, intellectuals and groups of people for who engaged in 
any social, cultural and political (even civil society) activities were considered and 
treated as threat to the Turkish state’ security, despite some minor changes of the 
Turkish state’s means of militarization of the Kurdish region, the approach (viewing 
the Kurdish question through a securitized lenses ) is still a the same, after more than 
nine decades since the Sheikh Said’s uprising.296  The Kurds and Kurdish speakers were 
generally by state officials considered as threat and they encouraged the army and other 
political and intelligent institutions to pay considerable attention to the Kurdish region 
for instance. For instance as during the Senem Aslan’s study of the Kurdish question 
from the early decades of the twentieth century has been highlighted, in Turkey; 
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[the] Kurdish speakers were perceived as a major threat, especially after the first revolts 
in Kurdish areas in the early 1920s. What the state elite feared most was the rise of a 
Kurdish nationalism allied with an imperialist Western power with the aim of seceding 
from Turkey. Almost every report sent to Ankara from the Kurdish areas addressed this 
fear and contained comments about Kurdish speakers' questionable loyalty to the 
republic. "People of this province do not yet believe that they are part of the Turkish 
nation," wrote a parliamentarian who inspected Siirt, a city in southeastern Turkey, in 
1940. "They look at Ankara with awe and admiration, but Ankara does not lie at all in 
their hearts. Therefore, during insecure times we should pay more attention to and act 
prudently about this province.297 
 
Tasks were given to state officials, ruling party CHP officials, bureaucrat-writers and 
army officials, to produce written materials to serve the State’s assimilation policies. 
Some examples are as below: 
- Süleyman Nafiz Pasa, Van Tarihi ve Kürtler Hakkinda Tetebbuat (History of Van and 
Research about the Kurds), 1928.  
- Albay (colonel) Faiz Demiroglu, Van ve Çevresinde Tarihi Incelemeler (Historical 
Researches in and Around Van), 1985. 
- Albay (colonel) M. Riza: Benlik ve Dilbirligimiz (Us and the Unity of our Language), 
Istanbul, 1933. 
- The work by the army official Dr Mehmet Sükrü Sekban, Kürt Sorunu (Paris, 1933) 
was produced in a brochure-style publication while the author was seriously ill in Paris. 
This document was circulated to state offices, and later to all civil offices after 1960. 
After 1960, it was re-published with the addition of forewords of army chiefs and 
officials under the emergency law in Turkey. This piece is purely a state propaganda 
publication.298  
- Army Major Hilmi, M. Kânunî Sultan Süleyman’ın 1533-1535 Bağdad Seferi, Askeri 
Basımevi, İstanbul, 1932. (Kanuni Sultan Süleyman’s Baghdad Expedition). 
- Army Staff Major Burhan Özkök, Osmanli Devrinde Dersim isyanlari (Dersim 
Revolts During the Ottoman Era), 1937. 
- Gendarmerie General Command, Dersim (100 copies were distributed)  
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- Gendarmerie Colonel Nazmi Sevgen published a periodical called Tarih Konusuyor 
(History Speaks), where he published numerous articles about the Kurds since 1950.  
- Gendarmerie Colonel Nazmi Sevgen: Doguda Kürt Meselesi (The Kurdish Question 
in the East of Turkey), Istanbul, 1970. 
- Gendarmerie Colonel Nazmi Sevgen, Dogu ve Güneydogu Anadolu’da Türk 
Beylikleri / Osmanli Belgeleri ile Kürt – Türkleri Tarihi, Türk Kültürünü Arastirma 
Enstitüsü Yayini (The Turkish Principalities in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia/ 
Ottoman Documents and Kurdish Turks’ History), Turkish Cultural Research Institute 
Publications, 1982. This book includes some of Sevgen’s publications and articles that 
were published beforehand such as, Zazalar: Tarih Dünyasi (Zazas: History World), 
Kürtler: Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi (Kurds: Turkish History Magazine with 
Documents), Kürt Meselesinin içyüzü (An Insider on the Kurdish Question), Irak-
Barzani Antlasmasi ve Muhtemel Neticeleri (The Iraq- Barzani Agreement and its 
Possible Outcomes).    
- Gendarmerie Colonel Nazmi Sevgen, Zazalar (Zazas), Zaza Kültürü, Ankara, 1995. 
- Army Dr Mehmet Çapar, Dogudaki Asiretlerin Türklügü (Turkishness among the 
Tribes in Eastern Anatolia), Istanbul 1972. 
- Army Dr Mehmet Çapar, Dogu Asiretleri ve Emperyalism (Eastern Tribes and 
Imperialism), Istanbul, 1975.  
- Army Staff Colonel Bekir Tümay, Menderes Devri Anilari: Gördüklerim, Bildiklerim, 
Duyduklarim (Menderes-Era Memories: What I Saw, Knew and Heard) 
- Army General Kenan Esengin: Milli Mücadelede Hiyanet Yarisi (The Treachery Race 
in National Struggle, Ankara, 1969.  
- Army General Kenan Esengin, Milli Mücadelede Ayaklanmalar (Revolts During 
National Struggle) 
- Army General Kenan Esengin, Kürtçülük Sorunu (The Pan-Kurdish Problem), 
Istanbul, 1976. 
- Army Dr Ibrahim Etem Gürsel, Kürtçülük Gerçegi (Reality of Kurdishness), Ankara, 
1977.  
- Major General Abdullah Kuloglu, Bölücü Davranislar ve Türk Devleti (Divisive 
Behaviours and the Turkish State), Ankara, 1981. 
- Colonel Sadi Koças, Kürtlerin Kökeni ve Güneydogu Anadolu Gerçegi (The Origin 




- Lieutenant Colonel Kadri Kemal Kop, Anadolu’nun Dogu ve Güneydogusu (Eastern 
and South-Eastern Anatolia), Ankara, 1982. 
- Colonel Resat Halli, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Ayaklanmalar (The Uprisings in the 
Turkish Republic), Chief of Staff Publications, Ankara, 1972.  
Some other important names among the Kemalist army staff and writers are Hasan Resit 
Tankut, Sükrü Kaya Seferoglu, Kemal Türközü, Ismet Parmaksizoglu, M. Fahrettin 
Kirzioglu, Mehmet Eröz, Aydin Taneri, Tuncer Gülensoy, M. Salih San, Edip Yavuz, 
M. Serif Firat, Ahmet Arvasi, Kazim Mirsan, Abdulahaluk Çay, Yasar Kalafat, Ismet 
Alparslan and Hayri Basbug. Hayri Basbug is an interesting figure who should be 
discussed in more detail. He sometimes uses M. Tetik as his pseudonym when he 
publishes. He is a Zaza from Diyarbakir who works closely with state institutions. 
Mehmet Bayrak argues that he is a Turkish State agent who publishes to serve state 
propaganda. 299  Basbug was the chief editor of both Zaza Kültür Yayinlari (Zaza 
Cultural Publications) and Zaza Gençlik Dergisi (Zaza Youth Magazine). He was active 
in Türk Dünyasi Arastirmalari (Research on the Turkish World) and Türk Kültürünü 
Arastirma Enstitüsü (The Institute of Turkish Cultural Research). 
 
When it became obvious that these institutions were directly state funded, the same 
group of researchers tried to act under another institution, which was named Bogaziçi 
Yayinlari (Bogaziçi Publications)300. This group of people and their institutions used to 
focus on the argument that the Kurds are actually Turks or a Turkic tribe. When this 
idea became outdated and did not serve their purpose, they came up with the project of 
‘Zazism’. This project aimed at spreading the idea that Zazas are not Kurds, but a Turkic 
tribe and a people of its own. Hayri Basbug, under the name M. Tetik, managed the 
propaganda publications project himself from Ankara. The group would send these 
propaganda publications to recipients in Turkey and Europe. This project was clearly 
part of the state’s assimilation policies and/or divide and rule tactics.  
Looking at the case more closely, it bears a strong similarity to the early decades of the 
Turkish Republic. The originator and one of the most prominent advocates of the ‘Sun 
Language Theory’ was Professor Hasan Resit Tankut. Tankut was appointed as a state 
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advisor to the eastern provinces following the 1925 Sheikh Said revolt. He produced a 
vast number of publications from the region in the service of state interests.301 In his 
reports he outlines the assimilation and divide and rule tactics in detail. He argues “the 
Kurdistan region of Turkey should be divided as a T-shape based on the Euphrates 
River. Initially the Kurds should be divided as Alevi Zaza residents in the north of the 
T, and Sunni (Safii) Zazas in the south of the T. Later, as a whole, there should be a 
dam (line) of Turkish population placed between the Zazas and Kurmanjs.302 
 
The linguistic argument of whether Zazaki is a dialect of Kurdish or a separate language 
is another vast study area. To judge this, one should know all main four Kurdish dialects 
in detail. Also, this judgement should take into consideration the fact that the Kurdish 
language has been passed down to the modern era primarily orally and by cultural 
means. With the Zazaki case, it is generally argued that different areas (cities and towns) 
of Zazaki-speaking residents find it difficult to communicate to each other. According 
to some, these linguistic divisions in Zazaki could not be explained by mere differences 
of accent, and could be considered as wholly different dialects. Some Zazas in Dersim 
refer to their spoken version of Zazaki not Zazaki, but “Dersimki/Dersimi” or “Zonê 
Ma” (our language).303  
 
The political attempts at controlling the local society have gone hand in hand with other 
means to “assimilate” Zazaki speaking groups, such as education, language, economy 
and schooling. 304  The policy of assimilating particularly through attributing huge 
attention to ‘language’ as an effective means of assimilating the non-Turks took place 
in a hasty way right following the establishment the modern Turkish nation state.  As 
highlighted by Fuat Dundar: 
 
Only a few years before the Turkification campaign, the different languages were 
visual and public in Anatolia, in the field of communication, in trade companies, place 
names (especially villages), stores names and so on. All these were forbidden by a 
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series of codes. Through the ‘Speak Turkish Campaign’, non- Turkish languages were 
excluded from the public sphere and those who spoke non-Turkish languages had to 
assimilate.305 
 
These are not new policies applied by the Turkish state, but have been part of state 
policies since the 1930s in various ways. The main aim of these policies is almost the 
same as at the beginning, but the way they are applied has shifted according the broader 
needs of the state since the early years of the Republic of Turkey. The Turkish state 
developed its schooling policies and built many schools in the Kurdish areas in the 
second half of the 20th century, especially in the last quarter of the century. For example, 
Welat Zeydanlıoğlu refers to this process as following; 
Boarding schools were built in particular in the Kurdish provinces […], in order to cut 
off Kurdish children from their families and community and as in other educational and 
military institutions, they were strongly encouraged and more often forced to forget 
their mother tongue and exposed to propaganda that Kurds were “bad”, “dirty” and 
“primitive”, while at the same time also maintaining that there were no such things as 
Kurds.306 
 
However, the finalising of the assimilation through schooling would be the era 
following the 1980 army coup. But at about the same time, the establishment of the 
PKK was to make waves in the battle over political identity in the region. It is argued 
that if it had not been for the establishment of the PKK in 1978 and its political 
mobilisation which followed, the Kurds and especially the Zazakî-speaking group, 
would have been successfully assimilated by the Republic of Turkey. The PKK is 
widely criticised for its cultural and language policy towards Kurds, in the sense that it 
did not focus on promoting Kurdish language, culture and folklore, but instead focused 
mainly on political activities. Since the 2000s, the PKK and its organisations started to 
pay more attention to the cultural areas of the Kurdish identity.  
 
Along with the above-mentioned “tools” employed by the Turkish state, religion has 
become an important means of creating a sense of strong belonging for the inhabitants 
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of the region towards the state. As Çewlig/Bingöl is a predominantly Sunni Muslim 
region, it had a tendency of opposition towards the early period of the Turkish Republic 
led by Atatürk and later by his followers within the Republican Peoples Party (CHP)307. 
From the 1950s onwards, Turkey has seen the governments of conservative parties for 
decades until the present times, with the exception of short periods in which social 
democratic political were in government or formed coalitions with conservative parties 
to form governments.  
 
In this era of conservative governments, the region has won some forms of freedom, up 
to certain limits, compared with the historical barriers of the Kemalist Turkish state’s 
“red lines”. This exchange has built a sense of strong belonging towards the Turkish 
state for some inhabitants. These ties have become even stronger in the last three 
decades, the era following 1980 coup. In 1983, the Motherland Party (ANAP), led by 
the prominent liberal figure Turgut Özal308, won the first general elections held after 
the coup to form the government. His party had built strong relations with religious and 
tribal leaders. As emphasized by Ersin Kalaycioğlu “it seems as if there is a definite 
popular attraction of “conservatism” (muhafazakarlık) in Turkish politics, which can 
be converted into remarkable electoral support at the poll”.309 
 
Through these society leaders, it seemed that he was willing to share some of the power 
of central government with the region. This was done more directly than ever before in 
the history of the Republic of Turkey. As a result of these policies, Özal managed to 
win vast support in the region in a considerably short time.310 This phenomenon was 
visible in Çewlig/Bingöl, similarly to the majority of the Kurdish areas of Turkey. 
Tunceli or Dersim in its broader historical boundaries could be indicated as almost the 
only region where he could not get as much direct support, as it is the only province in 
the Kurdish area that is Alevi-inhabited, apart from some scattered towns spread in 
other areas. Therefore, it had strong ties with secular political parties, mainly the CHP. 
Although during the second part of the 20th century mostly conservative parties had 
power at the governmental level, the state’s regime was mainly Kemalist. The state 
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institutions, particularly the army, either served as an opposition to conservative 
governments, or more directly dominated the political atmosphere. 
 
The political tendency (also the ability of the conservative political parties in gaining 
the public support) in this thesis is often mentioned in relation to the two main example 
cities bordering Çewlig/Bingöl, which are Elazig (addressed as a symbol of Turkified 
city) and Diyarbakir (addressed as a symbol of Kurdish resistance towards the state’s 
attempts of Turkifiying the region). This game of push and pull is still ongoing in 
Çewlig/Bingöl by the two dominant political players, the state and the Kurdish 
movement. The political contest has its shifts over the decades, with each of the political 
players getting stronger or weaker. The factors that decide which side is ascendant 
change depending on local and regional aspects, and global trends.311 
 
3.1.1 Attempts to ‘Divide and Rule’: Policies by the Turkish State 
Studying the development of the Kurdish question in Turkey reveals that the Turkish 
state has mainly relied on the following three competing policies in its relation to the 
Kurds and the Kurdish movement; firstly, a policy of assimilation by breaking down 
tribal structure, which usually resulted in armed rebellion; secondly a policy of co-
optation of tribal leaders with the purpose of controlling these unruly regions; and 
thirdly, a policy of divide and rule using one tribe against another. Particularly, the 
policy of divide and rule has shown to be an effective instrument in 
weakening/fragmenting the Kurdish movement.312  The divide and rule policy has been 
a vital instrument for the Turkish state to apply it to its “Kurdish problem” since 1930s. 
This has mainly been done by using differences in language and religion among its 
Kurdish population. There are two different dialects of Kurdish, and two main different 
religious sects among the Kurdish citizens of Turkey. The ‘divide and rule’ strategies 
date back to the late 1920s, mainly after Sheik Said’s revolt.  
 
The Turkish state has honed and sought to improve its tactics of divide and rule. The 
early design of these policies over the Kurds dates back to the late 1920s and early 
1930s. There was a rise in these policies after the Seyyid Riza revolt of Dersim in 1937-
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38. This era witnessed harsh policies as the state perceived a serious threat since two 
major revolts (the 1925 Sheik Said and 1937 Seyyid Riza revolts) took place in mainly 
Zaza-populated areas. Not only did the state use security tactics against the people of 
the region, it also used ‘social tactics’ in provoking groups against each other313. The 
‘other’ would sometimes be Alevi or Sunni, and sometimes would be Kird/Zaza or 
Kurmanj. Speaking to an elderly local on my field trip, he said “There is a neighbouring 
village that is Alevi in Çewlig/Bingöl’s Sancak. The head of Army in the area would 
come to us telling how badly the Alevi village thought of us and how hostile they were 
to us. We have lived in the same area over generations with the same village in peace. 
We found out that the same Army official was doing similar propaganda in the Alevi 
village against us. Still, some of the villagers would tend to believe this negative 
propaganda, which was problematic, but some would choose to side with power of 
state”.314  
 
A similar example can be found in the Çewlig/Bingöl region’s town of 
Kaniresh/Karliva town over the linguistic differences. Kaniresh/Karliova is the only 
majorly Kurmanj-populated town of Çewlig/Bingöl. There are some Kird/Zaza villages 
in the town’s area neighbouring areas Çewlig/Bingöl and the town of Solhan. I have 
witnessed similar stories told by locals where the state officials took active role and 
used the linguistic differentiations usually against the Kurmanjs. Kurmanjs and Alevis 
are set as minorities against Kirds/Zazas and Sunnis. Similarly to numerous cases in the 
wider region of Mesopotamia and the whole Middle East, vague state propaganda 
against the ‘other’ is common. Sentiments regarding the supposed superior cleanliness 
of Kirds/Zazas compared to Kurmanjs, or the immorality of Alevis contrasted to Sunnis, 
can be heard.315 Whenever there is ground for it, difference is used as a tool, especially 
by those who do not believe that ‘the other’ is not part of their community. This, in 
many cases, is supported by those in power, as it is easier to manage a divided 
community.  
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3.1.2 An Overview of Education, Language and Assimilation Policies in the Region 
Culture in its wider meaning includes its materialistic and spiritual angles. These are 
important pillars of identity among different ethnicities. Culture and identity on one 
hand prevent an ethnicity from diminishing, and on other hand help the diversity and 
the richness of the multicultural society of a state and the world in a wider perspective316. 
In other words, if an ethnic group loses its cultural elements, then it starts losing its 
identity, assimilating into a more dominant identity, usually which geographically 
surrounds it. This process of smaller or politically weaker cultures being diminished 
and becoming parts of bigger and/or politically stronger cultures lead the world towards 
a monocultural and single-identity planet. 
 
Applying this phenomena to the Zaza case, although a pro-Zaza group may sound as if 
they advocate for the construction of a positive Zaza identity, in reality this ideology 
functions to serve the Turkish state’s divide and rule and assimilation policies. The 
Turkish state used secular Turkification up until the 1980s, which found some strong 
ground in Dersim and Elazig, mostly among the Alevi Zazas. In a polarised atmosphere, 
the Sunni Zazas identified secularism with Turkishness, since secularism was part of 
the Kemalist regime’s political agenda along with a strong sense of Turkish identity.317 
This conception of the identity did not allow for much other than these two elements. 
After the 1980s, the political space was opened to the conservative political groups. 
This new model of the Turkish state, inevitably, started to attract Sunni Kurds/Zazas. 
The mostly Sunni Zaza-populated Çewli /Bingöl begun to picture itself as part of the 
Turkish State. The Turkish State was no longer ‘the other’ as clearly as it had been 
before. This phenomena became even clearer towards the beginning of 2000s, and the 
pro- Zaza and pro-Turkish groups of the Kirds/Zazas of Çewlig/Bingöl identified 
themselves along with the Turkish state as ‘us’.318  This has a similarity with the 
Ottoman Empire’s policy of Ummah with Kurds in its last two centuries. This approach 
emphasised the Ummah (Sunni brotherhood) over ethnic identity, as a phenomena vital 
to keep the Muslim peoples of Empire together.  
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The richness of different languages is under serious danger. There are various reasons 
why nation states choose to weaken the use of “other” languages within their territories. 
These reasons could be seen as colonialist policies, the reaction of nation states to their 
minorities, and globalism. Turkey does not hide its desire for a monolithic nation by 
proudly stressing its one language, one religion, one nation, one flag etc. mono-ethnic 
strategies. The Turkish state designs all its policies towards all varieties of “otherness” 
with these motivations. It has zero tolerance towards other ethnic groups when they 
attempt to promote their cultural, linguistic and social identity. The Turkish state since 
its creation has had a special focus on assimilating Kurds, and especially Zazas. Zazas 
were a weak target for the Turkish state, as there were some differences, especially 
linguistic, which could be used as a useful tool in its divide and conquer policies.319 
 
The Köy Enstitüleri (Village Institutions) which were established in April 1940 played 
a vital role in the Turkish state’s education policies 320  . As part of this projwere 
established in the Kurdish regions, which, according to many, were part of the 
assimilation project through the means of education. Another state sponsored 
institutuion, which had the task of spreding and promoting state ideology and in the 
Kurdish region strictly controlled and fund by the state as part of the Turkification and 
assimilation policy of the state in Kurdistan in the soc-called ‘people’s house. In Senem 
Aslan words;    
One institution whose activity reports have been critical to this research was the 
People's Houses, founded in 1932 by the single party with the aim of spreading the 
ideals of the regime to the masses. Through its activities, which ranged from organizing 
conferences and theater performances to establishing libraries, it played a major role in 
the attempts to modernize the region and assimilate Kurdish speakers into Turkishness. 
By 1949, there were 76 People's Houses and 759 People's Chambers, as they were 
called in the rural areas, operating in the eastern and southeastern provinces.321 
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In these institutions, it was forbidden for children to speak Kurdish, and those who 
attempted this would be punished, sometimes physically punishment. In his book Kürt 
Sorunu ve Demokratik Çözüm, Mehmet Bayrak writes: “In my primary school, three of 
my teachers were graduates of Village Institutions. My class teacher was a Turkish 
teacher who had never seen a Kurdish village until his arrival in our village. He had his 
spies amongst his pupils, who would report to him the children that spoke Kurdish at 
school, on the streets and in their homes. I found out later that one of his spies was my 
brother who was at the same school as me. I, too, stopped talking in Kurdish and 
improved my Turkish”.322 Speaking Turkish was seen as essential part of maintaining 
a good quality of life among middle class Kurds in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. The 
Village Institutions were closed down in 1952 but similar policies continued, especially 
in the Kurdish areas.   
 
The Sun Language theory was introduced in 1930 323 , claiming that the Turkish 
language was the primordial language of humanity and is the basis for most of the 
world’s languages. As part of a similar trend during the same decade, it was claimed 
that both Kurds and Zazas were Turks or Turkic tribes. Attempts to “prove” this idea 
scientifically were made by various bodies of state institutions. In his book History of 
Varto and Eastern Provinces, Mehmet Serif Firat claims that the Zazas are a Turkish 
group of people, and Zazaki is a dialect of Turkish. He then argues “Zazas were 
originally Turkish, but they were falsely identified as Kurds by the Ottoman rulers. 
Therefore, they were misled into thinking of themselves as a “foreign” (non-Turkic) 
ethnic group. This group of people have lost their actual ethnic belonging and were 
confused in the mountainous area and so they were disconnected from their roots”.324 
The pro-state publications were as non-sceintific as this example in the earlier decades. 
This can be regarded as a desperate and manipulating political argument.  
 
Firat continues making claims about Zazaki by saying, “it is 50% Persian, 40% Turkish 
and 10% Arabic. Most of the vocabulary is originally Turkish and one can see the words 
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have been altered from the original and become formatted differently. In some cases, it 
is obvious that the first word is Turkish while the last word is Persian or Arabic”.325 
Ideologically speaking, it is Nazmi Sevgen who is the father of the idea that Zazas are 
Turkish and Zazaki is a dialect of Turkish language. Sevgen was an army officer in the 
Turkish Army, and he took an active role in suppressing the Kurds during the Dersim 
uprising in 1937. During his service he carried out some “research” on the Zazas and 
Zazaki of Dersim province. In the following years, his articles and a book on the topic 
were published. 
 
Another important figure in the engineering policies of the state towards the Zazas was 
Hayri Başbuğ, with his several publication related to this subject.  Başbuğ,’s 
publications became available and coughed the interest of the public since the early 
1980s. He claims that both Zazas and Kurmanjs are a Turkic tribe. He states “No doubt, 
Zaza Turks are descendants of Sumer (Sumerians), Subar or Suvar, who were ancient 
Turks. The strongest connection that links today’s Zaza Turks to the said Sumerians 
(Turks) is the fact that the Sumerians resided in the river basin of the Tigris and the 
Euphrates, and the Zazas still do”.326 As in this case, the arguments are usually vague. 
Başbuğ first argues that the Sumerians were ancient Turks, and then makes a connection 
by claiming that the Sumerians are the ancestors of Zazas. This “research” was devised 
to serve the assimilation agenda of Turkish state and its internal policies, and therefore 
was made without regard to academic accuracy or ethics. 
 
In another publication, Hayri Başbuğ makes some further linguistic comments in his 
attempt to relate Zazakî to the Turkish language. He claims “Zazaki and Kurmanji take 
their roots from the old times and they are dialects of Turkish. These two dialects should 
be given more importance and value as they are two precious treasuries for our language 
(Turkish). Moreover, they are both important sources for research on the old Turkish 
language”.327 
 
                                                 
325 Fırat, Doğu İlleri ve Varto Tarihi, pp. 39-40. 
326 Başbuğ, Hayri. İki Türk Boyu Zaza ve Kurmanclar, Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 
1984, pp.17-19. 
327  Başbuğ, Hayri. Göktürk-Uygur Zaza Kurmanç Lehçeleri Üzerine Bir Araştırma, Ankara: Türk 




Another scholar of that era of fabrication is Professor Tuncer Gülensoy, who published 
similarly on the same topic. In his Research on Kurmanji and Zazaki Turkish, Gülensoy 
argues that “Eastern Anatolia (where the majority of Kirds/Zazas reside) is the beating 
heart of Turkishness. The large majority of residents of this area speak a Turkic dialect 
and they are no doubt Turkish. They have always had a Turkish life style with their 
culture, folklore, handcrafts, etc. People of the Eastern Anatolian region have never felt 
different or parted from Turkishness”.328 
 
Professor Orhan Türkdogan also took a role in shaping that trend of the assimilation 
planning project. Türkdogan in his publication The Place of Zazas and Kurds in Turkish 
Society often refers to Zazas as Zaza Turks, and Zazakî as Zaza Turkish. Türkdogan 
argues “Zazakî no doubt is a Turkic dialect which is part of the Oğuz dialect of old 
Turkish. It is scientifically proven that Zazakî is Turkish”.329 In another section of his 
book, Türkdogan argues that those who are working on the study of Zazakî abroad have 
a political agenda and that they are trying to construct an identity.  
 
One more important personality claiming that Zazas are Turkish and Zazakî is a Turkic 
language is Mahmut Rişvanoğlu. In his published work The Hidden Reailty, The 
Identity of Kurmanjs and Zazas 1, Rişvanoğlu argues that “Kurmanjî and Zazakî have 
many differentiations but they both are Turkic dialects. For many centuries, Turkic 
groups of people in different areas of the world have been using different varieties of 
dialects. Kurmanjî and Zazakî are also dialects of old Turkish and have seen some 
changes over the time”.330 
 
Other writers, politicians and state personages have claimed that Zazas are Turks. 
Along with the previously named sources, it is worthwhile investigating research on 
identity and languages in Turkey, and how these works approach Zazas and Zazakî. 
The Languages and Ethnic Groups in Turkey, published by Professor Ahmet Buran and 
Berna Yüksel Çak, touches on the ethnic arguments about the Zazas. The authors argue 
“There are various sources about the population of Zazas. The Zaza population is one 
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million according to Ali Tayyar Önder and two million according to Ali Riza Özdemir. 
Mesut Keskin claims that the Zaza population is between four and six million.331” In 
the last population census, which included a question on what language/dialect one 
spoke at home, the number of Zazakî speakers was 150,644, with the number of 
speakers of  Zazakî as a second language being 92,288. Since the 1965 population 
census, this question was not included, and so this statistic could not be drawn upon. In 
the 1965 population census many Zazas clearly considered themselves Kurds, for the 
population of Zaza Kurds is far higher than 150,644332. As highlighted through the 
study Servet Mutlu; 
Given the dispute and the lack of an agreed-upon definitive study on the issue, the best 
view may be that there are Kurdish languages as there are Romance languages. Here, 
the pertinent observation is that most Zaza speakers regard themselves as Kurds and 
have been etically designated as such.333 
 
In his book The Ethnic and Religious Groups Living in Turkey, Cemal Şener touches 
on the issue of Zazas and their origins. He points out that both sides of the debate will 
reference the relevant historical sources suiting their political agendas. Zazas have two 
main religious beliefs, which are Sunni and Alevi. The total population of Zazas is 
indicated as 300,000 in some sources in 1970. The population of Zazas who can still 
speak Zazakî is believed to be between 700,000 and one million at the beginning of 
2000s. Around 60% of them are Sunni Zazas and 40% are Alevis.334  The percentage 
of Sunni Zazas is higher in Çewlig/Bingöl. The smaller towns of Kigi, Adakli, 
Yayaladere and Yedisu that border Tunceli/Dersim province are mainly Alevi, and the 
other larger towns and the Çewlig/Bingöl city centre are mainly Sunni.  
 
Peter Alford Andrews, in his study of The Ethnic Groups in Turkey, argues that there 
are some disputes about Zazas. He emphases the misleading nature of the 1965 
population census and claims it could not be a good base for questioning the population 
                                                 
331 Buran, Ahmet., Çak, Berna Yüksel. Türkiye’de Diller ve Etnik Gruplar, Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 
1.edition, 2012, p. 230.  
332 Mutlu, Servet. ̀ Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study`, International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, 28:4 (1996). 517-541, cited in 520. 
333 Mutlu, `Ethnic Kurds in Turkey`, p. 519. 
334 Şener, Cemal. Türkiye’de Yaşayan Etnik ve Dinsel Gruplar, İstanbul: Etik Yayınları, 5. edition, 2006, 




of Zazas, as they simply regarded themselves as Kurds and selected that option in the 
census.335  
When looking at the group that claim Zazas are Turks and that Zazakî is a dialect of 
Turkish, the following statements become clear:  
a) The group of scholars making these arguments had a diverse array of views of the 
origins of the Zazas within the Turkish people. In other words, they failed to devise a 
unified theory. 
b) Linguistically, there are also different views of positioning Zazakî and where it took 
its roots from. The scholars failed to come up with a scientifically accepted opinion. 
c) The most commonly-argued idea has been that Zazas are not Kurds and Zazakî is not 
a Kurdish dialect. The ideologically motivated scholars ascribing to this idea then take 
the case further with some vague arguments that the Zazas are Turks and Zazakî is a 
dialect of Turkish.   
d) The majority of these scholars also consider Kurmanjî as a dialect of Turkish and 
Kurmanjs/Kurds as Turks. 
e) There is a contradiction between the state-sanctioned claim that Zazakî is a dialect 
of Turkish, and that the Zazas are a Turkish people, and the state’s banning of the Zazakî 
language (along with Kurmanjî) in eastern and south-eastern Turkey for decades. If the 
state really accepted that Zazakî is a Turkish dialect, logically the language may have 
been promoted and supported with educational means instead of being banned. 
 
3.1.3 The Role of Religion after the 1980s 
Despite the existence of different views and opinions toward the role of religion and its 
impact on the Kurds identity and self-udenrstanding Kurds, it is arguable to claim that 
religion and particularly Islam has been a major been a strong force of identification 
among the Kurds. For instance as defined by Ali Ezzatyar;  
The role that Islam has played in Kurdish political movements historically is equally 
paradoxical and seemingly contradictory […] the role of Islam in Kurdistan differs 
signifi -cantly from Islam’s role in the rest of the Middle East as well as most of the 
Muslim world. In Kurdish society today, many Kurds identify as Muslim while at the 
same time, counterintuitively, disowning any brotherhood or commonalities with their 
Arab, Persian, or Turkish neighbors. Many seldom attend the mosque and ignore 
                                                 





standard instructions on daily life that many other devout Muslims follow or at least 
are aware of.336 
 
They chose to remain loyal to the Islamic Caliphate and the Ottoman Empire while 
many other ethnic groups under Ottoman control struggled for independence and 
formed their own states, such as Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and other Balkan states.  
Çewlig/Bingöl is a conservative Sunni Muslim-dominated city in the east of Turkey. 
When the Sheikh Said revolt begun in 1925 in Dicle, a town of Diyarbakir province, 
Çewlig/Bingöl participated actively in the revolt and showed a clear support for the 
uprising. During the secular rule of the CHP from 1923 to May 1950, Çewlig/Bingöl’s 
relationship with the newly established Turkish state was problematic. Following the 
single party government era of the CHP from 1950 and onwards, Çewlig/Bingöl started 
to interact with the state in a more direct manner through important local figures such 
as religious leaders and prominent landowners such as Aghas and Begs (those who own 
large portions of land and wield local power). The role of religious leaders and sheikhs’ 
families became more apparent after the 1980 army coup. Turgut Özal, the leader of 
Anavatan Partisi/Motherland Party (ANAP), used these religious figures as strong tool 
for his voter base. He took power in a single party government in the first democratic 
election following the 1980 coup. Certain families became mediators between the state 
and locals. The families that took active roles in the Sheikh Said revolt and provided 
leaders, decades later were taking side with the rulers unlike their fathers and 
grandfathers.337 This was the trend in most of the Kurdish region apart from the Alevi 
Dersim/Tunceli, where locals tended to side with the opposition party, the secular CHP, 
which had been the ruling party until 1950. 
 
3.1.4 The Atempts of the Turkish State in Turning Çewlig into Another Elazig 
(Model of a Turkified City in the Region) 
The Turkish state has historically focused on assimilation policies since the 1930s. As 
mentioned earlier in the thesis, state officials and CHP party officials planned and 
executed the process of assimilating the Zaza areas of the eastern and south-eastern 
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regions of Turkey. The title of this section notes that Elazig is the example of the 
Turkish state’s ‘successful’ assimilation policies in the area. In the early years of the 
Turkish Republic, the state officials aimed and planned a systematic assimilation 
process. Ismet Inönü, then the prime minister, said in 1927 “Our task is to turn whoever 
lives in our land into Turks”, i.e. to Turkify all the non-Turkish inhabitants of Turkey.338 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the founder of Turkish state, argued that the Turks and Kurds 
had equal responsibility in creating this new state. Right after the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic, Ataturk said “we are clearly Turkish nationalists. This republic’s 
ethnic identity is Turkish and Turks back it. The more the society of this republic is 
enlightened by Turkish culture, the stronger the Turkish republic will become”.339 The 
two very clear statements by two highest state officials indicate the Turkish state’s 
tendency towards the Kurds, also a contradiction between the discourses and practices 
from the early stages of the creation of the modern Turkish nation state revealed the 
exclusionary intension of the elites - above all them Mostafa Kemal’s – Turkish state. 
That tendency is to diminish Kurdishness, eliminate their ethnic identity and make them 
accept the Turkishness as their only identity. This would sometimes be via milder 
assimilation policies, sometimes via denial policies, and sometimes by force if and 
when they thought it needed. 
 
Elazig was a historically Kurdish province with the majority of its population being 
Kird/Zaza. The reason why this thesis chose Elazig as example is because Elazig stands 
vital for various reasons. Its province territories borders both with Çewlig / Bingöl and 
Dersim, the two only majorly Zaza cities in current Turkey. Also, both Sheikh Said (in 
Elazig, Çewlig / Bingöl and Diyarbakir) and Seyyid Riza (in Dersim) revolts took place 
in the surroundings of Elazig province. It is for these reasons why the officials targeted 
Elazig in first place to assimilate and Turkify which they mostly succeeded until the 
current day. In Elazig the ‘other’ element is usually Kurdish rather than Turkish.340 
 
During the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, it was Ziya Gökalp, a Zaza himself, 
who was pioneer of Turkish nationalism, and he “acted as a key social theorist behind 
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the origins of the Turkish state ideology and nationalism and gave clarity to the 
transformation from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic in the early twentieth 
century”.341 Also as Cemal Gürsel (a high ranked Turkish military officer and the fourth 
president of Turkey) stated “Trust me [gentlemen], without Ziya Gökalp, this state 
would not exist today! (15 May 1961)”.342 Following his death at a young age in 1924, 
Nihal Atsiz continued his ideological path in leading the Turkish nationalist social 
engineering. Nihal Atsiz is still the main inspiration of the modern Turkish nationalism 
and the main Turkish far-right political party, the Nationalistic Movement Party 
(MHP).343 
 
The aim of this chapter will be to investigate and explain the political dynamics and 
mobilisation of the identity formation in Çewlig/Bingöl from 1980 to 2015. This will 
be conducted by looking specifically at three facets of identity formation and three 
different groups of actors in Çewlig/Bingöl. These three groups are the Turkish State, 
the Kurdish Movement, and the local inhabitants themselves. In an area such as 
Çewlig/Bingöl, a politically tense region of Turkey, the politicial development ansd the 
issue of identity is very complex field of study. The people of this region have been a 
subject of massive state policy of constructing and deconstructing identity and culture. 
Most importantly is the way that the Turkish state desires to “convince” the locals that 
the only way of their living a prosperous life is through accepting Turkishness as a 
homogenous Turkish-ness and unitary identity. In addition due to their resistance to the 
state policy these region has several time been experience demographic engineering 
conducted by the state. For instance The Kemalist government passed a Law on 
Resettlement (Iskan Kanunu) in 1934 to settle people with Turkish origin in that region, 
to forcibly relocate Zaza- and Kurdih-speaking tribes”.344 Particullary the policy of 
demographic engineering345 has been a policy where the state occupying different parts 
of Kurdistan have relied hugely on. Also, due to the challenge of the Kurdish 
movement, the Kurdish population has been a target of the Iranian state’s policy of 
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demographic engineering. This policy has left a variety of negative effects within 
Kurdish society. At present, due this policy Kurds are suffering from issues such as 
identity and geographical fragmentation. For instance contemporary to the reign of Ata 
Turk Reza Khan has in Iran in order to defeat the Kurdish movement followed massive 
policy of the demographical compassion of the Kurds in Iran. Cronin writes that;  
Reza Shah’s massive experiment in social engineering – the settlement of the nomads and the 
complete political, social and cultural integration of tribal population into broader Iranian 
society – was brought to an abrupt end by the Anglo-Soviet invasion of August 1941 and his 
own enforced abdication the following month.346 
 
The best example could be pointed out is the case of Elazig, the bordering city to 
Çewlig/Bingöl, where the Turkish state “succeeded” in a Turkification process through 
the above-mentioned means such as schooling, the economy, language policies, 
demographic engineering, etc. 
 
It is obvious that the state is at an advantage in the battle to gain political support on the 
ground, as it is indeed the power that has full control of the economic levers, which it 
uses for sculpting the society in line with its desire for a mono-ethnic state structure. 
This trend has grown even stronger since the army coup in 1980. The Turkish state 
started to play a more direct role in shaping the political structure in the last three 
decades. The government’s intervention is despite the fact that Çewlig/Bingöl was the 
leading province in the NO vote of 1982 constitutional referendum, by 32%. The total 
results in Turkey as a whole were 92% YES and 8% NO. This difference between 
Çewlig/Bingöl and rest of Turkey demonstrates a considerable gap, bearing in mind the 
political atmosphere following the army coup in 1980. The newly established 
conservative Motherland Party (ANAP), with its charismatic leader Turgut Özal, won 
the first general elections held following the army coup and the new constitution, in 
November 1983.347 This was an easy win by 45% of the vote, both in Turkey as a whole, 
and in the Çewlig/Bingöl region, which led ANAP to form a single party government. 
Çewlig/Bingöl was and is known for its religiously conservative culture, and the 
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inhabitants welcomed the new government which was of a different stripe to the overly 
secular CHP and seemed to open a space for a plurality of identities. Özal’s government 
gave a great priority to the economy, with its liberal reforms.  
 
In the earlier period of the Turkish Republic, there were a number of reports regarding 
Kurds prepared by state bodies including the prime minister, ministers, MPs and other 
leading personalities and institutions working for the state. Along with the above-
mentioned, there were also inspectors from the ruling CHP (the Republic of Turkey 
was under a single party regime until 1950), the general command of gendarmerie, 
general inspectors that served the state with their reports on Kurds including today’s 
Kird/Zaza-inhabited areas. The information in the reports concerned their ethnic, 
cultural, sociological, anthropologic and linguistic structures. Zazas were clearly 
regarded as part of broader sense of Kurdishness and their language as Kurdish in the 
reports of the early era. There was an increase in nationalistic Turkish state policies in 
1930s. In parallel with the context of policies, the Kirds/Zazas became regarded as 
“mountain Turks”. In the 1936 general inspectors’ meeting held in Ankara, there were 
major discussions on Zazas held by these state bodies.348 It was suggested that the state 
should focus on schooling, peoples’ houses and settlement projects in order to Turkify 
them as part of the newly launched assimilation policies.  
 
In 1942, the general secretary of the CHP, Memduh Sevket Esendal, prepared a report 
about the region where he referred to the spoken language, Kurdish, as the “language 
of home” or “indoor language”. Some reports suggested that there should be created a 
“corridor” of 50 km between Kurmanj and Zazas, into which should be a transferred 
Turkish-speaking population, as part of divide and assimilate policies. This would serve 
the state’s argument that the Zazas are not Kurds, but either Turks or a people of their 
own. This would also help diminish the speaking of their language, marginalising it 
quicker and easier.  
 
Another important source in the early times of Turkish republican history, is the series 
of five population censuses that took place between 1927 and 1950. In these reports, 
                                                 





Kirds/Zazas were regarded as Kurds and the column of mother language was noted as 
Kurdish. In the first two decades of the republic, Kirds/Zazas were viewed as Kurds in 
all sorts of formal state publications. Some of these publications by important state 
figures were Ziya Gökalp’s Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkında Sosyolojik Tespitler (Sociological 
Findings Regarding Kurdish Tribes), Hasan Reşit Tankut’s Zazalar Üzerine Sosyolojik 
Tetkikler349 (Sociological Surveys Regarding Zazas) and Basri Konyar’s Diyarbekir İl 
Yıllığı (The Yearbook of Diyarbakir). These works are important sources for the region 
at the time.   
 
The first study during the Republican era is Ziya Gökalp’s Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkında 
Sosyolojik Tespitler (Sociological Findings Regarding Kurdish Tribes). This work was 
written in 1922 as Gökalp was asked to produce this by Dr. Riza Nur, and was published 
only after the death of Gökalp. In his book, Gökalp argues that Kurds consist of five 
main groups that are Kirmanj, Zaza, Goran, Soran and Lur. Gökalp states that the 
dialects of these groups are not mutually intelligible, but stresses that all five dialects 
are derived from old Kurdish. Gökalp points out that Zazas call themselves Kirds and 
Kirmanjs call themselves Kirdas; most significantly, he argues that the appellation Zaza 
is primarily applied to them not by themselves, but by the Turks. 
 
Çewlig/Bingöl had distanced itself from the Kemalist regime in the past. The new 
Turkey after 1980 offered a space for the liberal and conservative policies. The state 
could therefore earn support from the “others” who had been targeted by Kemalist 
policies. Both the new government and the citizens in Çewlig/Bingöl and other 
provinces were happy with new exchange of mutual support. 
 
3.2. The Kurdish Movement’s Reaction Against the State’s Policies: The Case of 
Amed/Diyarbakir  
In the 1960s and 1970s, Kurdish political resistance in Turkey made a new attempt after 
two decades of inactivity. The PKK announced its establishment in 1978, and 
introduced itself as the unifier of Kurdish resistance against the Turkish state. The PKK 
entered the stage as a movement of armed struggle that challenged the Turkish state’s 
                                                 




authority in the region the referred to as Kurdistan in Turkey.350 For instance David 
Romano on PKK’s success and contribution to reviving and refreshing the Kurdish 
movement in Tukey, following many decades of Kurdish deprivation and desperation 
in Turkey says;  
If there is one thing that every observer of the conflict, be the Turkish generals, Kurdish 
peasants, or western academics, generally agree on, it is that the PKK succeed in 
bringing the Kurdish issue back into the limelight of public discourse in Turkey.351 
 
The oppressive policies during the 1980 army coup, and especially the torture that took 
place in Diyarbakir prison, helped the PKK to extend its support base among the 
Kurdish population in Turkey vastly. This period also witnessed the institutionalisation 
of the political mobilisation of the Kurdish ethnic-national identity. For many people in 
the region, supporting the PKK became a way of showing opposition to the acutely 
nationalistic state apparatus which has strived, not only to eradicate the Kurdish ethnic 
identity, but which also created the unequal social and economic conditions which 
aggrieved so many. This period thus represents a critical time in the political 
mobilisation of the Kurds in Turkey.  
 
3.2.1 The Current Kurdish Movement’s Policies towards Zazas (1980s to 2010s) 
Although Turkey has a free market economy, the State plays an important role in 
economic structure. The economy in eastern and south-eastern (the Kurdish) areas is 
not as advanced as other areas and especially the western areas of Turkey. These are 
remote areas and far from mainstream marketing fields of large cities in the west of 
Turkey such as Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Kocaeli, Bursa, Adana, Mersin 
etc.  Traditionally, there not many economical activities which make the economy more 
vulnerable and more dependent on direct role of state. With affects of globalism and 
global economy, the local economical activities are diminishing and becoming more 
dependant on ‘outside’ economy majorly.  This chapter will discuss that; the Turkish 
state uses the weakness in economy of the Kurdish region as an instrument for its 
political agenda. Thus, it uses this weakness to further its assimilation policies. It is 
beneficial for an individual or a group of people to side with the absolute authority, the 
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Turkish state, in the region is preferable for those who do not give much importance to 
politics.   
  
The Zaza and locally (in Çewlig / Bingöl) Kird / Zaza identity position is vastly 
discussed alongside with the Kurdish related one in Turkey. This is the case both by the 
Kurdish and Turkish political perspective. Zazaness is mainly pointed out as the 
counter-position with Kurdishness by the Turkish Nationalists or by the pro-Zaza 
nationalists that do not see it as great problem being affiliated with Turkishness as 
oppose to Kurdishness. The pro-Zaza nationalists see Kurdishness as a threat to their 
own existence. This goes hand in hand with the Turkish state’s most recent goal over 
‘Zaza Identity Construction’. Its initial goal over this identity construction was to 
‘convince’ the Zazas that they were a Turkic tribe which they achieved in places like 
Elazig and Dersim / Tunceli mainly.   
 
The period from the early 1980s to 2015 witnessed a noticeable transition in Kurdish 
policies in Turkey. Following the military coup of 1980, which ushered in a period 
authoritarian policies, the election of Turgut Özal, a prime minister praised 
internationally for his liberalism, also heralded the entry of a number of parties with 
conservative and religious tendencies into the mainstream political arena. Under the 
banner of Muslim brotherhood, these parties were able to mobilise a large number of 
Kurds who had for so long been marginalised by the state. Whereas before, identifying 
oneself as being a Kurd led to automatic discrimination and exclusion from 
participating in any political activates  now, one could find legitimate commonality 
with their Turkish counterparts under the ‘inclusive’ guise of religion. Parties such as 
the Welfare Party352, Virtue Party and Justice and Development Party (AKP) have 
cleverly utilised the Islamic religious identity to mobilise the Kurds for their own 
political gains For example, the Welfare party in the 1980s mobilized voters who were 
ignored by other parties in Turkey. Developed to integrate vulnerable and excluded 
groups into the political system, the welfare party helped to resolve one of Turkey's 
foremost problems by including the Islamic-oriented periphery and the large Kurdish 
population in. this kind of “inclusion was not costly because the Islamic periphery did 
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not request the immediate redistribution of political power. Rather, it was primarily an 
outcome of the changing parameters of the state after 1980 caused by a growing 
economy and liberalization”. 353  In addition, it could be argued that 1980s also 
witnessed a revival of Alevi identity, which caused Alevi Kurds to question their 
identity as well as raising questions of their ethnic belonging.   
 
The Kurdish issue has always been part of political discussions and problems in Turkey. 
This became much more apparent and visible with the influence of the media over last 
three decades.354 It seems like this issue always contemporary and a solution to it is 
being postponed, or being treated along with security policies. Since it is always a “hot” 
issue, it has drawn the attention of academicians, research centres, media institutions, 
and some NGOs, which have mostly taken a political approach to it. The majority of 
these bodies have a political agenda or preconceived opinion about the Kurds; therefore, 
these parties frequently produce misinformation, complicating the study of the Kurds 
and Zazas in Turkey as it is a considerably a new research area.  
 
Those who work on this subject primarily emphasise the violence of the Kurds’ 
relations with the Turkish state, and the fact that the Kurdish question has not been 
solved over decades. Few analytic works of sociology have been produced, and many 
of the figures from media organisations, NGOs and politicised institutions work without 
a scholarly perspective and do not consider the cultural and ethnic realities of the 
Kurdish people. Publications related to the area, by both Turkish and Kurdish 
intellectuals, usually only focus on the contemporary aspects of topic. This leads them 
to base these analyses on current conditions, ignoring the historical and cultural angles.  
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Some writers who have written on the Kurds in Turkey are Hasan Cemal,355 Cengiz 
Çandar,356 Mustafa Akyol,357 Prof Dogu Ergül,358 Belma Akçura,359 Ugur Mumcu,360 
Bejan Matur,361 Orhan Miroglu,362 Muhsin Kizilkaya,363 and many other intellectuals, 
who emphasise the modern-day situation. Along with above mentioned, there are other 
publications that have a more direct perspective on Kurdish history, their origin and 
languages. These publications grow in number in the late 20th century and current times. 
Some prominent names are Kemal Burkay, 364  Altan Tan, 365  Fethullah Kaya, 366 
Mehmed Emin Zeki Beg,367 Mehrdad R. Izady,368 Abdurrahman Qasimlo,369 Martin 
van Bruinessen,370 Robert Olson,371 and a still growing list of important names which 
have authored important scholarly publications that help understand the issue further.  
 
As part of Kurdish studies, Zazas are generally mentioned as part of the Kurds, and 
Zazakî as a dialect of Kurdish. Furthermore, the Kurdish political movement(s), 
Kurdish media, Kurdish intellectuals, Kurdish politicians, and some universities that 
have instituti Although while there are studies of ethnolinguistic and identity that either 
reject the Kurdness of Zaza or put a question mark with the claim. However studies of 
scholars as for instance Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, Jaffer Sheyholislami and Amir 
Hassanpour that highlight the Kurdness of the Zazas.372 Another example of Kurdish 
intellectual and scholars support to the idea of the Kurdishness of Zaza and Zazaki is 
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Pervine Jamil a well-recognized scholar of identity and ethnolinguistic claim’s clearly 
that Zazaki is a sub-Kurdish dialect, not an independent language.373 
 
The main group of intellectuals that see Zazas as Kurds are themselves Zazas, and they 
are members of the VATE Studies Group.374 This organisation is a group of Zaza 
people who first started working together in Sweden 1996. They formed the VATE 
group in Stockholm in 1996 and held their first meeting. They started publishing a 
periodic journal with same name, VATE, in 1997. They held 22 meetings up until 2012.  
 
Following the era of democratic opening in Turkey since 2003, different cultures and 
language groups found more space available to work and publish in their languages. 
Again, in the same period, VATE Publishing House extended its activity from diaspora 
to Istanbul in 2003, announcing that they will work in line with the VATE Studies 
Group, and started publishing mainly in Zazakî. The VATE Studies Group has 
produced publications dealing with the standardisation of the Zazakî language. It has 
published Zazakî vocabularies and other Zazakî publications in the last two decades.375 
 
When the VATE journal starting publication in 1997, its preface stated “This journal’s 
aim is to improve and advance the Zazakî dialect. When reading VATE, one should not 
expect to see a standard accent. We all long for a standard Zazakî but we should be 
aware that this will not be possible to achieve in one day, month or even year. This 
work will be on a voluntary basis, will take a long time, needs a passionate focus and 
most importantly will require a group of self-sacrificing people. Our intellectuals and 
writers will need to have a good level of the Zazakî dialect and a good level of the 
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accent of their areas they come from. They should ideally have a good understanding 
of reading and writing in Zazakî too. We can then seek for a most common ground and 
format of standardising our dialect”.376 It is clear that they see and stress that Zazakî is 
a dialect of Kurdish and see themselves as Kurds. When VATE announced the outcome 
of its 22nd meeting,377 they declared that they have so far standardised 10,000 words.378       
 
The pioneer of VATE is M. Malmîsanij who fled to Europe following the 1980 army 
coup in Turkey. When VATE was formed he acted as editor of the journal. In his first 
vocabulary he prepared from Kirdkî/Zazakî to Turkish in 1987, in the introduction he 
points out that, “Kirdkî / Dimilî (Zazakî) did not even have its own [published] 
vocabulary despite the fact that it is spoken in thirteen provinces of Turkey either on a 
major or minor scale. Those who speak this dialect name themselves Kird or Kirmanc 
and name their dialects Kirdkî or Kirmanckî. The Kurdish speakers of Kurmanjî [the 
main dialect of Kurdish in Turkey) them Dimilî or Zazas”.379 
 
Deniz Gündüz in Istanbul established Vate Publishing House in 2013. It has been more 
than a decade that Vate publishes publications mainly in Zazakî in general. It also 
publishes in Kurmanjî Kurdish, Turkish and a limited number of Kurdish studies 
publications in English.   
 
The director of VATE Publishing House Deniz Gündüz, in his work Kirmanckî/Zazakî 
Language Classes, writes “Zazakî, which is also known as Kirmanckî, Kirdkî or 
Dimilkî, is the Kurdish dialect which has suffered from most severe banning and 
assimilation policies of the Turkish state over the decades. Furthermore, it the last 
dialect that has seen any sort of standardisation work or professional studies carried out. 
As a result, it is the most degenerated and damaged dialect of Kurdish. Moreover, 
Kirdki/Zazakî is the last dialect which started its written history. It has only been in the 
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last three decades that it began being written systematically, whereas the start of work 
on the systematic standardisation of Kurmanjî goes back at least one century”.380   
 
Another group that sees Zazakî as a Kurdish dialect is Tzp-Kurdî (Tevgera Ziman u 
Perwerdehîya Kurdî – the Kurdish Language and Education Movement) which held a 
conference in Çewlig/Bingöl from 30/06/2012 to 03/07/2012. In that conference, they 
stressed that Kirdkî/Zazakî is a dialect of Kurdish and its speakers are Kurds. The 
conference, in its final declaration, asserted that that “The first Kird/Kirmanckî 
conference delegation sees itself as part of the national language conference and 
therefore accepts all the decisions taken in the national language conference. The 
delegation strongly opposes those who attempt to present the Kirdkî/Kirmanckî dialect 
of Kurdish as a separate language and the speakers of it as a separate people. It sees 
these attempts as politically motivated and part of works that aim to divide Kurdish 
people”.381    
 
The academic works produced in Artuklu University (based in the Mardin province of 
Turkey) also claim the Zazas as Kurds and Zazakî as a Kurdish dialect. The head of the 
Living Languages Department (it was not named as Kurdish Language Department for 
political reasons), Professor Kadri Yildirim, stressed in an interview: “We accept Zazas 
as a Kurdish group and Zazakî as a Kurdish dialect. The Kurdish language consists of 
the main dialects of Kurmanjî, Zazakî, Goranî, Soranî and Lurî. Therefore our classes 
are held in both dialects of Kurdish that are spoken in Turkey, Kurmanjî and Zazakî, 
and we benefit from this strategy greatly”.382    
 
Kadri Yildirim, in another of his interview, points out that “The vast majority of 
Kurmanjs and Zazas identify themselves as Kurds and see Zazakî as a dialect of 
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Kurdish.”383 Mardin Artuklu University hosted the 20th meeting of the VATE group 
working on the standardisation of Zazakî between 30/10/2011 and 02/11/2011. 
Immediately before this, the University held a conference titled ‘Zazakî Literature and 
the attempts of standardising Zazakî’. In this conference, the head of Mardin Artuklu 
University, Serdar Bedii Omay, said, “we have been aware of the VATE group’s 
valuable work on Zazakî for a while now. Although there is no Zaza population in our 
area (the Mardin province and surroundings), the importance of helping Zazakî is still 
incumbent, as it is under threat of dying as a dialect or language”.384 Speaking in the 
same panel, Professor Kadri Yildirim pointed out “we have had a discussion in our 
academic work. As a result, we have decided that the dialects Kurmanjî and Zazakî 
should be studied together. This will help overcome the existing problems and decrease 
the vague arguments that they are not dialects of same language. We have started using 
this method in our department, and we believe that this method will create a useful 
model in this area of Kurdish language”.385   
 
The Institute of Living Langauages at Mardin Artuklu University, and some writers of 
VATE journal, have published a co-edited work titled “Edebîyatê Kirmanckîra 
Nimûneyî/An Anthology of Kirdkî/Kirmanckî Literature”. In the introduction of this 
edition of the journal, they stressed, “Kirds/Zazas are a branch of Kurdish society. 
Depending on their area of origin, they name themselves as Kird, Kirmanc, Dimilî and 
Zazas; and they speak Kirdkî, Kirmanckî, Dimilî and Zazakî”.386 
 
TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation) began Kurdish broadcasting in 2009 
on the TRT6 channel; it devotes some hours of the week to Zazakî programs. In its 
programs, TRT6 treats the Zazas as Kurds and Zazakî as a Kurdish dialect. It has a 
liberal tendency towards those who claim that Zazas are a separate people and Zazakî 
is a language of its own. Groups claiming this also have their programs broadcast on 
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TRT6.387 A prominent publication, the Nubîhar Journal, also sees Zazas as a Kurdish 
group.  Nubîhar has published tens of volumes in Kurmanjî, and it dedicated all of its 
118th volume to Zazakî (the volume was written solely in Zazakî). The editor of 
Nûbîhar, Süleyman Çevik, in his introduction to the volume, points out “until now the 
Kurmanj Kurds did not pay enough attention to Zazakî and Zazas, they did not focus 
on the language aspect. Zazakî is a major dialect of Kurdish and it has millions of 
speakers. Kurmanjs make the effort to learn many other languages, but not Zazakî. This 
is wrong, and we should give a higher priority to learn Zazakî. Kurds should learn to 
speak and write in Zazakî as it is under serious threat”.388 
 
Another prominent publication that sees Zazas as Kurds and Zazakî as Kurdish is 
Azadîya Welat (Freedom of Homeland). It publishes a paper of eight pages every 
Monday called Veroj, which is a Zazakî word meaning sun-facing. The editor of the 
Zazakî section, Ahmedê Bıra, explains that “this newspaper will be mainly publishing 
news and introducing the Zazas. Zazakî is a dialect that is under danger of diminishing. 
Therefore our people should support the newspaper. We expect all Kurdish people to 
support this idea and newspaper, should read it, and get it to be read by the masses. 
Furthermore, we encourage more writers to write in Zazakî. We have a team of 15 
writers, and depending on the demand, we may publish daily instead of weekly in the 
future”.389  
 
When thinking about the group that sees Zazas as part of Kurds and Zazakî as a Kurdish 
dialect, the following points become clear: 
- Those who regard Zazakî a dialect of Kurdish have instituted a collective action 
aiming to save the language from shrinking and disappearance, and search for ways to 
increase its use in everyday life to protect it from the assimilation policies of the Turkish 
state.  
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- They believe that the view that the Zazas are a separate nation and Zazakî is a separate 
language from Kurdish, is the product of a project planned by the state, or at least 
supported by the Turkish state and its institutions.  
- According to the group which upholds that the Zazas are Kurds and Zazakî is a 
Kurdish dialect, the Zazaist group (the group that believes Zazas are a people of their 
own and Zazakî is a separate language) does not produce anything that will serve Zazakî 
and Zazas survive for future centuries. They only have a vague political argument 
which suggests Zazas are not Kurds and their language is not part of Kurdish, which is 
why this group receives support from the Turkish state. The state does this in line with 
its ‘divide and rule’ strategy.  
- The pro-Kurdish Zazas accuse the some western scholars and saying most of the time 
these scholars have not based their arguments on proper research. They instead went 
with the arguments backed by the Turkish state and fabricated academic productions. 
On the other hand, they praise the group of western scholars and researchers that see 
Zazas as Kurds and Zazakî as a Kurdish dialect.  
- The historical sources that regard Zazas as Kurds and Zazakî as a Kurdish dialect are 
mostly the older ones that date from before 20th century. The group of sources which 
claim otherwise have mainly been authored in the 20th and 21st centuries, coinciding 
with the period of the Turkish state (established in 1923).  
- The pro-Kurdish groups of Zazas do not belong to one political trend. VATE, the main 
group which puts most work into the linguistic area and make attempts to preserve 
Zazakî, consists of a group of intellectuals who have major differences in their political 
motivations. Some of the prominent members of the group tend to oppose the KCK 
trend of politics. One would expect the KCK and its institutions to be the dominant 
group in all areas of Kurdishness in Northern Kurdistan/Turkish Kurdistan.390 
 
3.2.3 The Use of Language and Culture as a Tool by the Kurdish Movement  
Although the group supporting the Turkish state claims that the Kurdish movement has 
an agenda of diminishing the use of Kirdkî/Zazaki language, it is the pro–Kurdish 
movement Kirds/Zazas who have expended the most effort on producing works in 
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Zazaki and worked on standardising the language as a dialect of Kurdish. The most 
prominent group of these intellectuals are the group called VATE (which means 
“saying” in Kirdkî/ Zazaki). This group of people first came together in Sweden, where 
they were mainly political refugees, most of whom had been there since the 1980 army 
coup in Turkey. Starting in the mid-1990s, they have accomplished a significant amount 
of language production and standardisation. When I met with Mamoste391 Malmisanij, 
the leading figure of VATE, in Sweden on one of my field trips, he stressed that 
Kirdkî/Zazakî was under serious threat. He added “it is not used among its speakers as 
much as it should be. Moreover, due to the lack of institutions to promote it, this 
dialect/language has been massively disadvantaged. Therefore, we founded the VATE 
group to promote Kirdkî/Zazakî. We gather periodically about every six months and try 
to standardise one subject area in each gathering”.392 Many of those engaged in work 
on Kirdkî/Zazakî claim that if this dialect/language will ever survive, the biggest credit 
should go to the VATE group and especially to Mamoste Malmisanij393. VATE consists 
of 20 to 30 individuals. They come from different regions of all the Kirdkî, Kirmanckî, 
Dimilî and Zazakî speaking areas. When they decide if a word should become standard, 
they first give priority to the originality of the word, whether it can be shown to be 
genuine Zazakî. If the word does not exist within Zaza history and culture, they may 
then borrow it from Kurmanjî, Goranî or Soranî. If it is a new or technical word, they 
then borrow it from Turkish, Persian, Arabic, English or other European languages.394 
 
3.2.3 The Attempts of the Kurdish Movement to Turn Çewlig/Bingöl into Another 
Diyarbakir (Symbol of Kurdishness in the Region) 
The Zaza identity and language quickly became politicized with Kurdish movements 
appealing to them, with the most recent being the PKK.395 It could be argued that 
Diyarbakir and Elazig became the symbols of the policies of the opposing sides, the 
Turkish state and the Kurdish movement(s), towards the Zazas.  
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To give an example from my personal experiences, I worked as an English-Turkish-
Kurdish interpreter for an Italian delegation on a trip to Çewlig/Bingöl to observe the 
2009 elections in Turkey. On 24th of March 2009, during an interview of this delegation 
with the former chair of the Human Rights Association (IHD) Bingöl branch, Mr 
Ridvan Kizgin mentioned how the PKK attempted to connect the Kirds/Zazas to 
Diyarbakir, which is predominately Kurdish populated and known as the most 
significant city in the Kurdish area for the Kurdish nationalist movement. It is regarded 
as the unofficial capital of northern Kurdistan. There are also Zazas living in Diyarbakir. 
By contrast, the Turkish state has attempted to incorporate the Zazas into Elazig, which 
borders Diyarbakir. Elazig is strategically placed as it also borders Bingol and Dersim, 
major cities the population of which is mainly Zaza. Elazig’s population is a mixture of 
Zaza, Kurmanj and Turkish inhabitants.396 Sheikh Said himself was from Palu, a town 
in Elazig; after his revolt, the state’s focus of assimilation in this region was successfully 
executed. To some extent, this is also applicable to the Dersim region where the Seyid 
Riza revolt also resulted in a state policy of assimilation, turning Dersim into a pro-
Kemalist region with a secular character. 
 
While the assimilation policies in both Dersim and Elazig were nationalistic in 
character, the assimilation policies in Elazig have followed religious lines, mainly that 
of keeping the city predominately Sunni and thus pro-Islamic Turkish 
nationalisation.397 Given these considerations, it is perhaps unsurprising that there has 
been heated debate academically as well as politically regarding Zaza identity. This has 
manifested itself in debates on the Zaza language, which has been used as a political 
marker for both Kurdish and the Turkish state (to argue that Zazas are not Kurds but a 
Turkic tribe), as well as some Zazas who identify with neither identity. 
 
Of the three conflicting arguments regarding Zaza identity, the first is that the Zazas are 
Turks, an argument that has been introduced and encouraged by the Turkish state as 
part of the assimilation policy. The base of this argument is that the Zaza is a Turkish 
tribe. It is still possible to see people in Zazaki-speaking areas identifying themselves 
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with the Turkish identity, arguing that Zazas were an important Turkic tribe throughout 
Turkish history.398 In 1991, at a conference in Solhan, a town of Bingol province where 
the large majority of the population is Sunni and Zaza, the head of the Turkish army 
used three common words in Zazaki and their equivalents in Azeri/Azerbaijani to 
“prove” the connections between the Zazas and the Turks.399 Another example of this 
is the previously mentioned situation in Elazig. 
The argument that Zazas are neither Turkish nor Kurdish, but that they are Zazas as a 
separate people, has a linguistic basis. Lezenberg states that in 1909 the German scholar 
Oscar Mann, on entirely linguistic grounds, asserted that the varieties of Zaza(ki) were 
not dialects of Kurdish, but belonged to a distinct branch of the Indo-Iranian language 
family.400 This argument is politically endorsed by people who are alienated not only 
from the Turkish identity but from the Kurdish identity as well. Those who take this 
stance are generally non-political people who focus more on their day-to-day lives and 
are indifferent to nationalistic and political sentiments. While an argument can be made 
that by taking this seemingly controversial stance they are contributing to the 
politicization of the situation, it should also be noted that this group identifies more 
with religious affiliations, as to whether they are Sunni or Alevi. A relevant example of 
this is that Metin Kahraman, the famous Zaza singer, recounts consciously performing 
different identities in different settings. While the population of Dersim tends to become 
'Kurdish' in opposition to 'Turkishness', when faced with 'Kurdishness' they become 
'Alevi' or 'Zaza' instead.401 That being said, politically the group has been recently 
backed by some ex-PKK members who have set up opposition groups in Germany. An 
example is Selim Curukkaya, a Kird/Zaza from Çewlig/Bingöl and a former high-
ranking member of the PKK. He argues that the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan 
have used the Zazas for their own political gains, claiming that if the PKK were to gain 
political power, the Zazas would be oppressed as they have been by the Turkish state.402  
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Paul J. and Jongerden, Joost. Turkey’s Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview, Boston: Brill Leiden, 
2003, p. 201. 
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The third argument is that the Zazas are Kurds. The Kurdish nationalist movement has 
stressed this idea throughout the history of the Republic of Turkey.  The Kurdish 
Movement had a stronger need to stress this in recent decades, as its political rival the 
Turkish state has made efforts to convince the Zazas that they were not Kurds. Some 
scholars such as Zülfü Selcan403 and Paul Ludwig404 have sometimes differentiated 
between the Zazas and the Kurds by claiming some linguistic differentiations. It is also 
pointed out by the group who claim Zazas are a separate people, that the Sheikh Said 
and the Seyid Riza rebellion were known as Zaza and not Kurdish rebellions. On the 
other hand, the majority of academics in this field such as David McDowall,405 Amir 
Hassanpour, Michael Gunter 406  and Martin Van Bruinessen, do not differentiate 
between the Zaza and the Kurds. Moreover, in the first Zazaki publication in history, in 
1899, Molla Ehmede Xasi in his Kirdkî/Zazaki Mewlud (a religious epic honouring the 
Prophet Mohammed’s birth) Mewludê Kirdî (1899), clearly stressed that the 
Kirds/Zazas were Kurds. This source is important for this discussion, as it is the first 
publication in the literary field by a Kird/Zaza intellectual of the time. The Kurds and 
Zazas also have the same common aspirations and thus identify with each other as one 
ethnic group. The Kurds and Zazas also inhabit the same geographical region, which it 
has been argued further cements their connection to each other. This argument has 
always been influential, even more so since the rise and influence of the PKK.  
 
From the early 1990s, the PKK was able to expand its influence in Zazaki-speaking 
areas such as Çewlig/Bingol, Dersim /Tunceli, Dicle, Genc and Lice to name a few. 
Recent elections in Turkey have also helped to back the view that the Zazas see 
themselves as Kurds. In the last two local elections in Dersim (a predominately Zaza 
region), the mayor of the city was elected from the pro-Kurdish Parties the Democratic 
Regions Party (DBP), formerly known as the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and 
the Democratic Society Party (DTP).407 This marked a shift in voting patterns, as pro-
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Kurdish party members had never been elected to the position of mayor in the city until 
the 1999 local elections in Turkey. Similarly the percentage of votes for the pro-Kurdish 
parties has continued to increase in Çewlig/Bingöl. The city also managed to elect a 
mayor from a pro-Kurdish party, Mr Feyzullah Karaaslan, in the 1999 local elections. 
This pattern shows a constant rise for Kurdish nationalism and can also be seen in most 
of the other Zazaki-speaking areas. Moreover, there has always been between 20 and 
30% of Zaza members of parliament within the pro-Kurdish parties represented, in the 
Turkish parliament in Ankara.408 Compared with the Zaza proportion of the Kurdish 
population of Turkey, this Zaza representation in the Kurdish political arena is higher 
than its percentage of the population. This trend has continued in elections up until 
2015. There is a regular rise in Zazas’ appearance more actively in cultural activities 
such as Newroz (the major Kurdish festival, and recently a political activity), the local 
convivial organised by pro-Kurdish organisations, and in the rallies of Kurdish political 
parties.409 The fact that the Zazas are voting for pro-Kurdish parties and becoming more 
active in generally Kurdish activities, shows in some way that they are identifying 
themselves not only with the Kurdish identity but also to some extent, the Kurdish 
national movement in Turkey. 
 
3.3 The Political Structure of the Kird/Zazas in Contemporary Identity 
Formation: Finding Their Own Identity 
Feeling a sense of Kurdishness seems to have been largely the case among Zazakî 
speakers themselves historically. Since 1980, traditional outlooks on local identities 
have started becoming increasingly complex, and questions of Zaza cultural/ethnic 
identities acquired new qualitative as well as quantitative characteristics. For a number 
of reasons, including the army coup (1980), which changed some of the political 
structures of the Turkish state, and the political/military establishment’s attitude to east 
and south-east Turkey” (Turkish Kurdistan) in particular. Furthermore, the increasing 
presence of Turkish schooling and media in Turkey’s Kurdish areas led the process 
along a more complex route. The schooling age dropped to as young as age three.  This 
new schooling policy, along with the ban on speaking Kurdish as a language at schools 
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in Turkey, meant that the state used schooling as a tool for its assimilation policies. A 
primary school teacher, who is a Kird/Zaza himself, stressed that the Turkish state uses 
all and each of its institutions to assimilate minorities and especially the Kurds in recent 
decades.410  
3.3.1 The Importance of Religion and the Religious Leaders in Identity Formation 
in Çewlig/Bingöl 
Çewlig/Bingöl, as stated before, is a predominantly Sunni Muslim area with strong 
religious traditions. The city had a high level of participation in Sheikh Said’s 
movement, both for religious and ethnic reasons. Çewlig/Bingöl’s result in the 
constitutional referendum of the 7th of November in 1982 is also significant. This anti-
democratic constitution was designed under the control of the Kemalist army officials 
after the 1980 coup; major parts of it are still in use in the 21st century. In that 
referendum, Çewlig/Bingöl had the highest turnout to reject the vote in all Turkey, with 
a 32% vote against the proposal. The vote to reject in all Turkey was only 8%. The high 
level of resistance was significant at a time of severe army restrictions, and 
Çewlig/Bingöl was labelled as “the brave city”.411 This was mainly because of the 
religious position of Çewlig/ Bingöl, and the role of religious leaders opposing the 
Kemalist and secular army regime under the military’s chief of staff Kenan Evren, who 
led the coup in 1980.  
 
In the November 1983 general elections, the Anavatan Partisi/Motherland Party 
(ANAP), under its charismatic and liberal leader Turgut Özal, won the election and was 
able to form the government as a single party government.412 Özal managed to win vast 
support from the more religious areas of Turkey, including Çewlig/Bingöl which 
supported him with 45% of the vote.413 The religious leaders then affiliated themselves 
in a wave with ANAP. This would give them strength to locate a space where they 
would have more freedom in their religious activities. Furthermore, they were now in a 
position where they could benefit from the state ‘opportunities’ directly.  
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3.3.2 The Role of Tribes and the Tribal Leaders of the Kird/Zazas in Çewlig/Bingöl 
Along with the religious leaders, traditional tribal leaders had an important role local 
society since the Ottoman times in the region. The Ottoman Empire used to manage its 
Kurdish population via these intermediary tribal leaders and religious figures. This 
trend continued in a more indirect style during the Republic of Turkey era until the 
1980s. The rise of the PKK led the Kurdish movement to diminish the power of these 
individuals; but because the PKK took longer to establish itself in some Kurdish areas 
than others, some traditional leaders enjoyed a longer period of influence than others. 
The pro-Kurdish movement was successful in mobilising the mass youth. This then 
started to create a new generation that would not accept the power of those traditional 
individuals. Although those society leaders have lost the vast majority of their power, 
they are still a resort to which the traditional Turkish political parties would go to seek 
support, mainly during elections. Therefore they still have a considerable negotiating 
power with the ruling parties, where they use their mediating position between their 
group of people and high party or state representatives. Thus, they have the access to 
state means such as getting the state bids and helping their supporters to get jobs in state 
institutions or contracts from the state. They sometimes receive these benefits directly 
for themselves and for their close relatives, or smaller benefits for their wider circle.   
 
3.3.3 The Role of NGOs/Institutions from both State and Kurdish Movement 
Perspectives 
The locals of Çewlig/Bingöl, after finding themselves caught between the Turkish state 
and the Kurdish movement over the course of decades, have begun to take part in the 
formation of their own identity only after the 1980s. For Çewlig/Bingöl, neither side 
easily represented the local residents; they had been in conflict with the Turkish state’s 
policies since the start of the republican era, but also the secular leftist ideology of the 
PKK did not seem to suit the city’s strongly Sunni Muslim character. The Kurdish 
movement, to gather support and become a serious rival to the Turkish state, started to 
mobilise via NGOs in all the areas in which Kurds lived in Turkey.  
 
Politically, the self-identification process in Turkey and especially in the Kurdish 




experience in assimilation policies using different methods. Until the beginning of the 
20th century, the map of different ethnicities and/or spoken languages in today’s Turkey 
(then part of the Ottoman Empire) was rather colourful. When the Turkish Republic 
was established in 1923, the founding group decided that a multi–ethnic structure was 
a threat to the unity of the state, and could be a reason for the feared division of the 
country, as the Ottoman Empire itself had been fragmented over the past centuries. In 
the decades following its establishment, the Turkish state implemented vast 
assimilation policies towards all groups of people which were seen as ‘others’ by the 
policy makers of the new state. In the case of the Zazas and Kurds, the state firstly 
denied that they are Kurds by arguing that they are ‘mountain Turks’. In the later stage 
it introduced various strategies to diminish anything other than Turkishness. 
 
The Zazaist group has been supported by the Turkish State, even more so during the 
21th century in which the Justice and Development Party (AKP), after forming a 
government as a single party in 2002, have taken control gradually at the governmental 
and later the state levels.  
 
As part of this political project, there have been two new state universities established 
in two mainly Zaza inhabited cities, Çewlig/Bingöl and Tunceli/Dersim. In both 
universities there are Zazakî departments producing material in line with the current 
regime’s political tendencies, sometimes acting as pro-state propaganda tools. The staff 
of these departments are chosen among certain academics who mainly support state 
policies towards Kirds/Zazas. The conferences organised by these departments are 
mainly designed in an attempt to serve the political needs of the state. The academic 
production is also a result of this tendency.414 On my field trip in in 2012, I met a high 
positioned member of academic staff of Bingöl University. In this meeting he stressed 
that there was no space for a different voice in the academic atmosphere at the 
university. One would not be able to argue anything contradicting the state-sanctioned 
views openly in the classes, panels and conferences. It would lead the individual going 
through a disciplinary process, resulting in their losing the position at the university and 
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possibly more.415 Similarly to other state institutions, universities in the region are used 
as strongholds for the state propaganda for in its assimilation policies. The state does 
not allow locals space for their search for finding and building self-identity. 
 
Chapter 4: The Localist Tendency towards Idenity in Çewlig/Bingöl 
for the Kirds/Zazas; Economy, Culture and Identity, an Overall 
Analysis 
As the Zazas themselves becoming the decisive subject group in the new trends of local 
identity, they argue that it should be them who must decide how this identity process 
shifts. Moreover, they claim that identification of Zazaness should be decided by the 
Zazas not the “others”. The “other” in Çewlig/ Bingöl case is mainly the Kurdish 
movement and sometimes the Turkish state. The local political factors play prominent 
role in this identity construction process. This process is politicised to theextend where 
the Çewlig/ Bingöl inhabitands chose different cities in the region for economic 
interactions, for touristic purposes, cultural activities etc. In the following, this chapter 
will aim to shed a light on how these dynamics can become a tool in such identity 
processes can be affected. Moreover, the Turkish State, practises all its state institutions 
to serve its assimilation policies or take a direct role in how this identity process evolves.  
 
Along with the economical structure there also religion, language, culture with its 
folklore, traditions and customs, which hold an importance to this identity construction 
battle. Although Çewlig/ Bingöl is dominantly inhabited by Kird/ Zaza and Sunni 
Muslims, there are also a smaller percentage of Kurmanj and Alevi inhabitants. The 
identity formation phenomenon is an ongoing process that still being shaped by the 
political groups on the ground. What is still making it possible for all the three said 
local identity groups to come together is the cultural pillar of this identity. The residents 
of Çewlig/ Bingöl still manage to meet in same platforms such as wedding parties, 
cultural festivals, religious festivals etc.  
 
 
4.1 Economy and Its Role in Identity Construction in Çewlig / Bingöl.   
Turkey is divided into 81 provinces, and the province of Çewlig / Bingol situated in 
eastern Anatolia / Turkey. The city is located in the upper Euphrates region of eastern 
Anatolia which bears the traces of many civilizations in the lands of Çewlig / Bingöl as 
the history of the city goes back to B.C. 4000-5000.416 Bingöl became a province in 
1936, and its name has been changed from Capakçur to Bingol, which basically means 
a thousand lakes from bin ‘thousand’ and göl ‘lake’, a reference to the great number of 
lakes in the region.417 Çewlig / Bingöl is a small sized city in the region, and does not 
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have a historical city culture compared to its neighbor cities such as Diyarbakir, Elazig 
and Erzurum. Therefore, the economic activities in the city are not based on urban style 
financial dynamics. Thereby, it is still primarily dependent on traditional economic 
activities such as; animal husbandry, agriculture and beekeeping. This research argues 
that the traditional economy has a direct reflection on the identity construction of the 
area, and it has kept identity rather a ‘closed’ one towards to external influences. In 
what follows, I will provide a general overview of the city in terms of population, 
geography, and history. The research will then analyse how economic regional 
disparities have an influence on individuals’ social identity.   
 
Çewlig / Bingöl is at an intersection point in the eastern Turkey as the road from Ankara 
to Iran border and the road from South-Eastern Anatolia to the Trabzon Port in Black 
Sea Region interconnect at Bingöl. In addition, it had been affected by many different 
civilizations until settlement was established.418 Thereby, there are historical remains 
such as castles, tombs, caves and churches, among which the Quba remains, Kralkizi 
Castle and Kigi Castle. There are also numerous gravestones and a few ancient churches 
around Kiğı. A large part of the historical remnants within the province’s boundaries 
are found in the southern parts of Genç, Kigi, Adakli and Solhan.419 
 
The province covers an area of 8.125 square kilometres, and it is surrounded by 
mountains, with peaks over 2500 metres in height, and connected by deep valleys and 
plateaus of tectonic origin. In addition, Çewlig / Bingöl province is one of the least 
populated and poorest provinces in Turkey. 
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Source: Bingol Valiligi, Nufus ve Dagilim.420 
Population density of Bingol is 33 (people per km2) compared to Turkey`s 
national average of 104. According to Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK), as can be 
seen in table 1, Bingol has eight counties, and its population is 273.354 in 2017. The 
most crowded county is Central, with 157,921 residents while least crowded county is 
Yayladere.421 Adakli (04/07/1987), Yayladere (04/07/1987) and Yayladere 20/05/1990) 
were announced as counties mainly in line with the state’s security projects following 
the rise of PKK in the region. Otherwise these counties do not have enough population 
to become counties according to the average population standards in Turkey. This is 
the case especially for Yedisu and Yayladere.   
 
4.1.1 Domestic Economic Means 
Bingol is a small city, which surrounded by Diyarbakir to the south, Erzurum and 
Erzincan to the north, Tunceli and Elazıg to the west, and Mus to the East, and more 
than half the population live in small villages and hamlets. Eastern and South-eastern 
Anatolia is generally characterized as an agricultural region since the establishment of 
Turkey, and the economy of Çewlig / Bingöl is also based on agriculture and 
stockbreeding, includes sheep, goat and cattle, and it does not have a developed 
industrial sector. In addition, there is a lack of both state and private investment in 
Çewlig / Bingöl, which explains why eastern Turkey is more rural and has less 
infrastructure, compared to other regions in Turkey.  Low and inadequate level of state 
and private investment are one of the significant factors for the persistence of the 
regional income disparities between Kurdish regions and the rest of the country. 
Economic development is a multidimensional issue, but the development of a region or 
a city is tied to the amount of investment in there. During the AKP government, in 2006, 
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only 5.78% of the subsided investment went to Kurdish regions, and even the combined 
subsided investment of Kurdish cities was lower than Bursa, a city of west of Turkey, 
between 2002 and 2006.422 Because of poor infrastructure, it is not an ideal place for 
firms to investment as unit expenditures of manufacture are expected to be higher. As 
a result, this situation has a negative impact on the long term economic enlargement of 
Çewlig / Bingöl.  
 
Table 2: Presence of Land in Çewlig / Bingöl 
Presence of Land  Area (ha) Rate (%) 
Total presence of land 825.300 100 
Agricultural land  59.140 7.17 
Irrigated  28.646 3.47 
Non-irrigated  30.494 3.70 
Pasturage area 414.407 50.21 
Meadow area  18.064 2.19 
Forest area 263.829 31.97 
Forest area 263.829 31.97 
Afforestation area 49.865 6.04 
Other areas  20.000 2.42 
Source: Çan, and Pirim, Bingol Investment Opportunities. 
 
Agriculture is main economic activity in Çewlig / Bingöl like most provinces in the 
southeast of Turkey. Beekeeping has become another major economic activity in the 
city in the recent decades. As can be seen in table 2, total agricultural land of Çewlig / 
Bingöl is 59.140 hectares, and 28.646 hectares of the area is being irrigated. Processed 
agricultural lands, which were 29.740 hectares in 2001; has been increased to 35.341 
hectare with an 18.83% growth rate. Animal husbandry is also having a great potential 
in the economy of the province due to wide pasturage areas, 50.21% of the total lands. 
As a result, people mostly engage with agricultural and animal husbandry economic 
activities in Çewlig / Bingöl.  
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Table 3: Number of Animals in Çewlig / Bingöl (2007-2012)  
Animal Type 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012 
Sheep 389.268 393.855 254,680 281,272 297,000 
Goat 140,248 124,033 74,740 124,592 140,800 
Cattle 64,717 66,000 64,758 97,961 106,704 
Poultry 160,645 222,065 123,035 129,344 150,019 
Beehive 91,502 82,468 82,224 96,958 94,952 
Source: Bingöl Directorate of Provincial Food Agriculture and Livestock.423 
 
Live animal breeding has the greatest portion in animal husbandry in Çewlig / Bingöl, 
and table 3 shows that people generally breed sheep, and goat. The number of sheep 
had the highest percentage between 2007 and 2012 regarding animal husbandry in 
Çewlig / Bingöl. Moreover, apiculture and honey production are also significant fields 
of economic activity. The chronic lack of private and the state investment leads the 
local economy of Çewlig / Bingöl to rely heavily on agriculture and animal husbandry. 
Furthermore, as is often the case in such situations of underdevelopment, the economic 
improvement problems increased the level of underdevelopment issue. Economic 
development is a multidimensional issue, and the development of a region or a city does 
not only depend on the level of economic investment. However, the scarcity of both 
private and government investment in Çewlig / Bingöl makes it difficult in the best of 
economic improvement to attract more economic infrastructure, as a result, it has 
lagged behind in terms of industrial and commercial development in Turkey. It should 
be notes, this is not only the case in Çewlig / Bingöl but also in most eastern and south-
eastern and eastern cities of Turkey, where most of the Kurdish population live in 
Turkey. For instance, in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), the eastern and south-
eastern regions of Turkey where Kurds live are considered the least developed areas in 
the country. Pro-Kurdish politicians and academics argue that this is a deliberate policy 
by the state officials in line with the state’s general tendency towards the region as a 
whole. Hasip Kaplan, a prominent politician and MP of Peace and Democracy Party 
(BDP) in an interview with him argued that; “the governments of Turkey previously 
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and now, deliberately left the Kurdish region behind in their economic and development 
policies. This is obvious when we compare the region with the other regions of 
Turkey”.424 This is a vastly used argument by the inhabitants, intellectuals, politicians 
and academics of the region. As a result, the economic statistics of the Kurdish regions 
are used as a strong reference to point out that there is a strong discrimination against 
the Kurdish regions of Turkey.  
 
Table 4: The GDP Share and Rankings of the Eastern Provinces in Turkey, 1965 
and 1979 
Provinces 1965 1979 
 Share (%) Ranking Share (%) Ranking 
Diyarbakir 0.78 43 0.83 34 
Siirt 0.75 45 0.44 51 
Mardin 0.72 47 0.58 46 
Adiyaman 0.42 57 0.41 53 
Agri 0.35 61 0.33 61 
Mus 0.33 63 0.32 62 
Tunceli 0.18 65 0.16 66 
Bingol 0.16 66 0.18 65 
Hakkari 0.13 67 0.11 67 
Source: Sönmez, M. Doğu Anadolu'nun Hikayesi. 425 
 
As can be seen table 4, the GDP share of Çewlig / Bingöl and some cities in the 
southeast of Turkey are quite low, and Çewlig / Bingöl`s GDP share is only 0.16% and 
0.18% in 1965 and in 1979. In addition, Çewlig / Bingöl`s ranking is 66 and 65 out of 
the 67 provinces in 1965 and 1979 respectively. This chronic economic issue is still a 
problem of Çewlig / Bingöl, and it is one of the least developed cities in Turkey. In the 
early 1950s, Turkey was an overwhelmingly rural country whose economic activities 
were heavily based on agricultural. Approximately 50% of the national income 
originated in agriculture, and as much as 80% of the economically active population 
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was employed in agriculture.426 Starting in the mid-1950s, an extremely rapid process 
of urbanization and industrialization led to a substantial structural transformation of the 
economy. In the mid-1970s, the industrial and urban sectors began to dominate the 
Turkish economy.427 As a result, many poor economic conditions in the Kurdish region 
led many Kurds left their villages to move mainly to western provinces, such as Istanbul, 
Ankara, Izmir and Adana, and the nearest urban centres where living standards were 
better. However, these poor economic circumstances were not the only reasons why 
people migrated from Çewlig / Bingöl, and this will be discussed in next subsection.   
 
The late 1990s marked a shift in the Turkish state’s Kurdish policies, and new political 
space opened as Turkey began adopting EU-required democratic reforms. Thereby, the 
EU made an important positive start in 1998 by amenably naming the Kurdish issue 
and citing its resolution as a requirement to Turkey’s attainment of EU membership.428 
More importantly, European Union pressure in the 2000s led the government to lift the 
state of emergency that had crippled civic life in the Kurdish regions.429 Turkish State 
has applied a number of security policies in order to ‘solve’ its Kurdish issue in 1990s. 
There was a lack of stability in governments; the ruling governments rapidly changed 
from one political party to another, and the political structure resulted a coalition party 
governments. There was a blockage in the political system which resulted in the 
February 2001 economic crisis in Turkey. There were also global reasons to this 
socioeconomic crisis, but it was mainly related to the lack of stability in Turkish 
political structure. Furthermore, the Turkish economy was weakened due to the war 
between the state and the PKK since mid-1980s. This led the voters seeking for a new 
alternative, and the AKP was formed in the best possible time for a new political party. 
It won the general election in November 2002 and formed single party government 
following an era of coalition governments in Turkey. Although they were a party that 
broke out from the religious Welfare Party- RP (later Virtue Party- FP), they firstly 
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appeared with a more liberal party programme when they established the AKP in 
August 2001.  
 
Following the period between 1999 and 2002, Turkish economy was challenged 
massively, and it witnessed a peak point by 2001 economic crisis. However, the Turkish 
economy witnessed a notable recovery, after falling by 9.5% in 2001, and Turkey’s 
GDP increased, annual average growth rate of GDP in the years 2002–11 (5%) were 
compared to that of the years 1989–95 (4%) and 1996–2001 (1%). 430  Following 
economic challenges in 2001, Turkey enjoyed five years of rapid economic growth, 
driven in large part by structural changes, both politically and socially.431 Nevertheless, 
socioeconomic policies that applied by Turkish governments have not been able to 
overcome the persistent regional inequalities between Kurdish regions and the rest of 
the country including Çewlig / Bingöl. The eastern and south-eastern (mainly Kurdish 
areas) regions continued to be the most disadvantaged areas of Turkey. For instance, 
since the mid-1980s, the GDP shares of the Kurdish provinces are the lowest when 
compared with the rest of the regions in the country.432 The economies in these regions 
of Turkey overly depend on agricultural production for economic growth as it was 
emphasised previously. In eastern Turkey, 64% of the population is employed within 
the agricultural sector while central Turkey employs 46.8% of its labour in 
agriculture.433 Even though the GDP per capita of Çewlig / Bingöl has increased from 
$2,301 to $5,858 between 2004 and 2014, this number is still below the average GDP 
per capita of Turkey. As seen in table 5, the GDP of Elazig and Tunceli, neighboring 
cities of Çewlig / Bingol, are $5,858 and $10,198 respectively. In other words, the GDP 
of Tunceli is almost two times more than of Çewlig / Bingöl. Furthermore, the GDP per 
capita of Çewlig / Bingöl is approximately 50% less than Turkey’s average. As a result, 
existing socioeconomic regional disparities persisted throughout the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. Although the ruling party AKP suggests that it will solve the 
                                                 
430 Pamuk, Sevket. ̀ Estimating Growth in the Middle East since 1820`, The Journal of Economic History, 
66:3 (2006), 809-828. 
431 Acemoglu, Daron. and Murat Ucer. `The Ups and Downs of Turkish Growth, 2002-2015: Political 
Dynamics, the European Union and the Institutional Slide`, http://www.nber.org/papers/w21608.pdf 
(Last accessed 15 August 2016). 
432 Kirisci, Kemal. and Gareth M. Winrow. The Kurdish question and Turkey: An example of a trans-
state ethnic conflict, (London, 1997), pp. 123-25. 
433 Altug, Sumru. and Filiztekin, Alpay, `Productivity and Growth, 1923-2003`, in Sumru Altug and 
Alpay Filiztekin (eds.), The Turkish Economy: The Real Economy, Corporate Governance and Reform, 




Kurdish issue with economical developments, the statistics do not necessarily prove 
their point. In the June 2011 general elections, the Prime Minister and AKP’s chairman 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in a political rally (held on 8th of June 2011 in Çewlig / Bingöl’s 
city centre) said; “we know what the problems of Bingöl and we will solve them. He 
then went on with his economic election promises.”434 The 2011 general elections were 
held on 12th June and the local results in Çewlig / Bingöl resulted in AKP gaining two 
seats of three and the third MP was Mr Idris Baluken, who was the ‘independent’ 
candidate but represented the pro Kurdish party BDP.435 Idris Baluken is a doctor and 
a Kurd / Zaza from Çewlig / Bingöl. This was the first time that a pro- Kurdish party 
representative was elected as the MP of Çewlig / Bingöl, in the history of this city.  
 
Table 5: The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in Turkey ($) 
Years 2004 2009 2014 
Turkey 5 961 8 980 12 112 
Malatya 3 428 5 341 6 954 
Elazig 3 570 5 914 7 749 
Bingöl 2 301 3 827 5 858 
Tunceli 4 543 7 273 10 198 
Source: TUIK, Ulusal Hesaplar.436 
 
Socio-economic development of Çewlig / Bingöl, as a result, is well below the country 
average, and it is relatively one of the less developed provinces in the southeast of 
Turkey, the least developed region in Turkey. This issue has been argued at different 
levels by both Kurdish intelligentsiapoliticians and Turkish state. Turkish governments 
generally maintain that the problem is related to socio-economic activities and 
traditional feudal structure in the region. Whereas, Kurdish groups usually claim that 
poverty and the reasons of less development of the regions, including Çewlig / Bingöl, 
are the outcome of the decades-long systematic nationalistic policies of the Turkish 
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state. These regions have been neglected for centuries, and it became a zone of 
deprivation. This negligence started during the Republican era, even though it has a 
background to Ottoman Empire. 
 
4.1.2 The reasons for Underdevelopment of Çewlig / Bingöl and Its 
Surrounding Areas 
At the time of the announcement of the Republic, the Turkish economy was weak, and 
its infrastructure had been destroyed during the struggle for National independence 
(1919-1923). As Richard D. Robinson points out, the economy at the time was “…an 
underdeveloped, backward, village economy, weakened by a half a century of foreign 
control and smashed by decades of war.” 437 Moreover, it relied on the social and 
economic legacy of the Ottoman Empire; and the empire, during the early twentieth 
century, was almost devoid of financial wealth. As a result, the establishment Republic 
of Turkey did not usher in an industrialist country. On the contrary, its economic 
productivity was, mainly, based on agriculture with feudal ties, with a very limited 
industry. 
 
Table 6: Labour Force from 1927 to 1950 in Turkey 
Sectors/Years 1927 1935 1950 
Agriculture 80.9 76.4 77.7 
Industry 8.9 11.7 10.3 
Services 10.2 11.9 12.0 
Source: Agriculture and Economic Development in Turkey, 1870-2000.438   
 
As reflected in the table above, the portion of the labour force in agriculture was 80.9%, 
76.4%, and 77.7% respectively, in 1927, in 1935, and in 1950. Furthermore, the 
Republic of Turkey largely depended on farmers, and agriculture constituted 41.7% of 
the GDP in 1927. Moreover, nationalist ideologies such as Yusuf Akçura and Ziya 
Gökalp point out the creation of national (Turkish-Muslim) bourgeoisie as a necessary 
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component of the strong national state.439 Yusuf Akcura asserts that foundation of the 
modern state is the bourgeoisie class. Contemporary prosperous states came into 
existence on the shoulders of the bourgeoisie, businesspersons and bankers. If the 
natural growth of the Turkish bourgeoisie continues without damage or interruption, 
we can say that the sound establishment of the Turkish state has been guaranteed.440 As 
a result of this nationalist discourse, the leaders of new Republic of Turkey started to 
marginalise the non-Turkish people in the economy.  
 
The trend of managing or miss- managing Turkish state has started since its different 
ethnic groups with a main focus area of assimilation. “The endless dialogue between 
“the present and the facts of the past”441 stands out as a relevant example. Economic 
polices since the establishment of the Republic have generated both economic growth 
and increasing regional inequalities, as the most underdeveloped regions, namely east 
and southeast of Anatolia, coincide with the areas with the greatest concentration of 
Kurdish population.442 The transformation of a multi-national (Ottoman) empire into 
one (Turkish) nation state involved a financial re-construction along nationalist lines, 
and Turkish nationalism has become Turkey’s official and hegemonic ideology since 
1923. Therefore, following the establishment of the new Turkish Republic (1923), the 
displacement and resettlement of Kurds into predominantly Turkish regions of Anatolia 
started as a result of this ideology. During the administration of the Republican People’s 
Party, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a series of steps was taken in an attempt to 
eliminate the Kurdish presence in the new Republic of Turkey through legal 
assimilation progressively.443 Thus, Turkish government enacted a law in 1927 with the 
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title “law concerning persons being moved from the east to the west” announced that 
1500 residents and 80 families were to be displaced.444 Despite the lack of accurate 
data, some scholars claim that from 1925 to 1928 more than 500,000 people were 
deported of whom some 200,000 were estimated to have perished in the aforementioned 
provinces.445 Another settlement law was enacted in 1934 when the Turkish parliament 
passed the Law on Resettlement (Law No. 2510), which regulated the settlement of 
immigrants and resettlement within the country. The law divided Turkey into three 
zones in accordance with adherence to Turkishness. 446  Tekeli reports that 25,831 
people from 5,074 households were transferred from Bingol, Tunceli, Erzincan, Bitlis, 
Siirt, Van, Diyarbakir, Agri, Mus, Erzurum, Elazig, Kars, Malatya, and Mardin, to 
Western Anatolia.447 Throughout the Republican era, in the words of an official report 
of the ruling Republican People Party’s General Secretariat in 1939–40, the aim of the 
new government was to “dismantle the territorial unity of Kurds” and to “Turkify the 
Eastern population.”448 As a result of these assimilations policies, many people had 
been forced to evacuate their home in Kurdish regions where people mostly engaged 
with agriculture economic activities to meet their needs.   
 
On 14 May 1950, after three decades long single party ruling era, the first democratic 
elections in the history of the Turkish Republic took place. The transition to multi-party 
rule, however, did not lead to a qualitative shift in the Kurdish regions, including 
Çewlig / Bingöl. The government programmes during the 1950s and 1960s promised 
to diminish the economic disparities divergences between the Kurdish regions and the 
rest of Turkey.449 Democrat Party (DP) government used Marshall Plan aid to subsidise 
the importation of agricultural machinery, particularly tractors, whose number soared 
from 1,756 to 43,727 between 1948 and 1956.450 However, the availability of tractors 
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provided by the USA through Marshall Aid did not achieve what it intended. In fact, it 
resulted in the displacement and dispossession of many Kurdish peasants in the 
1950s.451 Hundreds of thousands of Kurds left their land and migrated to other regions 
of western Turkey where they became seasonal migrant workers, street vendors, 
construction workers, factory workers or part of the reserve army of industrial labour.452  
 
Systematic denial of Kurds and unequal economic development of the Kurdish regions 
in Turkey have not changed in 1960s. For instance, General Cemal Gursel, fourth 
president of Turkish Republic, after the military coup in 1960, in Diyarbakir stated that; 
“there are no Kurds in this country. Whoever says he is a Kurd, I will spit in their 
face”.453  As a result, despite the main economic development strategy centred on 
successfully bringing about significant economic growth, the underdevelopment of the 
predominantly Kurdish provinces deepened in the 1960s and the 1970s. The growth of 
GDP more than doubled from 4.9% to 6.4% between 1960s and 1980s.  However, even 
with this extraordinary economic performance, the socioeconomic inequalities between 
different geographic zones inherited from previous decades deepened more. The 
governments of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s promised to alleviate economic disparity 
between geographic zones.454 Likewise, the 1960s government stressed the issue of 
“the development of the eastern region,” adding that it was necessary to introduce 
“special measures”, it was underlined, was not to create privileged regions.455  
 
On 24 January 1980, the government announced a new stabilisation programme based 
on neoliberal economic policy, and the task of managing this programme was given to 
Turgut Ozal. 456  The military regime came to power (12 September 1980) due to 
socioeconomic and political instabilities at that time. Surprisingly, they endorsed the 
neoliberal economic policies and made a point of keeping Turgut Ozal in the 
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government as the deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs. 457  Ozal 
liberalised the capital account and destroyed the difficulties to international capital 
inflows, which made the Turkish economy extremely defenceless to sudden outflows 
of international capital.458 Since the late 1980s, the world economy is becoming more 
integrated as national economies turned into market economies due to capital flows 
across the national borders. Therefore, competitiveness issues are more important than 
they were before due to mass international products. Thus, Ozal’s neoliberal policies 
mostly have deteriorated small business, workers, farmers, and peasants who have 
worked in agricultural sector, and this was a spark of economic crises of Turkey during 
1990s. Furthermore, economic crises that Turkey had faced have largely been paid for 
by the agricultural activities as a result of the authoritarian neoliberal restructuring of 
Turkey during the military regime. However, the most detrimental change occurred in 
the agricultural sector, and in Kurdish regions, because of their traditional agriculture 
activities. One of the neoliberal policies at that time was the fundamental abolition of 
subsidies and price support programmes for agriculture. As such, the reforms under 
Prime Minister Ozal caused economic destitution on labours, the unemployed, small 
producers, sharecroppers, and these groups were excessively represented in south-
eastern and eastern of Turkey.459 Kirschenman and Neckerman claim that employers 
consider the residential location of the applications as an important part of employment 
screening.460 In other words, access to larger job markets often is important for escaping 
poverty, and geographic marginalization into non-productive, often agricultural, 
regions often means continued poverty and economic discrimination.461 As a result, the 
lack of accessing to better job opportunities and the suppression of Kurdish identity 
persisted the level of poverty in Kurdish regions due to neoliberal policies in the 1980s.  
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Following the military coup in 1980, a governor-general was appointed over the eight 
overwhelmingly Kurdish regions, in Çewlig / Bingöl, Elazig, Hakkari, Siirt, Diyarbakir, 
Mardin Tunceli and Van, in which a state of emergency was declared. The governor-
general, in order to fight against the PKK guerrillas, was given an extensive power 
under special law. He was equipped with a wide range of authorities, including the 
forced evacuation of villages where it was assumed necessary. Thereby, by the end of 
1989, the number of forcibly displaced villages had reached about 400.462 Following 
state of emergency, in six Kurdish cities which were under the state of emergency, 
Tunceli, Hakkari, Siirt, Sirnak, Diyarbakir, and Van, and five nearby cities Çewlig / 
Bingöl, Batman, Mardin, Bitlis, Mus 820 villages and 2,345 hamlets were evacuated, 
and 378,335 residents were forced to leave.463 In addition, the US Department of State`s 
human rights report on Turkey for the year 1994, asserts that the Turkish government 
military forces forcibly evacuate 2297 villages, and displaced around two million 
people.464 The strategy of banishing the Kurds from their ancestral homelands was the 
unending aim of the Turkish state. As a result, the Turkish authorities generally tend to 
see Kurds as either the enemy or at least a potential enemy, and this is the one of the 
main reasons why the socioeconomic and political consequences of the involuntary 
migration of Kurds have not been changed since the establishment of Turkey.  Mass 
evacuations of villages in Kurdish regions and the unfavourable neoliberal policies 
during the 1980s deteriorated economic improvement of people in the regions. A 
villager, Mr Burhan Badan, spoke about his experience of being forced out from his 
village in 1990 in Solhan, a county of Çewlig / Bingöl during my Summer 2012 field 
trip; “the army came to our village and told us we had a week to choose either become 
the state paramilitary forces called ‘village guards’ or to migrate from the village! My 
family and I chose to leave the village while most of the villagers did not have the 
financial means to migrate and stayed to become ‘village guards’.” 465 There are similar 
examples seen extensively in the Kurdish regions. The locals in many geographically 
critical villages had two options; to stay and become part of Turkish State’s security 
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forces or to migrate, mainly to western capital cities, where they would go through a 
‘natural’ assimilation process. These policies were, once again, the Turkish state’s 
political tactics on the ground towards its Kurdish or Zaza population, as it would refer. 
As a result, the unending assimilation policy of Turkey has increased internally 
displacement people in the Middle East areas. According to the Global Trends report 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), by the end of 2017, 
68.5 million people were displaced, including 40 million internally displaced across the 
world. Furthermore, UNHCR`s figure shows that one person is forcibly displaced every 
two seconds because of conflicts or persecutions across the world.466 
 
In the late 1980s, the Turkish state started to build dozens of dams along the Euphrates 
River to alleviate regional socioeconomic disparities, and this plan called South-eastern 
Anatolia Project, known as Güneydogu Anadolu Projesi (GAP) in Turkish. The GAP 
was implemented in 1989 with a big expectation but it did not achieve what it intended. 
To illustrate, only 9 dams were finished by 2008 instead of building 22, and only about 
261 thousands of hectare land was irrigated out of 1.6 million hectare. The project 
intended to increase irrigation methods for Kurdish farmers, but massive hydroelectric 
power produced by the dams was transferred to western parts of Turkey, or the state 
sold to some of Turkey`s neighbour countries.467  The implementation of the GAP 
project in the Kurdish regions caused more displacement of Kurds due to building dams. 
Moreover, a conversation between President Turgut Ozal and Prime Minister Suleyman 
Demirel shows the main aim of building dams in the Kurdish regions:  
“Starting with the most troubled zones, village and hamlets in the mountains of the 
region should be gradually evacuated [and] resettled in the Western parts of the country 
according to a careful plan…Security forces should immediately move in and establish 
complete control in such areas. . . . To prevent the locals’ return to the region, the 
building of a large number of dams in appropriate places is an alternative”.468  
At first glance, the South-eastern Anatolia Project (GAP) seems to have been 
implemented in order to find a solution to the economic hardship of Kurdish regions, 
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including Çewlig / Bingöl, however it may be seen as discriminative intention of the 
GAP against the Kurds by “looking awry,” in the words of Slavoj Žižek.469  
 
Ismail Besikci provides another reason of why the Kurdish regions remained in poverty.  
Besikci maintains that the massive underdevelopment of Kurdish regions and the 
regional disparities are linked to the colonial policy of the state since the establishment 
of Turkey. According to his theory, Kurdish provinces, including Çewlig / Bingöl, are 
colonised in order to provide for the needs of Turkey’s industrialised cities; “like most 
colonized regions, Kurdistan’s stores of raw material, its vast natural wealth in 
petroleum, copper, coal and phosphate, soil, forests, and water are exploited and 
marketed for industry.” 470  Furthermore, according to the proponents of the view 
exploitation of the Kurdish regions’ natural and human resources for the benefit of the 
west of Turkey due to discriminatory economic policies of the country as the 
underdeveloped regions are not only a source of labour for the industrialised regions; 
they are also a significant market. Kemal Burkay also highlights that “Kurdistan is the 
region that provides the cheap workforce for the west; the capital accumulated in this 
region is flowing to the west. Kurdistan became a very convenient market for the 
bourgeoisie to introduce its products.” 471  Therefore, it is claimed that the “East 
[Kurdish regions] had been neglected.”472 As a result, predominantly Kurdish provinces 
like Çewlig / Bingöl suffer from economic exclusion due to nationalistic socio-
economic policies of the Turkish state.  
 
4.1.3 The Reflections of Economic Market on Identity Tendencies  
Studies the political economy of the Kurds have largely ignored the Kurdish periphery, 
and disregarding the less densely Kurdish cities, like Çewlig / Bingöl, may impoverish 
our understanding of Kurdish politics. Moreover, the unresolved Kurdish issue has led 
to widespread both voluntary and involuntary migration of Kurds to other countries in 
the Middle East and the Caucasus, as well as to Europe and North America.473 The 
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Kurdish issue has become an international problem as more than half a million Kurds 
now live in Europe, particularly in Germany, and conflicts between the Turkish and 
Kurdish residents of European states affect the law and order of those countries.474 As 
a result, studies of less developed Kurdish cities may reveal new outcomes in regard to 
better understanding of Kurdish issue.  
 
The Turkish state ideology emphasises the supremacy of Turkish language, culture, 
education, and history since the establishment of Turkish Republic in 1923.475 Turkish 
state, particularly, has focused on the unending assimilation of Kurds by relocating 
them. Ismail Besikci points out that denial of the Kurds as an ethno-political community 
and forced settlement were the main policies of Turkey. 476  This has meant that 
relocations mandated by the Turkish governments were to assimilatehe country’s 
subordinate ethnic populations. Despite legal actions to force Kurds to leave their 
regions, which started during the establishment of Turkey, most Kurds continued to live 
in the eastern and south-eastern areas of Turkey until after the waves of migration 
occurring first in the 1980s.477 As a result, the displacement of Kurds from their home 
to western regions of Turkey has been one of the more significant internal migrations 
of the Middle East, and Çewlig / Bingöl started to lose its population towards 
industrialised metropolises such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir.   
 
Table 7: The number of in-migration and out-migration in Çewlig / Bingöl from 
1975 to 2014.  
 Years  Population  In-migration  Out-migration  Net migration  
1975-1980  190 193  6 148  16 826  - 10 678  
1980-1985  205 716  7 703  16 989  - 9 286  
1985-1990  216 793  9 878  29 766  - 19 888  
1995-2000  222 139  13 795  25 202  - 11 407  
2007-2008  256 091  8 977  10 192  - 1 215  
2008-2009  255 745  6 986  10 726  - 3 740  
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2009-2010  255 170  8 453  10 448  - 1 995  
2010-2011  262 263  9 292  10 782  - 1 490  
2011-2012  262 507  7 569  11 145  -3576  
2012-2013  265 514  10 968  10 940  28  
2013-2014 266.019 9.400 12.852 -3.452 
Source: Bingol Valiligi, Nufus ve Dagilim.478 
 
These economic conditions forced people to migration, and table 7 shows the change 
in migration in Çewlig / Bingöl between 1975 and 2014. As it can be seen in table 7, 
there is a stabilization of population in Çewlig / Bingol since 1990s although the 
population of Turkey continues to increase. According to Turkish Statistical Institute, 
Turkish population almost increased 100% from 40.348 million to 80.810 million 
between 1975 and 2017 whereas Bingol`s population increased only 50% at the same 
time.479 The rate of out-migration in Çewlig / Bingöl increased, as can be seen in figure 
7, especially after the 1980s due to the conflict between the Kurdish insurgents and the 
Turkish military. Kurds’ movements within Turkey have taken place since the 
establishment of the Turkey for various reasons, but one of the key reasons is to 
assimilate Kurdish groups into Turkish culture. Another reason of migration during the 
1980s was neoliberal policies of the Turkish state which cut the subsidy on agricultural 
activities. Therefore, between 1985 and 1990, almost 10% of the Çewlig / Bingöl 
population migrated to mostly big cities in the west of Turkey where they hoped to find 
a better job. As a result, the demographics of migration have deteriorated 
socioeconomic instabilities and social unrest in Kurdish regions. The wealth in the east 
and southeast regions in Turkey were directly targeted with tragic social and economic 
nationalism of the Turkish state. When economic indicators are examined across 
Turkey, regional disparity in regards to sectoral employment as well as investment into 
education is evident, with the greatest inequality between ‘developed west’ and the 
Kurdish east. 480  Therefore, Kurdish scholars have examined existing regional 
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inequalities to prove their argument; that the economic policies of the Turkish 
governments have been exploitative, and discriminatory.481 In this disadvantageous 
position, Kurds would either stay in their homelands or remain poor, or they move to 
west of Turkey to work in a service industry in the service of the non- Kurds. By 
working in the west, the Kurds have begun to lose their culture and language ability. 
This, in every sense, would work well in line with the Turkish state’s assimilation 
policies and would be a “win win” case politically.  
 
Kurdish economic exclusion is due to the distance from the industrialized centre of 
Turkey, lack of social services such as education, and not having heavy industry which 
has resulted in less economic development. These chronical socioeconomic problems 
reinforced Kurdish economic exclusion since the establishment of Turkey.482 Moreover, 
Kurds who migrated either by force or voluntarily from their villages to bigger cities 
have faced socioeconomic problems and confusions with regards to their ethnic identity. 
While some Kurds see assimilation as the easiest and quickest way to enhance their 
socioeconomic condition, others blame the Turkish state’s assimilation policies for 
their poor socioeconomic situation and react by becoming more attached to their 
Kurdish identity.483 Seda Kartal has conducted a research to analyse personal emotions 
as a measure of the effectiveness of assimilation policies of Turkish state, and 
socioeconomic “reforms”, which have influence on Kurds. The result shows that 
“participants who have high hopes about retaining their Kurdish identity tend to be 
primarily Kurdish, the ones with low hopes tend to be primarily Turkish.”484 In addition, 
the majority of Kurds, those who migrated to industrialized cities of western Turkey, 
became part of the marginalized and criminalized urban poor population.485 Thus, in 
many Turkish cities, migrant Kurds have dealt with the problems of adjusting to urban 
life. There are also studies which show how identity influences economic outcomes. 
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For instance, following 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA, people showed heightened 
patriotism and amplified prejudicial attitudes towards Muslims, and they became more 
conservative. They have increased their support for leaders such as Bush and radical 
anti-terrorist acts.486 At the same time in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks some Muslims 
became more radical and showed increased support for Islamic fundamentalism.487 In 
a similar fashion, Barkey and Fuller observe that when Kurds settle in urban provinces 
of western Turkey, they have, in some cases, realized the socioeconomic discrepancies 
between their hometown and provinces they had migrated from. Therefore, some 
Kurdish migrants have reacted to socioeconomic differences by accentuating more their 
Kurdish identities. As a result, the unending assimilation policies of Turkish state have 
influenced not only the socioeconomic standards of migrant Kurds but also, perhaps 
inadvertently encouraged the Kurds to embrace their ethnic identity. 
 
Economy is an important measure in Çewlig / Bingöl in terms of where the locals 
choose to go to in the surrounding cities when there is the need for a bigger market city. 
There are two outstanding choices in terms of the cities to go to and once again they 
are either Elazig or Diyarbakir. The state prefers a flow between them and Elazig while 
the Kurdish movement’s choice is Diyarbakir as the bigger market city for Çewlig / 
Bingöl. The road between Çewlig / Bingöl and Elazig is well made modern road while 
the one connecting to Diyarbakir is not. Both cities are about 150 km distance to Çewlig 
/ Bingöl. The same goes for greater hospital needs, bigger airports needs, and some 
state institutions that do not have a branch in Çewlig / Bingöl etc. A local businessman 
in Çewlig / Bingöl, Sait Ölmez, in an interview said; “Of course, I would prefer to go 
to Diyarbakir (compared to Elazig) to buy my construction business material as long as 
they have it there. My money would go to my people, not to those support our 
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oppressors (the Turkish state).”488 On the other hand, another interviewee argued that; 
“Diyarbakir is dangerous for us to go for our needs. The roads are sometimes controlled 
by ‘the terrorists’ and the money we spend there probably goes to the PKK 
supporters”.489  These comments could be heard from different people in a similar style 
for variety of necessities they would need for their day-to-day life. These daily 
movements give great opportunities for the two major political actors (Turkish state 
and the Kurdish movement) use this arena for their political propaganda and 
mobilisation. The Kurdish movement uses the rhetoric of nationalist economy and 
culture.    
 
4.2 Zazas Identity Position between Kurdishness and Turkisness 
4.2.1 Expression of Turkishness 
Since the Turkish State begun its assimilation policy in its early decades, following the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, it desired to ‘Turkify’ the Zazas and 
divide them from the Kurmanjs. The Kurmanjs were referred as Kurds in this content 
to be pointed out as the only Kurdish group in Turkey. The Zazas are Turks, an argument 
that has been introduced and encouraged by the Turkish state as part of the assimilation 
policy. The practising area of this theory was firstly the area where Zazaki speaking 
people and Turkish-speaking people were neighbouring. The state took this position as 
the first and perfect solution, to Turkify all the ethnic groups of Anatolia or whoever 
lived in its state territories. This was more vital in the Zaza case as it also wanted to 
‘convince’ them that they were not Kurds. This project found a considerable ground in 
its immediate practice field, mainly in the neighbouring areas with Turkish speaking 
provinces. Therefore this thesis argues that Elazig is the symbol of assimilated / 
Turkified area where there was dominantly a Zaza speaking province in the history.  
Although there is still a proportion of Elazig’s residents that do not see themselves as 
ethnic Turks, the majority of the population there would side themselves with the Turks 
/ Turkey. This is the case, both ethnically and politically.  
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The Turkish state has implemented as politically and economically sponsored agenda 
towards the Kird / Zazas. The institutionalization of this agenda which mostly has been 
about “purifying” Eastern Anatolia of its indigenous Kurdish and Zaza population has 
endangered the development of the Zazaki more as they are minority both in Turkey 
and in Turkish Kurdistan region compared with Kurmanjs.  
  
Considering the above-mentioned development and challenge facing the Zaza people’s 
identity and those disputes and contest that is related to whether they are a people / 
language of their own or are they part of greater Kurdishness like other Kurdish groups 
Kurmanji, Sorani, Hewrami etc., one could argue that while the Kurdish language has 
been an important source of identifying the Kurds as a distinctive nation, the existence 
of variety of Kurdish language has been used as an element of fragmenting the Kurdish 
people by outsiders, and creating division among the different sections and 
communities of the Kurdish nation. The critical aspect of deploying the diverse nature 
and existence of variety of dialect within the Kurdish language has through the 
contemporary history of the Kurdish people, mainly in lines and as result of the creation 
of the nation states in Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria, reveals that these nations-states have 
massively relied on the policy of divide and rule in order to weaken and destroy the 
Kurdish movements. This argument is applicable in the case of the Kird / Zaza case in 
Turkey. Deploying similar policy is identifiable in both Iran and Iraq, where in Iraq the 
ruling the regimes tried to label the Kurdish Izzadis as well the Kurdish Faylis (a 
Kurdish Shiite community) as not Kurds490, in modern Iran different ruling regime (e.g., 
the Pahlavi and the Islamic republic) used the policy of demographic engineering and 
investing the religious affiliations of non-Sunni Kurds as an element of splitting off the 
Kurdish population and curtailing the potential of Kurdish movements.491 For instance 
this problematic approach is evident for the Iranian Kurdish movement both during the 
post-revolutionary periods in the 1980s when the Iranian Kurdistan was under massive 
attack of the Islamic regime’s army and generally through the four decades of the 
national movement in the Iranian Kurdistan since the 1979. David Romano highlights 
the linguistic and religious division and/or diversity and its effect on the capability of 
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the (Iranian) Kurdish movement as following; “Failing to mobilize especially Shiite 
Kurds, to attract substantial non-Kurdish support in Iran or sufficient international 
assistance, the confrontation of battlefield went badly for Kurds”. 492  Despite the 
existence of a critically complex attitude of the Turkish state towards the Kird / Zazas, 
it is possible to identify two major approaches/patterns both of which, regardless of the 
mechanisms/strategies that have been deployed, have left negative effect on firstly the 
Kird/Zazas’ identity, self-understanding, culture, and society. Even more critical is that 
it has resulted in significant fragmentation of the Kurdish identity and Kurdish national 
liberation movement in Turkey.  
 
4.2.2 Expression of Kurdishness 
The third argument is that the Zazas are Kurds. This view has been used by Kurdish 
nationalists throughout the history of the Republic, especially more recently. While 
some scholars have sometimes differentiated between the Zazas and the Kurds by 
claiming some linguistic differentiations and pointing out that, the Sheikh Said and the 
Seyid Riza rebellion were known Zaza and not Kurdish rebellions. On the other hand 
the majority of academics in this field such as David McDowall, Hassanpour, and 
Martin Van Bruinessen do not differentiate between the Zaza and the Kurds. Moreover, 
in the first Zazaki publication in history in the late nineteenth century Ehmede Xasi in 
his Zazaki Mewlud (a religious oral tradition honouring of the Prophet Mohammed’s 
birth) argued that the Zazas were Kurds. The Kurds and Zazas also have the same 
common aspirations and thus identify with each other as one ethnic group. As well as 
this, they share the same geographical boundaries further cementing their connection 
to each other. This argument has always been strong politically even more so today 
with the rise and influence of the PKK. Since the early 1990s, the PKK was able to 
expand its influence in Zazaki speaking areas such as Bingol, Dersim, or Tunceli, Dicle, 
Genc and Lice to name a few. Recent elections in Turkey have also helped to back the 
view that the Zazas see themselves as Kurds. In the last two local elections in Dersim, 
(a predominately Zaza region) the mayor of the city was elected from the pro-Kurdish 
Party the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), formerly known as the Democratic 
Society Party (DTP).493 This shows a shift in voting patterns as pro-Kurdish Party 
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member had never been elected to the position of Mayor in the city. Similarly the 
percentage of votes for the BDP has continued to increase in Bingol. This pattern can 
also be seen in most of the other Zazaki speaking areas. Moreover, in the present 
Turkish assembly, the percentage of Zaza members of parliament is always between 
twenty and thirty percent in the total number of MP's who represent pro-Kurdish party. 
Today, Zazas also appear more actively in Cultural activities such as Newroz (the major 
Kurdish festivity and recently a political activity), the local convivial organised by pro-
Kurdish organisations, and in the Kurdish political parties parallelly. The fact that the 
Zazas are voting for pro-Kurdish parties and becoming more active in generally 
Kurdish activities shows in some way that they are identifying themselves not only with 
the Kurdish identity but also to some extent, in the Kurdish national movement in 
Turkey.Jongerden argues that the revival of Kurmanji through the media resulted in 
attempts to revitalize Zazaki as a written language.494 The Vate Studies Group, as 
stressed previously in this thesis, has played a similar role to those who conducted a 
standardising work for Kurmanji decades earlier. The linguistic works on Zazaki started 
rather late and those who devote their time have a number of problems to deal with. 
Those who devote their time do all the work on voluntary basis. Hence, not only should 
they have the intellectual background in linguistic areas they also need to be in a secured 
financial position to be able to work voluntarily.  
4.2.3 Zazas in Europe: Designing the Identity from Europe 
The process of immigration of many leftist groups following the 1980 coupe, among 
them any zaza Kurds left significant effect in the development of Zaza identity either 
as a people / language on their own or just a section of Kurdish nationalism, and another 
dialect of the Kurdish language.495  
 
One can trace the rise of Kirdki / Zazaki publication to the ‘exiled’ community of 
Zazaki’s living in western European countries, among them the large Kurdish diaspora 
community in Germany and Sweden.496 Although there is a smaller community living 
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in Sweden, it seems like it was the country constituted the main ‘nests’ for a community 
of Zaza intellectuals.   
 
According to Ludwig Paul the first exclusively Zazaki journal named AYRE (mill) has 
been published in 1984 by the pioneer of Zaza nationalism Ebubekir Pamukcu. It is 
noteworthy to mention, that Pamukcu’s role and his published Zazaki journal has been 
an issue of dispute, particularly among those who consider Zazaki as a sub-dialect of 
the Kurdish language. However, despite this contest, which was related to Pamukçu’s 
identification of the Zazaki’s, his initiative resulted in the emergence of political and 
cultural debate around the Zaza identity and their linguistic and ethnical roots. In 
Ludwig’s words, “considered as an outsider among the Zaza, or even a “Turkish agent” 
trying to split off the Zaza from their Kurdish sister people, Pamukçu finally saw some 
fruits of his labour when in the early nineties a stronger awareness of their own cultural 
identity started to gain a foothold among the speaker of Zazaki”.497 
 
The Kurdish nationalism has a history of transferring nationalist ideas from Europe. 
This was mainly the case when individual from aristocrat families had an intellectual 
exposure to nationalist ideas in France since the Ottoman era. A small number of 
intellectuals moved from Turkey to Europe before the 1980 army coup. This was the 
case for those who moved from Kurdish areas of Turkey, too. Van Bruinessen argues 
that there is a strong connection between exile and nationalism.498 Kurds who live in 
diaspora also witness different nationalities and ethnicities live together in harmony. 
Moreover, one can, in most cases, freely express their identity unlike in their home 
country. The most outstanding work on Zazaki linguistically has been carried out by 
the intellectuals who have formed Vate Zazaki Standardising Group in Sweden in 1996. 
Mehmet Selim Uzun, when pointing out the vital role this group has played said: “if 
one day Zazaki makes it to survive it will be thanks to the work that Vate group has 
done over the last two decades. It is still under a serious threat and more work has to be 
done for it to survive.499 Similar works have begun on Kurmanji in the late 19th century 
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and early 20th century and therefore Kurmanji is in a better position as dialect of Kurdish 
in terms of studies and standardization. 
 
4.2. Localist Expression: ‘I am a Zaza’ 
Zazas name themselves and the dialect they speak differently depending on where they 
live or where they come from. Those names include: Kird/Kirdki; in Çewlig/Bingöl and 
some of the Diyarbakir towns (Lice, Dicle, Kocakoy, Egil, Hani, Hazro and Silvan), 
Kirmanc / Kirmancki; in Dersim, Erzincan and Varto- Muş, Dimilî/Dimilkî; in Urfa 
(Siverek), Adiyaman (Gerger), Diyarbakir (Çermik, Çüngüş) and Zaza/Zazakî; in and 
around Elaziğ.500 The word Zaza is a widely preferred version that is used in all areas 
in addition to the local names for each group due to a number of reasons.501 In the 
research area of this thesis, in Çewlig/Bingöl, the preferred name is Kird/Kirdkî. 
Malmisanij stresses that, in 19th there is two main sources documented that addressing 
Kird/Kirdkî was also historically used to name the Zazakî speakers of Çewlig/Bingöl.502 
 
The argument that Zazas are neither Turkish nor Kurdish but simply Zazas has a base 
linguistically according to some academicians. The German scholar Oscar Mann asserts 
that, on entirely linguistic grounds, the varieties of Zaza were not dialects of Kurdish, 
but belonged to a distinct branch of the Indo- Iranian language family.503 This argument 
is politically endorsed, by people who were alienated not only from the Turkish identity 
but also from the Kurdish identity. Those who take this stance currently are generally 
non-political people who focus more on their day-to-day lives and are indifferent to 
nationalist and political sentiments. While an argument can be made that by taking this 
seemingly controversial stance they are contributing to the politicization of the 
situation, it should also be noted that this group identifies more with religious 
affiliations, as to whether they are Sunni or Alevi. A relevant example to this is: Metin 
Kahraman, the famous Zaza singer, recounts consciously performing different identities 
in different settings. While the Dersimli tends to become “Kurdish” in opposition to 
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“Turkishness” when faced with “Kurdishness” they become 'Alevi' or “Zaza”.504 That 
being said, politically the group has been recently backed by some ex-PKK members 
who have set up opposition groups in Germany. One of the most outstanding figure of 
this group is Selim Curukkaya, a Zaza from Çewlig / Bingol and also a former high-
ranking member of the PKK. He argues that the Zazas have been used by the PKK and 
Ocalan for their own political gains, claiming that if the PKK were to gain political 
power the Zazas would be oppressed as they have been by the Turkish state.505 
 
There was rise of a movement around the idea of distinctness of Zaza identity and 
language, the Zaza’s political and ideological movement for establishing a sense of 
independent national identity, that they are neither Kurds nor Turks, but Zaza, was 
mainly seeded in Europe and supported by the Turkish state in 1980s. This movement, 
on the other hand, suffers from fragmentation and internal controversies and dispute. 
The anti- PKK group of Zazas (such as ex-PKK commander Selim Çürükkaya) that see 
themselves as Kurds, blame the PKK-led movement for the emergence of a distinct 
Zaza movement.  They believe that the PKK had an agenda of suppressing and 
diminishing Zazas and Zazaki among the Kurdish society of Turkey. However 
opponents of this assumption argue that “the solidarity was not formulated directly 
against the Zaza identity, but rather that the Kurmanji dialect became the area in which 
the power within the movement expressed itself”.506 
Since the 1950s and by the rise of the industrial movement in Turkey that have resulted 
in the intensification of urbanization, a tendency of shifting category of collective 
identity among Zaza Alevis is identifiable. This process which was initiated by a 
massive move/transmission and integration of the Zaza Alevis in other everyday life 
and cultural context has also resulted in interruption of practicing Alevism and 
emergence of far-reaching secularization and politicization of Alevi youth in the 1960-
70s. Alevi youth groups devoted themselves to leftist ideologies in far-reaching 
secularization, which was vigorously supported by a general politicization of Alevi 
youth, who, in the 1960s and 1970s, devoted themselves to leftist ideologies. These 
politicization and socio-political transmission among a new generation of particularly 
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Zaza Alevis and their political affiliation meant that “By reinterpreting its history and 
traditions, Alevism was declared the ideological source of communism and being an 
Alevi became nearly synonymous with being a communist”.507 
 
This process regarded as a comprehensive move resulted in the alteration of the self-
image of Zaza Alevis. This new form of self-image and self-understanding benefited 
the PKK lead Kurdish movement. As evidences show following this period where the 
Kurdish movement in Turkey ushered into a new phase with gaining new strength at 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, supporting the Kurdish movement (from the Zaza 
Alevi’s perspective) appeared logical. Consequently many Zaza and Kurmanji speaking 
Alevi’s joined/supported the movement and embraced Kurdish national identity508. 
Meanwhile the older generation of the Zazaki- and Kurmanci speaking Alevis have, as 
Krisztin Kehl-Bodrogi maintains, continued to view religion “as the main source of 
their collective identity and to reject Kurdish ethnicity. As a result, a split in the 
definition of we-group identity has emerged between the older and the newer 
generations”.509 
 
The formation of PKK opened a new chapter in the identity shifts in the region. The 
initial founding group of the PKK consisted activists, intellectuals, University students 
from various ethnic and religious groups in Turkey. Among them there were members 
from Çewlig / Bingöl who were Zaza and Kurmanj, Alevi and Sunnis. This was going 
to be a common ideological ground where the youth followed to become strongly 
politicised. It did not take long until Çewlig / Bingöl started to affiliate itself with the 
new-leftist PKK- led Kurdish movement.   
 
4.3 Çewlig/Bingöl’s Ethnic and Religious Identity 
4.3.1 An Overview of the Ethnic Structure of Çewlig/Bingöl and the Role of 
Language in Identity Construction 
Kurdish nationalism and the Kurdish language and sociocultural identity values and 
symbols have been a constant target of the Turkish nation state since the very early days 
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of the establishment of the modern Turkish nation state.510Compared to mainstream 
Kurds, the Zaza population in Turkey and their identity has had experienced more 
difficult conditions. The contemporary history of development of Zaza identity shows 
that the Zaza’s have been the subject of two competing and antagonistic political 
ideology, the Turkish state and the Kurdish national movement, in which both the 
Kurdish and Turkish nationalist claim that the Zazas are respectively a constituent part 
of Kurdish and Turkish identity. Each of these two ideologies have their own agendas. 
For the Turkish state, merging the Zazas into Turkish nationalism is about assimilation 
and annihilation as well as fragmenting Kurdish nationalism to smaller elements and 
reducing/deconstructing the Kurdish national movement. While for the Kurdish 
nationalists, this claim is an attempt of creating/maintaining unification among the 
different subsections of the Kurdish nationalism aimed at improving the capability of 
Kurdish national movement and in the worst case make the survival of Kurdish identity 
under the tough political circumstances created by the Turkish state more possible.511   
 
While scholars who raise questions regarding Zazaki being a subdialect of Kurdish, a 
form of unanimity among Kurdish linguistics scholar bring technical evidences that 
underline the argument of Zazaki as a sub-dialect of Kurdish. For instance, in their 
examination of the condition of Kurdish language, Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, Jaffer 
Sheyholislami and Amir Hassanpour even claim that, while due to the existence of a 
variety of sub-Kurdish dialects in Bashur (Iraqi Kurdistan), the Kurdish language is 
suffering from a certain form fragmentation,  
 
Kurdish in Turkey is not as fragmented as it is in Iraq or even Iran; with the exception between 
two to four million Zaza speakers, all northern Kurds speak Kurmanji. It might be easier to 
declare Kurmanji as the official or national language of Kurdistan-Turkey while granting 
linguistic rights to Zaza speakers512. 
 
Another example of Kurdish intellectual and scholars supporting the idea of the 
Kurdishness of Zaza and Zazaki is Pervine Jamil a well-recognized Kurdish scholar 
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(and the Chair of the Kurdish Bureau for Liaison and Information in Brussels), that 
argues Zazaki is simply a dialect of Kurdish but not a separate language; in this regard 
Jamal highlights that;  
Sure, it is a dialect, not a language for us. But if a Zaza person calls her/himself Zaza 
but not Kurdish, then we should sit and talk… if there are many Zazas, then, as a 
different minority, like Arabs and Turks, they should be given rights. I mean beheading 
does not help but minimum discipline is necessary.513 
 
The Turkish state, similar to other states occupying Kurdistan have always relied 
heavily on a policy of divide and rule, in addition to their other mechanisms of defeating 
Kurdish nationalism and the Kurdish national movement. This approach has been 
considered by the Turkish state in the case of the Kird/Zaza. The Turkish state and its 
institutions have sponsored and underlined the process of assimilation of Kurds aware 
of the existence of the linguistic differences not only between Kurdish and Turkish but 
also between the two major sub dialects of Kurdish in Turkey (Kurmanji and Zazaki) 
clearly expressed to transfer these difference in their own benefit while they are 
fragmenting Kurdish nationalism. Hasan Reşit Tankut, a persuaded Turkish nationalist 
and the Turkish Republic’s expert on “ethnopolitics”, suggested state apparatus to 
deploy the Kurmanji-Zazaki distinctness as an advantage for state politics. Tankut 
suggested that state by using the Zazaki speaking in building up/creating a “Turkish 
barrier” against the Kurds, the state would be able to make the Kird / Zazaki speaking 
population aware of their ethnic distinctness. 514  Aimed at realizing its policy of 
fragmenting Kurdish identity the supported Tankut in carrying out a field research prior 
to the military campaign against Dersim of 1937-38. As highlighted in Mehmed S. Kaya 
study  
Tankut, who had been “inspector of East Anatolia” for the nationalist Turkish Hearths 
association and an expert at the Turkish Language Institute, believed that the 
assimilation of the Kurds would be accelerated if Zaza and Kurmanci speakers were 
first separated. In the wake of the 1960 military coup, he proposed to the ruling junta a 
massive project of population resettlement, to create a 50 kilometre-wide corridor515. 
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The example of Tankut516 reveals this reality that the Turkish state viewed the existence 
of linguistic/dialectic difference between in one hand Kurmanji and Zazaki as well as 
religious difference between Sunni Zazaki and Alevi Zazaki as a powerful tool for 
weakening the Kurdish struggle in Turkey.   
 
It is noteworthy to mention that through the Turkish state’s process of fragmenting the 
Kurdish identity through giving the Zaza a distinct ethnonational roots, Politics and 
Logisticians, the studies of western scholars that have concluded that Zaza are not 
Kurds have served the Turkish policy. Through many occasions and examples the 
Turkish state in promoting the distinctiveness of the Zaza identity as an identity 
different from Kurdish reflected on the findings of studies of western scholars such as 
Karl Hadank, D.N. MacKenzie and Ludwig Paul. Interestingly these claims found 
significantly more acceptance among the Alevi than among the Sunni Zazas.  More 
recently, the Armenian scholars Garnik Asatrian and Victoria Arakelova have weighed 
in heavily in these debates, insisting that the Zazas are a people distinct from the Kurds, 
even though they may only recently have become aware of this distinctness. However 
it has resulted in different debate among Kurdish scholar where for some historical 
reasons many Kurdish intellectual and nationalists hold by Mehmed S. Kaya  
 
Have perceived the emerging Zaza nationalist movement to be a creation of either the 
Turkish state or Armenian nationalist interests, or an invention of Christian missionary 
interests … In short, the study of Zaza history, culture and society is a highly politi-
cised and polarised field. The leading Zazakî writers and their journal Vate (which 
began publication in Stockholm in 1996 and moved to Istanbul in 2003), have to tread 
carefully in this field, wary of being associated with at-tempts to divide the Kurds while 
remaining dedicated to preserving and de-veloping the Zaza language and cultural 
traditions.517 
For instance in his studies of Kurdish language and the policy of linguicide particularly 
implemented against the Kurdish language in Turkey Amir Hassanpour maintains that 
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“the harshest policy of linguicide in our times is probably practised in Turkey, where 
the entire state machinery is mobilized in order to eliminate the language in both 
speaking and writing518”. Hassanpour under the subtitle; “De-politicized” descriptions 
of Kurdish, argues that some studies have been use by Turkey to annihilate and 
fragment the identity of the Kurds519. For instance regarding the researches of western 
scholars David N. MacKenzie, David (1986) and Ernest McCarus, (1958 and 1992) on 
Kurd and Kurdish language that have been subject of elf censorship and have not 
mentioned those difficulties the Kurdish language are suffering from in the hands of 
the Turkish state. As Hassanpour clearly acknowledges the research criteria of the 
studies of MacKenzie and McCarus he has in very detailed manner highlighted some 
critical (ethical) aspects of their studies;  
 
The two major works, in English, on Kurdish language, McCarus (1958) and 
MacKenzie (1961), do not refer to the suppression of the language in any of the 
countries where it is spoken. Both were excellent doctoral dissertations based on field 
work conducted in Iraq. The former is a study of the grammar of the Sorani standard 
in Iraq. The latter was intended to be a descriptive study of the Kurdish dialects of Iraq 
and Turkey. Since the Republic of Turkey does not allow linguists to conduct field 
research on the language, MacKenzie was denied a research permit. However, there is 
no information in the book about the suppression of the language in Turkey, although 
the author refers to the closure of the 'field' in depoliticized language that reduces it to 
an accident, a technical problem of communication: 'It was originally intended to spend 
an equal period of time in the Kurdish-speaking areas of Turkey and Iraq.520 
 
However despite the Turkish state exploitation of Zaza identity and language for 
creating more split between Kurds, the Kird/Zaza have been awarded a special states 
that protect them from force immigration persecution and assimilation, yet, for the most 
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part, the Turkish state and its army have not dealt with the Kurdish and Zazas differently 
and consequently both groups have been subjects of the same assimilation policy.521 
 
4.3.2 An Overview of the Religious Picture of Çewlig/Bingöl and Its Surroundings 
Mainly the Zazas in Turkey are either practising Sunnism or Alevism. There is no 
reliable record of either ethnic or religious group in Turkey.  Zaza population is said to 
be between two and four million but it is mostly referred as three million as population. 
According to the Sunni Zazas, there are about three quarters of Sunni Zazas most of 
whom are in Sahfii school of Sunni Islam. On the other hand, Alevi Zazas believe the 
half of whole Zaza population believe in Alevism.522 The picture in Çewlig / Bingöl is 
that majority of population is Kird / Zazaki speaking and majority of those are Shafii 
branch of Sunni- Muslim.   
 
In the case of the Zaza, religion has played an important and in some regarding diving 
role in how people identify themselves. This problematic has resulted in evident 
fragmentary effect on how Zaza’s identify themselves. As different studies of ‘we-
group identity’ among the Zaza’s show that religious criteria have traditionally 
outweighed linguistic considerations. This assumption is more applicable in the case of 
Alevi and Sunni Zazas relation. In this relation a form of ‘otherness’ than ‘we-ness’ is 
identifiable. For instance the Sunni Shafi’i Zazas rely on religions criteria for their self-
identification has resulted in excluding the Alevi Zaza to a great extent. For instance as 
hold by Krisztin Kehl-Bodrogi; regardless of their language, Sunni neighbours 
designate all Alevis with the pejorative term “Kizilbas (literally ’redhead”). Alevis are 
considered heretics and, as such, ritually unclean. Social interaction between the two 
groups has been, until recently, extremely limited. Sunni disdain for the Alevis has 
taken forms of rejection from intermarriage to the refusal to eat an animal slaughtered 
by Alevi hands. The degree of ostracism has weakened in the course of the last several 
decades, though the boundary between the Alevi and the Sunni Muslims still exists. 
This boundary between the Alevis and the Sunni Muslims corresponds with a strong 
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sense of separateness on the part of the Alevis, who, as a whole, consist of Turkish-, 
Zazaki-, and in smaller numbers, Kurmanjs peaking adherents.523  
 
Çewlig / Bingöl is known with its conservative Sunni Muslim identity. Kaya argues 
that religion has one the central topics in sociological and anthropological research 
since the 1800s.524 The Ottoman State ruled these remote areas of its Empire via its 
local ‘society leaders’ in those days’ conditions. One could argue that the religious 
leaders are still powerful in the region. This was not the case only in the era of the single 
party government under the Republican People’s Party (CHP) between 1923 and 1950. 
Although CHP lost the power as single party government, its Kemalist ideology still 
controlled the state institutions.  
 
The religious leaders had vital role in Çewlig / Bingöl society since the creation Turkish 
Republic, their position was opposing the regime to start with and it had delivered a 
vast support to the religious – national Sheikh Said revolt in 1925. It was Çewlig / 
Bingöl who voted NO, by a record percentage in Turkey, against the new constitution 
referendum following the 1980 army coup. The Kemalist regime’s chief of staff had 
taken control through a military coup and his team designed the proposed constitution 
for a referendum. The religious leaders have a stronger prestige in the society compared 
with the local Aghas.525 After the rise of leftist Kurdish movement, which opposes these 
religious and feudal leaders in the region and also with global trends emerging, these 
individuals and families popularity is decreasing dramatically.  
 
4.3.3 Identity Expression: Marked by Religion or Ethnicity  
The self-identifying element has an interesting trend both in Çewlig / Bingöl (Sunni 
Zazas) and in Dersim / Tunceli (Alevi Zazas). Dersim was the area where systematic 
assimilation policies were firstly practised following the state’s suppression of the 
1937-38 Seyyid Riza. Due to the city’s more secular (compared with other Kurdish 
areas) and Alevi identity, the state approached with its secular- Kemalist policies. This 
new secular face of new state was more preferable after centuries of Sunni- Muslim 
Ottoman rule.  
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The very same state, this time with its Sunni- Muslim face approached the Sunni- 
Muslim Zaza city of Çewlig / Bingöl in the second half the 20th century. The new policy 
is at its peak times especially following the 1980 army coup and is on-going for last 
three decades. Since the AKP took power as single party government in Turkey in 2002, 
the Sunni- Muslim state approach towards Çewlig / Bingöl has became even more 
apparent. This trend was at its very peak point since 2007 when the AKP started to 
control whole state institutions, beyond being only a government party.   
 
The state managed to create confusions in terms of how people identify themselves. 
The field work trips for this thesis has given both examples of identity expressions when 
asked what their their ethnic identity; “I am neither Kurd nor Turk but I am an Alevi”526 
or “I am neither Kurd nor Turk but I am a Muslim”.527  
 
Based on such as formation of “self-identification and self-understanding” within the 
Zazaki community it is arguable to claim that difference in religious affiliations within 
different sub-Zaza communities has been a matter of division than unification. Such 
historical development has meant that the Alevi Zaza too have relied on their religious 
affiliation as a strong source of self-identification. Historically the (sociocultural) 
process of identity formation among the Alevis has ended with formation of a distinct 
Alevi identity. The Alevis historical relation within the state as well as Muslim 
communities around them show that the Alevi communities around Turkey has large 
historical memory of being supressed, therefore they view themselves as a despised and 
persecuted religious minority.  This historical failure of interaction with other elements 
of the Turkish/Kurdish society has meant that the Alevis have developed a particular 
for (A particular what of identity primarily with massive rely on religious criteria rather 
than language similarity. Therefore, regardless of their language, Alevis across Turkey 
share and show remarkable cultural similarity. Alevi ethnicity thus crosses ethno-
linguistic boundaries, as a fact becoming most apparent in the demand for group 
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endogamy. While no restrictions limited marriage between Alevis speaking different 
languages, marriage with a non-Alevi resulted in exclusion from the community. The 
principle that membership in the Alevi community could not be achieved by conversion 
but only by birth further strengthened the sense of unity among the Alevis. Only those 
born into the community had access to the secret doctrine of Alevism.528 
 
Historically, due to social and cultural development relation between the Sunni Zaza 
and Alevi Zaza – also a relation based on religious difference – despite their common 
language, Sunni and Alevi Zazas have a very weak sense of seeing themselves as one 
ethnic group historically. It is worth noting that while the Shafi’i Zaza’s mainly 
consider themselves as Kurds, the degree of considering themselves as Kurds ethnically 
vary within different Zaza Alevi communities. Consequently, despite the Alevi’s 
massive participation and contribution to the Kurdish movement in Turkey529, self-
labelling as Kurds among the Alevi Zaza’s in some areas of Turkey is an absent element 
at all530. The Alevi’s have suffered from the Turks far before their Sunni fellow Kurds. 
This relation has in historical roots backed in the time were the Alevi’s were often 
persecuted by the Ottomans, mainly due to two major reasons, firstly for their 
heterodoxy and secondly because the Ottoman accused them of having pro-Iranian 
sympathies. As emphasized by van Bruinessen, Alevi communities based on their 
(described circumstances) “chose to live in inaccessible mountain villages, relatively 
isolated from their Sunni neighbours. Since the 1950s many have migrated to the towns, 
where they compete for housing and jobs with the local Sunnis”.531  
 
Despite the historical background of these religious clear line differences, with rise 
Kurdish national movement in Turkey and its mobilisation in the recent decade(s), the 
Alevi and Sunni Zazas and overall Kurds now have strong common ground to come 
together around same interests. The number of inter-marriage is in a visible rise in the 
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region, the two communities often come together for Kurdish cultural celebrations, 
Kurdish music concerts, political protests etc.   
 
4.3.4 ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ Elements (who is who) in Çewlig/Bingöl Currently 
Many Kird / Zazas consider themselves and their identity to be under pressure from two 
sides; both the Turkish state / Turkisness and Kurdish movement / Kurmanji speaking 
Kurdish population in Turkey. This means that there is among some Zaza communities 
the feeling of being subject of Kurdish Kurmanjis assimilation policy is identifiable, in 
a way that they blame the Kurdish Kurmanjs for hindering the development of Zazas’ 
social and cultural development. For instance the study of Nesrin Ucarlar shows that 
some self-declared Zaza nationalists highlight their ethnic and language distinctiveness 
and explain the reason for the historical participation of the Zaza’s in the Kurdish 
movement;  
The Kurds and the Zaza are two distinct peoples; they have distinct languages and 
cultures … However, the Zaza people regarded themselves as Kurds in the 1970s when 
they inevitably attended the Kurdish political movements that were separated from the 
Turkish revolutionary movement.532 
 
Broadly speaking, such claims of ‘Zaza nationalist’ are denied by Kurmanji speaking 
intellectuals. They argue that the reason why Zazas feel that they are captured under 
suppressive condition that has resulted in underdevelopment in their society and culture 
due to the historical processes and circumstance surrounding the Zazas. This was the 
case for the Kurmanji speaking Kurds until the recent decades but the danger over 
Kurmanji dialect and their culture is not as great as it is for the Zazaki and Zazas in the 
current times. The Kurmanji has a number of advantages compared with Zazaki. Firstly, 
it is the only Kurdish dialect that is spoken in all parts of greater Kurdistan (in Turkey, 
Syria, Iraq, Iran and even in Armenian Kurdish speaking parts) while Zazaki is only 
spoken in Turkish part of Kurdistan. Secondly, the speakers of Kurmanji in Turkish 
Kurdistan alone, who share the same geography with the Zazas, are about five times as 
much as Zazas. Thirdly, Kurmanji, with help of the said above advantages, has started 
its standardising works about a century long before Zazaki and hence its publication 
and later broadcasting has started a lot earlier.  
                                                 





The Turkish state’s argument that ‘the Zazas are not Kurds’ is being stressed 
increasingly which is proving to be problematic identity shift in the region. The process 
of ethnic identity building in Çewlig/Bingöl is an ongoing one. The idea was originally 
started by the Turkish state, saying ‘the Zazas are not Kurds but are Turks and/or a 
Turkic tribe’ later being ‘marketed’ by suggesting that the Zazas are a separate people 
themselves. With the two above group of Zazas, embracing the idea for economic 
reasons and directly given state benefits leads them ‘buying’ the ideas that Turkish state 
has tried to ‘sell’ for decades. On the other hand, the Kurdish movement’s approach to 
these two group is usually not welcoming which leads them being closer to the state. 
The Kurdish political party labelled almost all the Kurds who do not vote for them or 
do not share the same ideological belief as state collaborators.533 It could be argued that 
the current Kurdish movement sacrifices the identity construction to its current political 
successes by using a wrong tactic. These factors make the issue more complex in the 
local politics. Furthermore, linguistically, one cannot finalize the argument by saying 
‘Zazakî is a dialect of Kurdish or that it is a language on its own independent from 
Kurdish’. On the other hand, this group (who says Zazas are not Kurds) is disregards 
the importance of common history, geography, folklore, sociology etc. Moreover, 
politically, one could not make a clear line between Zazas and Kurds in general. As the 
definitions for what is a language and what is a dialect are not clear, it would be wrong 
to label a group by only what they speak. Besides the language, there are other main 
common markers such as history, traditions, homeland, religion, common goal and 
common festivals to point out in stating whether a group of people is a separate ethnic 
group or not. 534  The trend of local identities makes the case more complex and 
interesting.  
 
4.4 The Cultural Aspect in Identity Construction in Çewlig/Bingöl 
4.4.1 The Cultural Similarities and Differences between Kird/Zazas and Kurmanjs 
in Çewlig/Bingöl 
Çewlig / Bingöl is a small sized city according to the standards in Turkey and Kurdish 
region. Besides, there was not a distinct social class difference due to the lack of 
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diversity in economical activities until recently. Therefore, one could not point out 
major differences between Kurmanjs and Kird / Zazas in the region. A difference was 
more apparent between the Alevi and Sunnis in the region until recent decades. Çewlig 
/ Bingöl’s Dersim (Alevi city) neighbouring counties Kigi, Adakli, Yayladere and 
Yedisu are all smaller than the other three, dominantly Sunni, towns of Genç, Solhan 
and Karliova. The four small counties have a mix of Alevi and Sunni population which 
brings the over all Alevi population in Çewlig / Bingöl to about 15 or maximum 20 % 
of total population in the province.  
 
Similar to many other micro – identities, there are some minor cases suggesting the 
Zazas and Kurmanjs see each other as ‘them’. Some Zazas claim that the Kurmanjs are 
less clean while some Kurmanjs think Zazas the same way. This can be seen in many 
other societies where local identities live together in a society. There are number of 
cases for religious groups in this respect. Sunni-  Alevis, Muslims- Christians, Muslim 
Kurds- Yezidis are the examples in Middle East to point our as example.  
 
I have raised the question whether there were any conflicts or local fights which was 
labelled as fight of Zazas and Kurmanjs to mostly elderly interviewees. Only one of the 
elderly interviewees pointed out that his elderlies told him that there was a fight in early 
1900s called ‘şêrr Gulê’ in in Girvas village (Arakonak currently in Turkish) of 
Solhan county. Gulê is a name for women and şerr is fight / war in Zazaki and 
Kurmanji. He added;  
The fight broke out because Gulê (who is a Kird / Zaza from Solhan) was married 
to Miheme (a Kurmanj from neighbouring villages with Muş province). They had a 
fight and the husband used violence against his wife Gulê. Gulê left for her family 
in her Zaza village and her large family went take her revenge. There, the two sides 
had a big fight but there were not any fatalities. It was later resolved via a 
peacemaker that had that function in the society”.535   
 
The woman has a stronger position in Kird / Zaza community compared with the 
Kurmanj community locally in Çewlig / Bingöl area. The above battle between Kird 
/ Zazas and Kurmanjs could be borrowed as an example to back up this argument. In 
                                                 




patriarchal societies of the region, this woman would be advised to back to her 
husband and respect him.  
 
4.4.2 The Identity in Oral History and Folklore 
Oral History is generally an important resort to look at for such local identities. One of 
the ways in transferring the culture and local identities is to explore folklore of these 
regions. Heci Xelil Agha, the carismatic leader of Çomergi tribe in Solhan, one Çewlig/ 
Bingöl’s town in an interview with Yusuf Ziya Döger (a sociligist and writer from the 
same area) talks about how they were naming themselves and the Kurmnajs locally;  
We always named ourselves ‘Kird’ locally along with Çewlig/ Bingöl, Dara Yêni 
(another town of the province, Genç as Turkish administrative name), Hani, Dicle, Egil, 
Lice and Palu. We also had a few Kirdasi or Kurmanj families such as Cibran, Xalit 
Beg and Hesenan families Solhan. Kirds and Kurmanjs always lived together with no 
problems here. During the revolt of Sheikh Said, Kird and Kurmanjs of this area and 
Xarpêt (Kurdish name for Elazig) acted together fighting the state.536 
 
Personalities such as Heci Xelil Agha are important for their oral history contribution 
for such a study as in how the locals identified themselves historically. In one of my 
field interviews, Dayê Mehbê spoke of her story;  
We have always known ourselves here in the region as Kirds and the Kurmanji 
spaeakers as Kirdas or Kurmanjs. I am aware that Kurds is a term that includes both 
Kurmanjs and us. Our region is called Kurdistan and our leader was Sheikh Said who 
was killed by our enemy state. The Turkish state will never allow our rights and they 
want our grand children to forget our language. I cannot speak Turkish and I would 
never want to speak in any language other than Kirdki with my grandchildren.537 
 
There is a rich folklore in Çewlig/ Bingöl and it stands one the most important elements 
of the local identity of the area.538 Culture in broader function, is the base for a group 
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of people to come together on the basis of a common interest, feeling and belonging. 
Kaya suggests that these are the elements that make an identity.539 The researches state 
that folk dances have, in centuries, developed gradually and found their current styles. 
We understand that the dance tradition dates back to old centuries by observing 
sculpture and wall embellishments in Anatolia.540 There are specific names to these 
dances in Anatolia and Mesopotamia areas. The dominant dance style in Çewlig / 
Bingöl, Diyarbakir, Mus, Elazig and Bitlis is ‘halay’.541 ‘Delilo’ is another important 
dance that is played in Çewlig / Bingöl and in its surrounding areas. Although it is the 
same dance it still has some specific differences in its moves compared with the broader 
region.542 Okan Alay argues that Çewlig / Bingöl’s dance style copies its moves from 
the geographic character of the province. The region has range of high mountains and 
they line up around Çewlig / Bingöl. During the dance, people line up in a dance row. 
Dance moves are usually quick and sharp.543‘Çepik’, ‘Kartal’ and ‘Qila Çep’ dances 
are good examples of the above argued lines. They are quick, sharp and harsh dances. 
Elderly people have to stop playing it after certain age as the quick rhythms could be 
harmful if the player is not fit enough.544 
 
The folklore in Çewlig / Bingöl is in many ways has its own characteristic style, 
especially with its traditional celebration dance. The wedding celebrations are the main 
arena for such performances. The over all style is still vastly in line with the broader 
Kurdish dance but it has some regional specific moves that are only seen in Çewlig 
/Bingöl.  
 
4.4.3 Cultural Celebrations: The Practice of Identity 
One of the most important definers that differentiate one ethnic group to another is the 
cultural activity. Smith points out culture as an important element when he discusses 
                                                 
539 Kaya, The Zaza Kurds of Turkey, p. 146. 
540 Ruhi, U. Türk Halk Oyunlari / Turkish Folklore, Kültür Bakanligi / Culture Ministry, Ankara, 1994, 
p. 8. 
541 Alay, Kültür Dünyamizda Bingöl, p. 149. 
542 Interview conducted with Cihan Encu, a dance teacher at the Cigerxwin Cultural Centre, a branch of 
Diyarbakir Municipality who is originally from Çewlig / Bingöl in my 2012 summer field trip. This 
centre is a prominent one in terms of Kurdish Movement’s cultural activities where they thought a variety 
of cultural activities to the pupils from local Kurdish (Kurmanj and Zaza) families.  
543 Alay, Kültür Dünyamizda Bingöl, p .149. 
544 Interview conducted with elderly local H. Mihemed on my summer 2012 filed trip in Genç, a town of 





the formation of an ethnic group. He continues; “the most shared or differentiated areas 
are language and religion. Furthermore, traditions, institutions, laws, folklore, 
architecture, clothing, music and art and /or differences in colours and physical 
appearances can be decisive.545  
 
Religion is an important element in Kird / Zazas identity formation. Religion was 
mentioned vastly in the previous sections of this thesis and therefore it will not be 
covered in detail again. Family, similar to many other traditional ethnic groups in the 
region, holds an important role in Kird / Zazas culture. This society is a vastly 
patriarchal society and traditional. On the other hand, those who live in urban areas 
change their lifestyle and give more importance to modern education. Despite being 
modernised, marriages and forming a family in a traditional style are still important in 
the local culture in Çewlig / Bingöl. The families still play the main role in these cultural 
activities. Asking for a girl to marry, engagement, marriage ceremonies processes are 
still arranged by two side’s families. Compared with Kurmanjs, polygamy is less 
common among the Kird / Zazas in Çewlig / Bingöl.546 The wife is usually chosen from 
a similar social class. Kaya argues that, therefore, kin marriages can be a common trend 
in certain areas. 547  Especially in the rural and traditional areas, the number of 
endogamy-trended marriages can be seen more. One of the important reasons for this 
is, because the individuals and families do not want to become separated and smaller 
families in a traditional economy structure. Endogamy would help to keep the land in 
the same great family and also keep the family ‘together’. Therefore, there are still a 
considerable number of cousin or second cousin marriages among Kird / Zazas. This is 
sometimes due to will of the two individuals and sometimes it is their families’ demand.  
The traditional trend is decreasing in number, as there is a shift from traditional to 
modern life style. The kin marriage is less than previous decades in the Kird / Zaza 
society.  
 
Engagement parties, marriage parties, Newroz Celebration548 are the main celebrations 
and those who attend perform the traditional dance. Majority of the society know how 
                                                 
545 Smith, A., Uluslarin Etnik Kökeni, Istanbul: Dost Kitapevi, 2003, p. 51. 
546 Çaglayan, Ercan. Tarih, Kültür ve Kimlik, Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayinlari, 2016, p. 129. 
547 Kaya, The Zaza Kurds of Turkey, p. 227. 
548 Newroz is a spring celebration that is celebrated throughout many middle-eastern societies, mainly 




to dance the traditional dance. This, in a way, is a celebration of identity. There is a rich 
list of dance styles played in Çewlig / Bingöl such as; govend, hilo (kartal), qila çep, du 
ling, hewaye siwarkirina bukê, hewayê xilasbuna dîlanê (vêwi), delilo, çepik, çaçanê 
etc.  
 
Newroz celebrations have become a mass celebration since the Kurdish movement have 
gained a massive support in the last three decades. Especially from 2000s and onwards, 
these celebrations take place with masses of people in the entire Kurdish cities and big 
cities in the west of Turkey where Kurds moved to due to political or economic reasons. 
Newroz is celebrated in Çewlig / Bingöl every year unless there is special case when 
the Turkish state ban these celebrations. It is celebrated also in the towns some years, 
if the political atmosphere is not too tense. The Newroz is usually celebrated right 
before or after the 21th March (the official day for it) in Çewlig / Bingöl. This is to 
allow and encourage the masses to take part in the main celebration in Amed / 
Diyarbakir on every 21th of March. Amed / Diyarbakir is seen as ‘the capital of 
Kurdistan’ and the celebration there is named ‘the final celebration’ every year. The 
shift from a traditional celebration to political style celebration is a visible indication of 
politicisation of identity in the region. This goes hand in hand with “the political pulling 
game” between the Kurdish Movement and the Turkish State over Çewlig / Bingöl. In 
this case, Çewlig / Bingöl is being “pulled” towards Kurdishness and its symbol city 
Amed / Diyarbakir by the Kurdish Movement. 
 
4.4.4 The Evaluation of Modes of Cultural Identity 
Groups of people in the eastern part of Turkey/Turkish Kurdistan name themselves 
depending on where they come from; what are their ethnicity and religious views and 
what language or dialect they speak and finally what are their tribal structure and other 
factors. In the eastern part of Turkey, there are Arabs, Turks, Turkomans, Kurds, 
Kurmanjs, Zazas (Kird, Kirmanc, Dimilî), Asuris, Yezidis, Alevis as names to identify 
different group people. 
 
                                                 
many parts of Turkish Kurdistan until the PKK movement started its political activities and mobilisation. 
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to ‘legally’ celebrate in 2000 in masses. It is mostly celebrated by the Kurdish movement supporters or 




Zaza as a term is the newer and dominant version that is used for the group of second 
dialect of Kurds in Turkey after the bigger dialect of Kurmanji of Kurdish. Historically, 
Kird/ Kirdkî, Kirmanc / Kirmanckî and Dimilî / Dimilkî were used for this group of 
people depending on which area they were residing. The term Zaza was the version, 
which mostly used in Elazig province, that is currently majorly Turkified.549 The fact 
that the dominant word in naming themselves is Zazas and / or Kurmanjs would not 
mean that they necessarily differ in ethnicity. A similar situation is the case in other 
parts of ‘greater Kurdistan’. In Iraqi Kurdistan, Sorani, Badini, Hawrami are used more 
than Kurd(s) as term to identify them internally. The term ‘Kurds’ is often used in the 
international arena, not only by the non-Kurds but also by the Kurds themselves. There 
is a very similar situation in Iranian Kurdistan as well. Interestingly, the Kurds of each 
part would rather call the Kurds of other parts as ‘Kurds’; they would not go into further 
details of which group (Kurmanj, Soran, Zaza, Badini, Hawrami, Goran etc.) of Kurds.  
 
The Zazakî speaking population is mainly based in Eastern and South- Eastern Turkey. 
There is also a considerable Zaza population in Marmara, Aegean and in mid-Anatolia 
due to the population move, mainly in last few decades. The state had forced some 
groups of Zazakî speaking people to move to the western cities in Turkey following the 
Sheikh Said (1925) and Seyyid Riza’s uprisings (1938). The main Zaza cities are 
Çewlig/Bingöl, Dersim (Tunceli), Diyarbakir, Elaziğ, Erzurum, Sivas, Urfa, Bitlis, Mus, 
Siirt and Adiyaman. There are Zaza speakers also in Malatya, Kayseri, Nigde, Aksaray, 
Kars, Ardahan and Gümüshane. Due to the population move during the 1960s and 
onwards, there are Zazas in main Turkish cities such as Istanbul, Bursa, Izmir, Kocaeli, 
Sakarya, Ankara, Konya, Mersin, Antalya, Adana, Gaziantep and Osmaniye today. 
Besides, they also moved to live in western European countries.  
 
The practice of cultural identity among the Kird / Zazas changes depending on their 
political position. If an individual or a family is sided by the Kurdish movement, the 
local traditional cultural codes seen as an identity element to look up to. It could be 
argued that this is the case for all the cultural practices such as food culture, clothing, 
dance, celebrations etc. On the other hand, those who support the Turkish state, will 
follow all the state dominated practises. They would watch the pro- state TV, look up 
                                                 




the dominant Turkish culture as an upper identity form and will try to imitate that. The 
Turkish state and its institutions use every means of propaganda tools. The Turkish TV 
series have become important ‘tools’ for injecting the Turkish Culture for last two 
decades. They are professionally produced and they play an important role in the 
cultural assimilation, now also outside of Turkish State territories such as Middle East, 
Balkans, some old Soviet territory countries and Arab countries. They are also 




This thesis has explored Kird/Zaza identity politics in in Çewlig/Bingöl in the period 
1980-2015. It did so by focusing primarily on Çewlig /Bingol as a case study. It also 
looked at oter Zaza populated areas in Turkey and especially the Kurdish region in 
Turkey. The thesis resorted to a variety of research methods, namely ethnographic 
fieldwork which I carried out in Turkey, Sweden, and Germany for a period three years, 
conducted intermittently between 2011 and 2014. 
 
This thesis has argued that identity construction shift in Çewlig/Bingöl has led to the 
creation of a space in which identity is discussed on collective and individual levels.  It 
challenged the traditional ways of self-identifying by focusing not only on the group in 
question and how they identify themselves, but also by looking at the different players 
who are manipulating those discussions for their political interests. The localist trend is 
being merged with the political actors in identity discussions arena, and this tendency 
brings a complex self-identifying process. The Kird/Zaza identity construction process 
is an on-going development that is at a crossroad in Çewlig/ Bingöl. It is a process in 
which multi political players take part. Thereby, the amalgamation of challenges 
discussed earlier leads to this specific identity construction. A number of internal and 
external dynamics shapes identity construction process in the context of Çewlig/Bingöl. 
Moreover, the political actors in this identity route have different interests, and 






Additionally, this thesis argued that the Turkish state started pursuing their interest of 
assimilating the Kurds since the establishment of Turkey in 1923. Even though the 
Kurds have fought against ‘the common enemy’ along with the Turks during the 
Turkish War of Independence between 1919 and 1922, led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha 
(later known as Mustafa Kemal Ataturk).550 After the establishment of Republic of 
Turkey, the Kurds demanded their rights, but the Turkish leaders consistently denied 
their promise which was to create a Kurdish autonomous administration. Consequently, 
tensions have led to endless conflict in the decades that followed. 
  
To further contextualize the Kird/Zaza identity issue, this thesis provided a historical 
background in the second chapter, which primarily revisited the Sheikh Said and Seyyid 
Riza revolts. These were major rebellions that begun in mainly Zaza populated areas of 
Çewlig/Bingöl and Dersim/Tunceli. However, the Turkish state took a punitive position 
and suppressed the series of uprisings in Kurdish regions. Due to the brutal response of 
Turkish government against Kurdish revolts, there was a “period of silence” for over 
two decades, following the 1938 Seyyid Riza Dersim rebellion.551 Furthermore, the 
Turkish state has adopted a strict security policy towards its Kurdish population. For 
instance, the Turkish state banned speaking in Kurdish, and it advanced its assimilation 
policies in the Kurdish regions, east and southeast of Turkey. The single party era of 
Republican People`s Party (CHP) came to an end in 1950 when the Democrat Party 
(DP) won the first multi-party elections held in young Turkish Republic’s history. This 
radical transition has lead towards an era of more space for different political activities, 
particularly for Kurds, from the 1960s and onwards. It can be said that the seeds of 
Kurdish movements’ revival were spread from the 1950s onwards, following the two 
decades silent era since the defeat of Seyyid Riza rebellion in 1938. These seeds began 
to grow, and Kurdish movements appeared on the Turkish political stage again. In this 
era, the Kurds firstly affiliated themselves with some Turkish leftist groups that 
opposed the regime. Since the 1970s, the Kurds found their own political institutions. 
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In 1978, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) was founded. It started to dominate the 
Kurdish political field vastly.  Among the founding group of the PKK, there were 
members from Cewlig/Bingol such as M. Hayri Durmus, Mehmet Karasungur and 
Mazlum Dogan. This factor functioned as strong connection between the PKK and 
Çewlig/Bingöl. 
 
Furthermore, this chapter drew on historical literature to elucidate the case of 
Kird/Zazas. The few historical sources on the Zazas in Turkish, Arabic and European 
literature are worthy for exploring the historical background of this complex identity 
issue. The majority of the references available about Zazas suggest that they were seen 
as a sub-group of Kurdish identity. Furthermore, the way that Kird/Zazas of 
Çewlig/Bingöl identified themselves until recently also indicates that they were closely 
related to broader Kurdishness. 552  These historical findings support the Kurdish 
movements’ argument, suggesting that the Zazas are a Kurdish group, and Zazaki is a 
Kurdish dialect. Since the 1980s, there are Zaza individuals and groups, both in 
diaspora and at home country, attempting to take part in their own identity construction 
as a subject of ‘building their identity’ process. This is a reactionary position towards 
the other two main politically interested groups, the Kurdish movement and the Turkish 
state. 
 
Following historical examination of Kird/Zaza identity, the third chapter of the thesis 
ventured to discuss/study the current and ongoing political battle over the Kird/Zaza 
identity in Çewlig/Bingöl. In particular, the third chapter looked at the Turkish state 
vested interest in the Zaza identity issue, its official discourse, and other assimilating 
strategies. The findings of this chapter is the ‘winner’ of this identity battle is still not 
decided, and it might take decades until this process of identity construction settles. The 
Turkish state has a vested interest in keeping its position in this identity debate. 
Although it did not succeed turning Çewlig/Bingöl into another Elazig province and 
Turkify it with its assimilation strategies, the Turkish state attempts to at least persuade 
the people of Çewlig/Bingöl that they are not Kurds. The Turkish state considers it as 
a ‘win win’ case to apply its Elazig model to Çewlig/Bingöl. This strategy would either 
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work directly and Turkify the locals of Çewlig/Bingöl or at least convince them that 
they are not Kurds, both of which at the same time, will serve the state’s divide and rule 
for its broader Kurdish issue. In doing so, the Turkish state uses its institutions such as 
education, language policies, and religion policies in the region. All these elements turn 
into valuable assimilation instruments in favor of the Turkish state. 
 
In the formal state discourse, the Zazas are now used alongside the Turks, Kurds, and 
Lazes as separate group of people, different from the Kurds. This will serve the Turkish 
state’s divide and rule policies for its century-long Kurdish question. The Kurmanjs are 
pointed out as the Kurds; the name Kurmanjs is used less and less in the political 
terminology. This is done for a systematic political purpose to allow the term Kurd 
being affiliated with Kurmanji speakers only, at least in Turkey. Thus, the ‘other’ to 
point out for Kurmanjs/Kurds would be the Zazas and vice versa. The term “Kurd” was, 
historically, the unifier term to include Kurmanjs and Zazas under the same umbrella, 
as ‘us’ in Turkish part of Kurdistan. The unifier word “Kurd” is being deconstructed by 
the Turkish state in a way that excludes Zazas from this category. The state does this 
for its divide and rule tactics. 
 
The Turkish state’s political engineers use education and language as two strong tools 
for their assimilation plans over Zaza population. The age of education in Turkey is 
now as young as three including the majority areas of Zazas. The pre-school classes are 
being promoted and many families send their children to these classes. The language in 
all the education levels is strictly only Turkish. Zazaki and Kurmanji (Kurdish) alonf 
with other languages is banned as an education language. As a result of this assimilation 
policy, the use of Zazaki language among new generation, who were born in 2000s, is 
decreasing dramatically. Zazaki is under serious threat as it was classified as 
‘vulnerable’ in the UNESCO’s Atlas of World Languages.553 The pro-Zaza groups that 
claim Zazas are not Kurds do not carry out any significant work to preserve the Zazaki, 
which they claim that it is not a dialect of Kurdish but it is a language on its own. It is 
the pro-Kurdish Zazas, who see Zazaki as a dialect of Kurdish, have considerable 
studies to preserve and improve Zazaki language. The most known group of this field 
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is Vate Studies Group that works as a group of intellectuals to standardise Zazaki. They 
stress that language is an important pillar of identity and pointed out that, without the 
linguistic side of it, an identity would be diminished. 
 
The Turkish state used to have a more direct and physical assimilation policies in 
education and language policy in the Kurdish region throughout the 20th century. The 
sate did this, in some cases and decades, as far as banning the use of language in public 
space and even in private spaces like local shops. Towards the end of 20th century and 
in the 21st century, the state started to apply its language and assimilation policies in a 
softer way.  
 
Çewlig/Bingöl area is majorly known with its conservative religious demography. 
Following the 1980 army coup in Turkey, conservative parties gain further strength in 
the Turkish political arena. This was the case in eastern and southeastern provinces like 
Çewlig/Bingöl too. At the same time the PKK’s appearance was gaining further 
strength in the region. The PKK is a leftist and socialist movement. The Turkish state 
used the argument of PKK’s non-religious ideology being a threat to the locals’ 
religious belief. When the current government of Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
took power with its political Islamist ideology in 2002, it also used this argument 
extensively. The AKP, in its first decade of power, succeeded in its economic policies 
and became a powerful government, where the party begun to take the absolute control 
of all state institutions such as army, judiciary, education and foreign policy. This was 
the first time in the Republic of Turkey that a political Islamist party becomes this 
powerful within the state, and it can be said that some religious group of people in 
Kurdish region and in Turkey supported this new political atmosphere in Turkey.  
 
In an attempt of pointing Elazig province case as the way out for Çewlig/Bingöl by the 
Turkish state, which was indeed to Turkify Çewlig/Bingöl province, would see a 
political reaction. The Kurdish movement came up with its reactionary position against 
this political goal of the Turkish state. The Kurdsih Movement argued that, Kird/Zazas 
are Kurds, and this was a historic reality according to the Kurdish movement. The Zaza-
ist group did not exist in the political identity discussions in Turkey prior to 1980s. It 




Kurdish movement in Turkey. If it is considered that Elazig is a role model for the 
Turkish state, it is Amed/Diyarbakir that the Kurdish movement desires as a solution 
role model for Çewlig/Bingöl as a political identity option. There is a considerable pro-
Kurdish movement of Kird/Zaza population in Diyarbakir province which strengths the 
argument of the Kurdish movement that the Zazaki speaking group of people are Kurds 
who speak a dialect of Kurdish.  
 
The Kird/Zazas of Çewlig/Bingöl, at the crossroad of politicised identity discussions, 
begun to have a say in their own identity construction. The division engineered by the 
Turkish state historically seems to gain some ground in this identity process. There are 
different political views among the locals of Çewlig/Bingöl reflecting all the three 
political identity stances. This is a result of these identity constructing political projects, 
especially of the two main political rivals on the ground. The political battle between 
the Turkish state and the Kurdish movements has gained support among the locals. The 
reason why Turkish state’s stance gathered support is mainly an economically liberating 
one; those who side themselves with the state have an easier and prosperous life. On 
the other hand, those who support the Kurdishness and Kurdish movement face various 
difficulties. They are those who are disadvantageous group in everyday life dealing 
with the state. Their stance is the more political one, which chooses identity position as 
opposed to leading an ‘easy life’.554 
 
The older generation does not have much hope that the Kurdish movement can defeat 
the Turkish state and change ‘Kurdish fate’ in the Turkish part of Kurdistan. They 
usually point out the Sheikh Said revolt’s defeat, as a reference in this context. In other 
words, they mean that even if the great Sheikh Said was not able to defeat the Turkish 
state, how anyone else can do so. Furthermore, the older generation is more religious 
and conservative, and they give great importance to the religious and tribal leaders. The 
PKK lead movement, on the contrary, believes the revolution can only be possible from 
ground and including all the classes of society, as in the socialist paradigm. Therefore, 
the youth tends to side more with the Kurdish movement while the older generation 
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tends to side with the Turkish state, at least in the legal politics arena. The PKK-led 
movement mainly mobilises through the NGOs, which again, goes hand in hand with 
the leftist style mobilisation of leftist movements. It has been a space that the PKK has 
used extensively in reaching its target area of society.  
 
Having examined the current conflict of Kird/Zaza identity between the Turkish state 
and the Kurdish movement, the fourth and final chapter paid attention to the economic 
aspects of the Zaza identity and how it shapes it. Moreover, it looked at the liminal 
status of the Zaza, that is, being positioned between Turkish and Kurdish discourses of 
identity. The local identity dynamics has its economic dimensions too. This research 
found that different political stances choose to interact with different provinces in the 
region. The pro-Kurdish group choses Diyarbakir when they need to go for greater 
market city in the region while the pro-Turkish group choses to go to Elazig for similar 
purposes. The motivations behind this is usually either “our money should not go to the 
‘separatists’” (addressing the Kurdish movement by the pro-Turkish state group) or “we 
should have our own internal economic structure” (addressing to the pro-Kurdish 
movement followers should have an internal economic dynamics).The pro-Kurdish 
group believes that the Turkish state applies a ‘negative discrimination’ towards its 
Kurdish population and stronghold cities of Kurdish movement. Therefore, they believe 
that by having these economic relations they will side with their identity and support 
their movement.  
 
The Zaza population in general and in Çewlig/Bingöl position differs depending on 
general developments and overall identity dynamics in the region and Turkey. For some, 
those are less involved in politics; the Zazaness has become a more folkloric identity. 
This is in a way a nostalgic way of stressing their identity. They see the cultural pillar 
of identity as common space with other Zazas. This is the group that seen as less 
‘harmful’ by the state and there is an open space for their non-political activities. 
Referring back to earlier parts of this thesis, the political identity discussions had started 
by the Turkish state itself and therefore it desires to be the only identity constructer in 
the field. This brought the Kurdish movement into this battle with its counter position 
to the state’s idea. The results of the 1980 army coup have started to re-shape the 




started forming political or intellectual groups. These groups were mainly politically 
motivated and therefore they took even a greater part from a distance about the identity 
battle over their own identity in their home country. The Kird/Zazas started to play a 
role in their own identity construction process from the 1980s. It is a process that still 
is in search of its direction in the coming decades. As it constantly has different political 
players involved in this ‘pulling battle’, it will remain undecided, and identity will 
therefore most likely not be homogenous. These three main stances over Kird/Zaza 
identity will remain for a while, as there is the ground for their own arguments about 
the identity formation in Çewlig/Bingöl. The main reason to this is the political 
approach of the Turkish state, which still desires to assimilate its ‘others’, especially its 
Kurdish population.  
 
The latter part of the fourth chapter also studied cultural, religious, and ethnic elements 
of identity construction. The ethnic, cultural and religious pillars of identity are 
expected to be the unifier elemnts for a group of people in Middle Eastern style societies. 
However, they seem to have become sources of disagreement in Çewlig/Bingöl case. It 
is the cultural pillar of identity that seems to still be able to bring more people togeteher 
on common ground in Çewlig/Bingöl. Ethnic belonging of some Zazas is being played 
on by the Turkish state’s assimilation policies. Therefore the future generation of those 
groups might not consider themselves as Zazas any longer. In order to be able to use it 
as assimilitaion tool, religion has become vastly politicised by the Turkish state. This 
reserch argues that the Turkish state with its new ‘owners’, the AKP government, with 
its politicised Islam ideology is taking a more apparent stance in this identity 
constructing dynamics locally in Çewlig/ Bingöl. The AKP-led Turkish state, with all 
its institutions, is not practising harsh policies, unlike the Kemalist regime, especially 
in Sunni Islam dominant Çewlig/Bingöl. Even though it pursues its society engineering 
plans over identity politics in a softer way. While the way the AKP approaches the 
Zazas is softer, the ultimate goal is still the old Turkish state approach, which is to 
assimilate or divide and rule.  
 
The ‘us’ and ‘them’ elements in Çewlig/Bingöl still hold many angles to it. It is still 
being discussed, measured and is undecided. As the Kurdish Question is still as 




discussions in parallel with the Kurdish Question. Along with the internal developments, 
it is also the global developments such as the identity trends in the region and in the 
world, the developments of Kurdish Question in the neighbouring countries and 
political changes in Turkish republic will decide the direction of this hot political debate. 
As it stands, the tendency of building the Kird/Zaza identity among the locals is 
trending. The Zazas might have different and diverging political views of ‘who we are’ 
and ‘what makes us who we are’ but this does not distance them from the current issue 
of constructing their identity, mainly based on the cultural grounds.  
 
Ultimately, this thesis argues that the formation of Kird/Zaza identity is not only the 
outcome of local discourses that is Kird/Zazas’ way of imagining their community. In 
addition, it is also highly dependent on external forces and discourses, namely the 
Turkish state and the Kurdish movement’s aspirations and attempts to use the political 
capital of Kird/Zazas. The construction of Kird/Zaza identity has been in a constant 
shift over the last four decades. The literature and field research suggest that the 
direction of this identity formation will continue to depend on the socio-political 
developments. Furthermore, this thesis argues that unless there will be a Kurdish state 
emerging in the region the fate of Zaza identity formation will depend solely on whether 
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Kurdish National Awareness, ‘in Vali, A., (ed.), Essays on the origins of Kurdish 
Nationalism, Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2003. 
Bruinessen, Martin von., Kürdistan Üzerine Yazilar, trans. By N. Kiraç, Istanbul, Iletișim 
Yayinlari, 2002.  
Bruinessen, Martin von.. Bruinessen, Martin van. `Race, Culture, Nation and Identity 





Politics_in_Turkey_Some_Comments (Last accessed 12 May 2017). 
Bruinessen, Martin van. ‘Aslini inkar eden haramzadedir! The debate on the ethnic identity 
of the Kurdish Alevis’, in Kehl-Bodrogi, K., Kellner-Heinkele, B., and Otter-
Beaujean, A., (eds.), Syncretictic Religious Communities in the Near East: 
Collective Papers of the Symposium, Berlin, and Leiden: Brill, 1997. 
Bruinessen, Martin von.. "Genocide in Kurdistan? The suppression of the Dersim rebellion 
in Turkey (1937-38) and the chemical war against the Iraqi Kurds (1988)", in: 
George J. Andreopoulos (ed), Conceptual and historical dimensions of genocide, 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994. 
Bruinessen, Martin von.. Agha, Sheikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of 
Kurdistan, London: New Jersey, 1992. 
Bruinessen, Martin von.. Kurdish society, nationalism and ethnicity, refugee problems,in  
Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl (eds.) The Kurds: a contemporary 
overview. London: Routledge, 1992.  
Bryman, A., and Burgess, R. G. Analysing Qualitative Data, London: Routledge, 1994. 
Bulut, Faik. Kürt Sorununda Çözüm Arayısları: Devlet ve Parti Raporlari, Yerli ve Yabanci 
Oneriler, Istanbul: Ozan Yayıncılık, 1998.  
Buran, Ahmet, Doğu Anadolu Ağizlari Uzerine Bir Inceleme, Ankara: Anadolu Basin 
Birliği Milli Bütünlük ve Kültür Yayinlari, 1985. 
Buran, Ahmet., Çak, Berna Yüksel. Türkiye’de Diller ve Etnik Gruplar, Ankara: Akçağ 
Yayınları, 1.edition, 2012. 
Burkay, Kemal. Seçme Yazılar-1, Istanbul: Deng Yayinlari, 1995.  
Burkay, Kemal. Kürtler ve Kürdistan, Diyarbakır: Deng Yayınları, 4. Baskı, 2008. 
Campanile, Giuseppe, Kurdistan Tarihi, Istanbul: Avesta Yayinlari, 2009. 
Carr, Edward Hallett, What is History?, New York, Basingstoke,1961. 
Cengiz, Seyfi. Diş Kaynaklarda Kirmanclar, Kizilbaşlar ve Zazalar, Ankara: Desmala 
Sure Yayinlari, 1995. 
Ciment, James. The Kurds, state and minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, (New York, 1996). 
Creswell, J., W. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design, London: Sage Publication, 1998. 
Creswell, John. W. Research Design, Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 




Creswell, John. W. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: choosing among five 
traditions, London: Sage Publications, 1998 
Creswell, J., W. Research Design. 2nd Ed, London: Sage Publication, 2003. 
Cronin, Stephanie. Tribal Politics in Iran; Rural conflict and the new state 1921-1941. 
London: Royal Asiatic Society Books, (2006), 
Cagaptay, Soner. Islam, secularism, and nationalism in modern Turkey: who is a Turk?, 
London : Routledge, 2006. 
Can, Fatih, M. and Pirim, Lokman, Bingol Investment Opportunities, Bingol: KREATIF 
MEDYA 2011. 
Çağlayan, Ercan, Osmanli Belgelrinde Zazalar ve Zazaca Üzerine Notlar, Uluslarasi Dil 
Zaza Dili Sempozyumu [13 - 14 May 2011], Bingol Universitesi Yayinlari, Ankara, 
2011. 
Çaglayan, Ercan. Tarih, Kültür ve Kimlik, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayinlari, 
2016. 
Casier, Marlies and Jongerden, Joost, Nationalism and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, 
Kemalism and the Kurdish Issue, New York: Routledge, 2011  
Cemal, Hasan, Kürtler, Istanbul, Doğan Kitap, 2003 
Çandar, Cengiz. Dağdan İniş-PKK Nasıl Silah Bırakır?, TESEV Yayınları, 2011 
Çağlayan, Ercan, Zaza Tarihinin Kaynaklari [Arap ve Fars Kaynaklari], Bingol: 
Uluslararasi Zaza Tarihi ve Kültürü Sempozyumu [4- 6 May 2012], , 2012     
Celik, Ayse, Betul. Migrating Onto Identity: Kurdish Mobilization Through Associations 
In Istanbul, unpublished PhD thesis, Graduate School of Binghamton University, 
State University of New York, 2002.  
Çem, Munzur Çem, Antolojîye Hîkayanê Kirmanckî (Zazakî), Istanbul: Sida, 1991. 
Çem, Munzur, Dersim Merkezli Kürt Aleviligi, Etnisite, Dini inanç, Kültür ve Direniş, 
Istanbul: Vate, 2009. 
Çiçek, Cuma, ‘Kurdish identity and political Islam under AKP rule’, Research and Policy 
on Turkey, 2:1 (2016), 147-163 
Coryn, C. L., Beale, J. M., and Myers, K. M. `Response to September 11: anxiety, 
patriotism, and prejudice in the aftermath of terror`, Current Research in Social 
Psychology, 9:12, (2004), 165–184 
Denzin, N. and Linkoln, Y.  Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. 




Dedekurban, Ali Haydar, Zaza Halk Inanclari, , Ankara: Zaza Kültürü Yayinlari, 1993. 
Dedekurban, Ali Haydar, Zaza Halk Inançlarinda Türkler, Ankara: Zaza Kültürü Yayinlari, 
1994. 
Delaney, Carol, The Seed and the Soil, Gender and Cosmology in Turkish Village Society, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. 
Dersimi, Nuri, Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim, Istanbul: Doz Yayinlari, 1996. 
Dervis, Kemal and Sherman Robinson. ̀ The Foreign Exchange Gap, Growth and Industrial 
Strategy in Turkey: 1973-1983`, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/492391468779376270/pdf/multi0page.pdf 
(Last accessed 13 August 2016). 
Disney, Donald Bruce, Jr. The Kurdish nationalist movement and external influences, 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36710864.pdf (Last accessed 26 April 2016). 
Diyarbakır: ‘Union of Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia Region Municipalities 
Publication (USARM), 2009. 
Dundar, Fuat, ‘Measuring Assimilation: ‘Mother Tongue’ Question in Turkish Censuses 
and Nationalist Policy’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2014 
Düzgüneş, Orhan, Güney-Doğu Anadolu’nun Tarihi Kültürel, Ekonomik Jeo-Politik ve 
Sosyak Durumu, , Ankara: Turk Ocaklari Merkez Idare Heyeti, 1992. 
Elias, N., Scotson, J.L., The Established and the Outsiders: A Sociological Enquiry into 
Community Problems, London: Sage Publications, 1965 
Entessar, Nader. The Kurdish Conundrum and the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979-2003 
(307-318), In Stanfield, Gareth & Shareef, Mohammed (eds.) The Kurdish Question 
Revisited, Glasgow: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd, 2017. 
Entessar, Nader. Kurdish Ethnonationalism, London: Lexington Books, 1992. 
Ercan, Y. Osmanli Imparatorluğunda Bazi Sorunlarve Günümüze Yansimalari,(Some 
Issues from the Ottoman Empire and Their Reflections in the Present), Ankara: 
Milli Eğitim Basımevi 2002. 
Ergil, Dogu. Kürtleri Anlamak, İstanbul:Timaş Yayınları, 2. Baskı, 2010. 
Eriksen, Thomas, Hylland. Ethnicity and Nationalism Anthropological Perspectives, 




Erman,Tahı̇re and Göker, Emrah. Alevi Politics in Contemporary Turkey, Middle Eastern 
Studies, 36:4, (2000), 99-118,  
Eroz, Mehmet. Doğu Anadolu Hakkinda Sosyo-Kültürel Bir Araştirma, Ankara: Baylan 
Matbaasi, 1973. 
Eroz, Mehmet. Türk Kültürünün Alt Kültür Unsurlarindan Kürtler, KAYSERİ: Erciyes 
Universitesi Yayinlari, 1992. 
Ersoz, Salih Sedat. Bugun Dunden Bir Adim Daha Öndeyiz, 
http://www.memleket.com.tr/bugun-dunden-bir-adim-daha-ondeyiz-17909yy.htm 
(Last accessed 15 February 2017). 
Espar, Ihsan, Dilope Zerri, Istanbul: Vate Yayinlari, 2008. 
Ezzatyar, Ali. The Last Mufti of Iranian Kurdistan Ethnic and Religious Implications in the 
Greater Middle East, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 
Fearon, James D. and Laitin, David D. ‘Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic 
Identity, International Organization’, The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 54:4 (2000), 845–877.  
Evans, Ryan. `The 1980 Coup And A Slow Transition: The Real Turkish Model For 
Egypt?`, 2013, Https://Warontherocks.Com/2013/07/The-1980-Coup-And-A-
Slow-Transition-The-Real-Turkish-Model-For-Egypt/ (Last Accessed 2 October 
2017). 
Firat, M,Serif. Doğu Illeri ve Varto Tarihi, Ankara: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1961. 
Flick, U., Kardorff, E., V., and Steinke, I.  A., Companion to Qualitative Research. London: 
Sage Publication, 2004. 
Fuller, E., F., and Barkey, H., J. Turkey’s Kurdish Question, Maryland: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1998. 
Gambetti, Zeynep and Jongerden, Joost. (eds) The Kurdish Issue in Turkey: A Spatial 
Perspective, Abingdon: Routledge, 2015. 
Gecer, Ekmel. `Media and Democracy in Turkey: The Kurdish Issue`, unpublished PhD 




jspui/bitstream/2134/16450/1/Thesis-2014-Gecer.pdf (Last accessed 8 February 
2017). 
Geri, Maurizio. ‘The Securitization of the Kurdish Minority in Turkey: Ontological 
Insecurity and Elite's Power Struggle as Reasons of the Recent Re-Securitization’, 
Digest of Middle East Studies, 26:1 (2016), 187–202 
Giddens, Anthony. Sociology, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006. 
Giddens, Anthony. The Constitution of Society: Outline of a Theory of Structuration, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984.   
Gokalp, Ziya.  Kürt Asiretleri Hakkinda Sosyolojik Tetkikler, Istanbul: Toker Yayinlari, 
2007. 
Gokalp, Ziya. Kürt Asiretleri Hakkinda Sosyolojik incelemeler, Ankara: Komal Yayinlari, 
1975. 
Gokalp, Ziya. Türkçülüğün Esasları, İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1968. 
Göktürk, Hilmi, Kürtlerin Soy Kütüğü ve Soy Tarihi, Türk Dünyasi Yayinlari, Istanbul, 
1979. 
Gönen, Zeynep. The Politics of Crime in Turkey: Neoliberalism, Police and the Urban Poor, 
London: I. B. Tauris, 2017. 
Gstrein, Heinz. Avukatsiz Halk Kürtler, Turkey: Üçüncü Dünya Yayinlari, 1974. 
Gumus, Burak. ‘THE TURKISH DEBATE ON THE "TUNCELI INCIDENTS", 
International Journal of Arts & Sciences, 5:7 (2012), 459–499.  
Gunter, Michel. M. Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish Issue in Nationalism and Politics in 
Turkey, ed. Marlies Casier and Jost Jongerden, New York: Routledge, 2011. 
Gunter, Michael M. ‘The Kurdish Problem in Turkey’, Middle East Journal, 42:3 (1988), 
389-406. 
Gunter, Michael M. The A to Z of the Kurds, Scarecrow Press, 2009. 
Gündüz, Deniz. Kırmancca/Zazaca Dil Dersleri, Istanbul: Vate Yayınevi, 2. Baskı, 2009.  
Gülensoy, Tuncer. Doğu Anadolu Osmanlicasi, Ankara, Türk Kültürünü Araştirma 
Enstitusu, 1986 
Gülensoy, Tuncer. Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu Ağizlari Üzerine Düsünceler, Ankara: 
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